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ABSTRACT 
 
Theatre and performance have historically been thought of in terms of the temporal 
while visual arts have been consigned to the field of spatial representation. 
Performance’s temporality, the fact that it happens in time, is highlighted in many 
discourses as performance’s greatest asset. This thesis investigates what we can find 
out about performance’s temporality by examining the material conditions of 
production and reception. By placing the focus off the event of performance and 
exploring issues around labour, work and leisure time; the art historical and 
economic relationship of performance and visual art; and the material remains of 
performance, the thesis seeks to reveal how performance’s temporality functions 
within a capitalist society. The research sets performance’s duration against 
different economies of time. It does this within a framework of cultural materialism 
and the materiality of performance while also situating the work art historically. It 
investigates the sites of negotiation between performance and the capitalist 
economy’s temporal logic and interrogates how cultural understandings of time 
affect experiences of attending to performance’s temporality. 
 
In focusing on performance work of both extremely long and short duration, as well 
as more traditionally staged, theatrical performance, the thesis maps out a genealogy 
of performance interested in making its temporality visible and often tangible. 
Placing different art forms alongside performance allows for a symbiotic 
relationship and thus facilitates new and productive ways of thinking about 
temporality and duration. Such an approach also makes it possible to identify any 
blind spots in the theorisations of the temporal in performance studies. The thesis 
thus proposes a re-evaluation of the terms used in discussion on temporality in 
performance with a focus on the social, economic and material relations within the 
production and reception of performance. 
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Introduction 
 
1 Begin to begin 
The audience has arrived in the theatre in good time, no one wants to be late, to rush 
in the last minute. The audience goes in, takes their seats. The curtain rises. The 
stage lights come on gradually and reveal that the stage is littered with rubbish. 
Random objects, some of them indistinguishable. The light gets brighter and then a 
scream, after which the lights dim down again, the curtain falls. The audience get up 
from their seats and go home (or leave the theatre at any rate). The performance 
lasted 35 seconds.  
The performers enter the performance area, set up in the gallery. They start 
performing, there are some spectators already. More spectators will arrive during the 
performance’s six hour duration. Some of the spectators will stay for the whole 
duration while others will come in for an hour or two. Some of them will go out and 
come back in again. The performers perform according to the rules set up for them 
in the structure of their game. They get tired and ideas get scrambled in their heads. 
They get hysterical.  
These two performances are Samuel Beckett’s 1969 play Breath and Forced 
Entertainment’s 12am: Awake and Looking Down from 2003. Describing them here 
serves a few purposes. Firstly, to point out, perhaps slightly crudely, the obvious 
fact that theatre (and performance) is a temporal medium and that it is full of 
temporal markers. It is also to point out that despite (or because of) being at 
opposite ends of duration (one of them very short and the other very long when 
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compared to standard theatrical duration), both Breath and 12am: Awake and 
Looking Down display an interest in playing with (and testing) time.  
They of course offer different approaches to their temporal markers. In 
Breath we see a more conventional theatre where audience members know to arrive 
at the right time (that is to say, there is a right time to arrive) and experience the 
performance from its beginning (the curtain rising) to the end (the curtain falling). 
The scream is the middle, and also the climax, and the audience leaves knowing that 
the performance is over.
1
 In 12am: Awake and Looking Down, the audience 
members know when the performance starts and finishes but they also might know 
that they do not need to be there for the whole duration. They structure their own 
time while the performers structure theirs.  
Secondly, I start with these performances because they represent a host of 
performance practices from different periods that show a shared interest in testing 
the conventions of theatrical duration. Describing them here serves to bracket the 
focus in the thesis in a specific period in contemporary performance practices and 
highlights the different sites of performance (from stages in theatres to gallery 
spaces and beyond) that this study discusses. 
This thesis, then, is about time. At its heart are two central research 
questions: Firstly, what is the relationship between capitalist production and its 
methods from the 1960s onwards and the material conditions of performance’s 
temporality during that time? And secondly, can a focus on the materiality of 
performance change the way we view the relationship between performance and 
time? In answering these questions, this study has the following main aims: 1. to 
                                                          
11
 Breath was originally written for an erotic revue show Oh! Calcutta directed by Kenneth Tynan 
and was therefore meant as a short sketch of a much longer show. 
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develop a new approach to understanding performance in terms of its wider material 
conditions; 2. to outline a diverse mode of engagement based on the historically 
developed relationship between labour and performance; 3. to make a distinct 
contribution to interdisciplinary research in performance studies that will enable 
performers and researchers alike to re-evaluate their position at the centre of a 
network of time, temporality and materials bounded by the ways in which 
performance is commoditised. 
In her book Performance: Live Art since the 1960s, RoseLee Goldberg 
articulates a very common notion in performance studies when she asserts: ‘It is the 
element of duration, of time, that is at the heart of performance’.2 That performance 
is a temporal medium is often considered one (if not the most important) of 
performance’s strengths. That performance happens in time means that one has to be 
there when it happens. Or to borrow from Adrian Heathfield, performance ‘brings 
us as spectators into a fresh relation: into the now of the enactment, the moment by 
moment of the present’.3 That performance happens in time has been taken to mean 
(by several performance studies scholars and theorists) that performance happens 
only in one time and then disappears. I do not dispute Goldberg’s statement about 
the inherent nature of performance’s temporality. What I am interested in doing in 
this thesis is to examine that temporality and to interrogate the claims that have been 
made about it.  
In order to do so, I employ case studies from various practices. From a live 
art context, I discuss the work of Marina Abramović, Tehching Hsieh and Alastair 
MacLennan, among others. I also examine the more theatre based or traditionally 
                                                          
2
 RoseLee Goldberg, Performance: Live Art since the 1960s (London: Routledge, 2004), p. 34 
3
 Adrian Heathfield, ‘Alive’, Live: Art and Performance, ed. by Adrian Heathfield (London: Tate 
Publishing, 2004), pp. 6-13, (p. 8). 
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staged work of Goat Island, Robert Wilson and Elevator Repair Service. In addition 
to performance practices, I use examples from visual art and sculpture, especially in 
Chapter 1 where I chart a connection historically made between sculpture and 
performance and discuss the work of Robert Morris and Bruce Nauman, as well as 
Andy Warhol and Barnett Newman. I will investigate how these artists employ 
different temporal frames and durations in inviting the audience to attend to the 
event and thus to its duration. This is a question of attunement to the assumption 
that performance time is different or in opposition to real time and thus demands 
that the spectators attune to it in a way that is foreign to ‘real time’ in our ‘real’ 
lives.  
Furthermore, according to this logic, performance and its duration, is, if not 
in direct opposition to capitalism’s time, then at least able to escape the art market. 
In other words, performance resists commodification. I will examine how some 
performance practices approach time in a period of changing labour markets and 
during a cultural and economic shift beginning to take shape in the 1960s. To begin 
with, in this introduction I will examine some ideas around time and temporality, 
both in theatre and in general. I will then discuss the key terms and locate the area of 
research that the thesis focuses on.  
2 Temporalities 
I begin by considering approaches to and ways of thinking about time in the modern 
era more generally and how that is reflected in theatre’s temporality.  Time has been 
and to some degree continues to be approached and felt differently in different 
cultures and in different times. In his essay ‘The Impossibility of the Present: Or, 
from the Contemporary to the Contemporal’, Steven Connor argues that, ‘modern 
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temporality… begins with the replacement, during the late medieval period in 
Europe, of the cyclical, recurrent, or sacred time of religion, with a form of linear, 
progressive and secular time centred not on God but on the State’.4 Increasingly 
time was measured not by natural signs or events but by clocks, a practice 
consolidated during the 17
th
 century. The invention of more and more accurate 
clocks, especially in the 19
th
 century, introduced rhythms that were wholly new. 
Punctuality became a part of good manners and more importantly, new inventions 
such as the railways and factories could function more efficiently as timetables 
started regulating structure and order. Time zones, too, were a part of the process of 
standardisation by modernity. And it was this regularisation that made capitalism 
able to develop rapidly.  
For David Gross, the clock demythologized and historicized static notions of 
mythic or sacred time. Gross writes:  
Mythic atemporality gradually came to be replaced by a sense of continual 
duration that never had to be confronted before. Moreover, this duration was 
experienced not as cyclical but as linear. Like a river that sweeps everything 
with it and lets nothing stand still, time began to be viewed as moving in 
only one direction: from a distant past to an unknown future with the present 
as a continuously vanishing moment in between.
5
  
 
In other cultures, however, varying ideas of time still persisted. In his study of 
Balinese culture, Clifford Geertz describes the eternal present which dominates 
people’s perception of time in Bali. In his essay ‘Person, Time and Conduct in Bali’, 
Geertz notes how the Balinese use a naming system for their fellowmen (dead and 
alive) which detemporalises the conception of time. Furthermore, their calendar 
systems ‘mark and classify the qualitative modalities in terms of which time 
                                                          
4
 Steven Connor, ‘The Impossibility of the Present: Or, from the Contemporary to the Contemporal’, 
in Literature and the Contemporary: Fictions and Theories of the Present, ed. by Roger Luckhurst 
and Peter Marks, (Harlow, Essex: Pearson/Longham, 1999), pp. 15-35 (p. 16). 
5
 David Gross, ‘Temporality and the Modern State’, Theory and Society, Vol. 14, No. 1, 1985, pp. 
53-82 (p. 56). 
11 
 
manifests itself in human experience’.6 The lunar-solar calendar, then, does not ‘tell 
you what time it is; they tell you what kind of time it is’.7 In ‘The Attitude of the 
Algerian Peasant towards Time’, Pierre Bourdieu writes about the Kabyle peasants’ 
‘nonchalant indifference to the passage to time which no one dreams of mastering’.8 
There are no timetables for either work or leisure time and no desire for 
productivity. However, when they are given an increase to their minimal wages 
during an experiment at a factory, the peasants’ desire to work harder and to earn 
more money increased too. What takes place is a transition from event time to clock 
time.
9
 According to Bourdieu, what therefore shapes time and one’s experience of it 
is economic and power relations. 
In theatre, the subject of narrative is one of the more widely examined 
temporal markers. Erika Fischer-Lichte notes that,  
The pursuit of a coherent plot – even if it does not unfold according to the 
‘classical’ pattern of exposition, development, crisis, suspension, and 
denouement – and the psychological development of characters allow the 
audience to experience time as a meaningfully structured arch, in which 
everything that occurs is connected comprehensibly to one another. 
Effectively, everything from beginning to end is justified.
10
 
Fischer-Lichte also points out the importance of rhythm in types of performance: 
‘Even in traditional drama where plot and character development provide the 
leading structural principles, rhythm will be of central importance in the succession 
of scenes, speech, movement, and within individual scenes themselves’.11  
                                                          
6
 Clifford Geertz, The Interpretation of Cultures (New York: Basic Books, 1997), p. 391 
7
Geertz, p. 393 
8
 Pierre Bourdieu, 'The Attitude of the Algerian Peasant Towards Time', in Mediterranean 
Countrymen: Essays in the Social Antropology of the Mediterranean, ed. by Julian Pitt-Rivers (Paris: 
Mouton, 1963), pp. 52-77, (p. 57-8). 
9
 Bourdieu, p. 71 
10
 Erika Fischer-Lichte, The Transformative Power of Performance: A New Aesthetics (London: 
Routledge, 2008), p. 132. 
11
 Fischer-Lichte, p. 133 
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Repetition, too, is part and parcel of theatre’s labour. The repetition begins at 
the very beginning, in the rehearsal process where the citation (often) of a text is 
repeated in the hours it takes to get it right. (In fact, the word ‘rehearsal’ in French is 
the same as ‘repetition’.) After rehearsal comes the run of the production where the 
show is performed night after night. Repetition emerges here as a ‘mechanism of 
remembering and retaining’.12 Despite such repetition, theatre professionals are in 
pains to point out that each performance still manages to remain unique, that the 
same performance is never the same, but always different and you have to be there 
to witness it. Such logic in fact insists on a linear time frame where this time (this 
now happening at the very moment) will never return or repeat.  
In an attempt to trouble such thinking, repetition has also become a 
technique in some contemporary performance practices – think, for example, of Pina 
Bausch’s Café Müller (1978) where a couple repeatedly enact an embrace. The 
woman places the man’s hands on her as they go through a movement pattern where 
the two stand and embrace, then the man holds the woman close to his chest, as if 
ready to carry her. He then lets go, dropping the woman on the floor from where she 
gets up and stands facing the man again. This little static dance happens repeatedly, 
getting faster and faster.  
Or think of Claire Marshall in Forced Entertainment’s Spectacular (2008) 
where she insists on doing her climatic scene over and over. Her attempt at the best 
stage death involves her falling to the ground and writhing, screaming and groaning. 
Robin Arthur’s soliloquy is constantly interrupted by Marshall’s histrionics and her 
subsequent failure to achieve perfection. She gives up each attempt, only to try 
                                                          
12
 Jane Blocker, ‘Repetition: A Skin which Unravels’, in Perform, Repeat, Record: Live Art in 
History, ed. by Amelia Jones and Adrian Heathfield (Bristol: Intellect, 2012), pp. 199-208 (p. 199). 
13 
 
again after a while – a repetition of a thing that cannot be achieved. Try as she 
might, she will not die. Neither do the spectators believe or feel that she will. But in 
her attempts she reveals something essential about theatre and its economy – that the 
difference between repetition, uniqueness and any variance in perceiving such 
notions is always shifting. 
As theatre and its function and position has changed over its hundreds of 
years of history, so has its approach to duration. While ancient Greek theatre was a 
part of ceremonies and rituals lasting several days, the standard duration of two 
hours for a night at the theatre as we know it now is at least partly a product of 
modernity’s drive for a regulated life, a life divided into work and leisure time. 
Jonathan Kalb argues that, ‘Ours is an era of notoriously miniscule attention spans, 
when time has generally become more valuable than money for the social class that 
attends high-profile theatre’.13 Kalb’s statement is an interesting one because he is 
actually conflating two separate but central issues. Firstly, the period that I cover in 
this thesis is indeed often called one of short attention spans where we are 
continually demanded to pay attention to several things at the time. Television, 
radio, internet, advertising, work life and leisure time activities are all increasingly 
taking more and more of our time. We can sit on the sofa with our laptops or smart 
phones while watching television and its fifteen second ads.  Even if we cannot 
physically be in two places at the same time we can at least try and reach the gap 
between places thanks to tools like Skype. Secondly, and partly due to the first point 
Kalb highlights, time has become more sparse and therefore more valuable. Thus 
those with wealth can afford to have more free time. Time, in effect, has become a 
                                                          
13
 Jonathan Kalb, Great Lengths: Seven Works of Marathon Theater (Ann Arbor: Michigan 
University Press, 2011), p. 16. 
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new status symbol. Whether it is the wealthy who attend high-profile theatre is 
debatable but Kalb’s statement does open up a discussion about the economic 
implications of theatre and performance making. I address these issues and discuss 
the standard duration of theatre and its intricacies such as the interval in Chapter 3. 
It might be useful here to trace some of those ways that the type of 
performance I discuss in this thesis has come to be. Peggy Phelan’s account of the 
birth of performance art traces three different historical traditions that performance 
can be said to derive from.
14
 The first of the three narratives describing that history 
is that performance emerges from the history of theatre and begins as a counterpoint 
to realism. The second account states that performance emerges from the history of 
painting and gains its force and focus after Jackson Pollock’s ‘action painting’. And 
finally, the third narrative sees performance as representing a return to 
investigations of the body most fully explored by shamans, yogis and practitioners 
of alternative healing arts. It is the second one I trace in the first chapter as I 
examine how what Pamela Lee terms chronophobia
15
 describes a mood of the 1960s 
and how a concern over time traversed from visual art to performance. In all of 
these narratives, however, it is time which becomes a central concern to 
performance.  
3 Early avant-garde and Gertrude Stein 
In Performance: Live Art since the 60s, RoseLee Goldberg traces a history that 
anticipates Phelan’s narrative which I discussed above. Goldberg traces the history 
of performance art back to the late 19
th
 and early 20
th
 century and to early avant-
                                                          
14
 Peggy Phelan, ‘On Seeing the Invisible: Marina Abramović’s The House with the Ocean View’, in 
Live: Art and Performance, ed. by Adrian Heathfield (London: Tate Publishing, 2004), pp. 16-27, (p. 
21). 
15
 Pamela Lee, Chronophobia: On Time in the Art of the 1960s, 2
nd
 ed., (London: MIT Press, 2006). 
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garde practices from August Strindberg to the Futurists and Surrealists.
16
 In 
Goldberg’s account of performance art’s history performance was a way of 
animating the avant-garde movements’ manifestos and an experiment in audience 
interaction. The early avant-garde interest in time is peculiar to its time. Futurism’s 
fascination with the newly found speed made possible by the modern machine – 
cars, aeroplanes, trains – would seem to anticipate a current permeation of 
technology in our never sleeping society. But I would like to consider for a brief 
moment one of the avant-garde artists in particular. 
In her lecture ‘Plays’, Gertrude Stein writes that the emotional time of the 
audience is different from the emotional time of the play and that this difference is 
endlessly troubling. It is troubling, Stein notes, because one doesn’t know why this 
should be and also why this need not be.  This ‘syncopated time’ of the theatre 
means that ‘your emotion as a member of the audience is never going on at the same 
time as the action of the play’.17 Stein finds a nervousness in theatre and that 
nervousness is due to the different tempos and operations of time that are happening 
at the same time. The role of the arts for Stein is ‘to live in the actual present, that is 
the complete actual present, and to completely express that complete actual 
present’.18 To this end, Stein turns to painting and in particular to landscapes. Stein 
called her plays landscapes where there were no stories but where ‘the essence of 
what happened would be…what made what happened be what it was’.19 In other 
words, the temporal lag (or difference) between the play and the spectator does not 
matter when the play is a landscape ’because landscape does not have to make 
                                                          
16
 RoseLee Goldberg, Performance Art: From Futurism to the Present, 3
rd
 ed. (London: Thames and 
Hudson, 2011). 
17
 Gertrude Stein, ‘Plays’, in Theater of the Avant-Garde 1890-1950: A Critical Anthology, ed. by 
Bert Cardullo and Robert Knopf (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2001), pp. 450-465, (p. 450) 
18
 Stein, p. 455 
19
 Stein, p. 463 
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acquaintance’.20 While in theatre narrative drives the spectators forward (or makes 
the spectators follow in linear fashion) and make acquaintance with the characters 
and to take time to get to know them, in landscape everything is present at once.  
Jane Bowers argues that, ‘in Stein's theater texts do not impel us forward in 
time’.21 Therefore, ‘we can suspend our normal anticipatory response to theater and 
engage in the event in a meditative way, suspended in the experience of the thing in 
and of itself’.22 Bowers suggests that Stein’s plays give the spectators a certain type 
of freedom or confidence to decide for ourselves when to enter the field of the text 
and to ‘endow the landscape with multiple meanings—or none at all beyond our 
experience of it’.23 As Bowers notes, Stein’s plays create a space for a meditative 
way of thinking, a space where spectators are ‘suspended in the experience of the 
thing’. Not only is there no narrative (the absence of narrative is surely a modernist 
staple), but the structure of the event is one of open-endedness. Stein’s landscape 
theatre presents a canvas of events conveyed through language, a language that is 
perhaps seemingly not to be trusted (yet a language that makes perfect sense but one 
that has to be attended to differently). It is in fact the act/notion of attending to 
something that is of major importance in this study.   
I mention Stein here because of two reasons. Firstly, I want to draw attention 
to the temporal experiments of the modernists associated with movements such as 
Futurism, Surrealism, Dadaism, Expressionism and Symbolism which Goldberg 
sees as the beginning of the genre of performance. Secondly I want to discuss 
Stein’s approach to theatre as somewhat different from her contemporaries and more 
importantly as useful in terms of the type of temporal experiences I will be 
                                                          
20
 Stein, p. 463 
21
 Jane Bowers, Gertrude Stein (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1993), p. 20. 
22
 Bowers, p. 20 
23
 Bowers, p. 20 
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examining in this thesis. In doing so, I wish to set the temporal framework around 
this study. The research starts in earnest in the 1960s when performance as an art 
form or a medium begins to be articulated. Although there are perhaps similarities 
and shared ideas in the work of the early avant-garde artists and practitioners 
discussed in this study, I suggest that the social, cultural, material and political 
contexts in which they make their work is markedly different. I trace these 
differences and examine the interests in time in these works. 
4 Literature review and genealogy of terms 
In Live: Art and Performance, Adrian Heathfield traces the same path for 
performance art as Goldberg does. He argues: ‘Performance’s birth within and 
against theatrical form is equally rooted in an engagement and its disruptive 
potential in relation to fictive or narrative time’.24 Heathfield lists the ‘different 
experimentation with time’25 that contemporary performance employs and discusses 
presence and the critique of capitalism through the use of time in performance. 
Heathfield notes how, ‘From its beginnings in modernist movements such as 
Futurism, Dada and Situationism, to its emergence through Happenings and 
correspondence with Minimalism and Conceptual art, performance has consistently 
replaced or qualified the material object with the temporal act’.26 
It was Michael Fried’s essay on minimal art which highlighted the temporal 
aspect of theatre and theatricality and which has remained a seminal piece of writing 
in performance theory. For Fried, writing in the mid-1960s, the new art of 
minimalism is inherently theatrical because it brings to the fore the temporal 
                                                          
24
 Heathfield, p. 8 
25
 Heathfield, p. 8 
26
 Heathfield, p. 8 
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relations between viewer and art work. The work, according to Fried, is theatrical as 
it makes the viewer aware of their position in the gallery and in relation to the work, 
unlike modernist art which absorbs the viewer and thus somehow stops or 
obliterates time. Fried’s ‘Art and Objecthood’ is in some ways articulating the same 
distinction between art forms that the German art critic Gotthold Lessing articulated 
in his essay published in 1766, Laocoon: An Essay on the Limits of Painting and 
Poetry. As Rosalind E. Krauss explains, ‘Lessing asserts that sculpture is an art 
concerned with the deployment of bodies in space...this defining character must be 
separated off from the essence of those art forms, like poetry, whose medium is 
time’.27 In Passages in Modern Sculpture Krauss tackles the assumption and argues 
that ‘The history of modern sculpture is incomplete without discussion of the 
temporal consequences of a particular arrangement of form’.28 Krauss discusses 
various artists from Auguste Rodin to Robert Smithson and notes: ‘One of the 
striking aspects of modern sculpture is the way in which it manifests its makers’ 
growing awareness that sculpture is a medium peculiarly located at the juncture 
between stillness and motion, time arrested and time passing’.29 I analyse Fried’s 
essay and Krauss’ work in more detail in the first chapter which looks at temporality 
in 1960s art and culture. 
That performance art is seen as a temporal medium (and thus separate from 
visual art) is reflected in the different terms used. Writing of the use of the term 
performance art in her book, Performance: Live Art since the 60s, RoseLee 
Goldberg states: ‘In Britain there is a preference for the term “live art” because it is 
                                                          
27
 Rosalind E. Krauss, Passages in Modern Sculpture (London: Thames and Hudson, 1977),  
p. 3 
28
 Krauss, p. 4 
29
 Krauss, p. 5 
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more directly descriptive and this is used as frequently as “time-based art”’.30 
According to Andrea Phillips, ‘Time based practice is closely linked with the 
development of new modes of technological innovation. As cameras, computer 
interfaces, hypertextual languages and new ways of manipulating sound are 
invented they are seized by artists in order to produce time based work that often 
involves a critique of (veiled) contemporary technological usage.’31 ‘Real time’ is a 
term employed frequently in live art and in conjunction with several of the artists’ 
work that I discuss here. It could be said that ‘real time’ is live art’s raison d’être. 
Real time is taken here as the opposite of fictional time, the time of narrative. Real 
time, then, is sometimes used as interchangeable with the term duration. In a recent 
issue of Performance Research Journal on duration, editor Ed Scheer writes: ‘For 
performance artists, duration refers to the time it takes to break away from the things 
that inhibit creativity, empathy and intuition, yet the extent to which performance 
develops its object in real time forms the basis of what we might call ‘the durational 
aesthetic’’.32 Scheer goes on to say that one of the seminal components of durational 
aesthetics is ‘the quality of time experienced in the doing of an action rather than 
simply the quantity of chronological time that a task might consume’.33 This is why 
we might say (and, in fact, do quite often say when speaking of performance events) 
that an action takes as long as it takes, it has its own duration.  
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For Goldberg, ‘By its very nature, performance defies precise or easy 
definition beyond the simple declaration that it is live art by artists’.34 Goldberg 
(again) voices a common understanding of the conditions and strengths of 
performance when she writes, that ‘it is the very presence of the performance artist 
in real time, of live performers ‘stopping time’, that gives the medium its central 
position.’35 Goldberg’s phrase ‘stopping time’ implies that the event of performance 
is somehow outside of normal time, indeed that being there is the crux of 
performance. Heathfield argues that, ‘In the hi-tech, spectacle-rich environments of 
the West, cultural production is now obsessed with liveness’.36 In this study I 
examine these issues of liveness and presence and also look at the way discourses 
on performance’s duration talk about time. Indeed, what does Goldberg mean when 
she talks about stopping time?  
One of the strategies used for bringing spectators ‘into the now of enactment, 
the moment by moment of the present’37 (and thus ‘stopping time’) is to focus on 
the body, and on the body in pain in particular. In her book The Show and the Gaze 
of Theatre: A European Perspective, Erika Fischer-Lichte draws on Elaine Scarry’s 
research on pain and its essential capacity to elude words. Scarry argues that pain 
‘cannot be denied and…cannot be confirmed’.38 Indeed, by its very definition, pain 
cannot be communicated. Therefore, ‘[t]o perceive pain’, as Fischer-Lichte states, 
‘means to perceive one’s own pain, never the pain of another’.39 Fischer-Lichte 
argues that the gap between the spectator and the artist’s pain can only be crossed by 
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the use of the spectator’s imagination. The sensation of pain (or ‘merely’ witnessing 
it) draws one into the now, or into real time. Such writing is sometimes related to 
notions of trauma and witnessing. Trauma theory maintains that the event (which is 
traumatising) is not registered fully by consciousness and thus cannot be 
experienced. Therefore, the event is played over and over repeatedly for that person 
afterwards. One cannot escape it. Dori Laub explains that, ‘trauma precludes its 
registration’.40 During the occurrence of the traumatic event, the witness is 
concentrating on surviving and thus ‘testifies to an absence, to an event that has not 
yet come into existence’.41 Therefore the testimony can only be dealt with after the 
trauma has ceased. For some writers, performance is such an event.
42
 It cannot be 
grasped at the moment of its realisation and must therefore be repeated and repeated 
after the act. 
For others, performance is a medium perfectly situated to attempt to capture 
the elusive present. Fischer-Lichte argues that, ‘Performance is experienced as the 
completion, presentation, and passage of the present’.43 She goes on to argue that 
the topos of simultaneous presence of actor and spectator is an old one. According 
to Fischer-Lichte, the issue was debated already in the 18
th
 century.
44
 Fischer-Lichte 
notes that theatre ‘does not tell a story taking place at another time and place but 
portrays events that occur and are perceived by the audience hic et nunc’.45 The 
presentness of theatre carries ‘a highly effective potential for transformation’ as it 
“heals’ the ‘sickness’ of passion, results in the loss of self-control, or can change 
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one’s identity’.46 The possibility for transformation has been taken on even more in 
live art where attuning to real time can affect a change. Marina Abramović’s The 
House with the Ocean View (2002) is an attempt at just such transformation. 
Abramović wanted to initiate an ‘energy dialogue’ between her and the audience 
where their simple (but powerful) co-presence would in effect be the work. 
Abramović’s purpose and aim during the piece was to be completely present, 
constantly in the now. 
Despite performance being cited as the medium of time, research on duration 
and temporality has been lacking. It is only recently that a surge of interest has 
started to take place and research groups and conferences of all sizes have focused 
on the issue, Performance Studies international entitled ‘Now Then: Performance 
and Temporality’ which took place at Stanford University in 2013 being one of the 
most recent and biggest ones. What follows is a look at research on time in 
performance studies. Indeed, it seems that it is the incorporation of different media 
in performance which prompts discussion on the issue of time. Charlie Gere’s book 
Art, Time and Technology is concerned with the accelerated time of contemporary 
society and questions the role of visual art ‘in the age of real-time systems’ by 
which is meant multimedia and telecommunication.
47
 Gere argues that ‘if art is to 
have a role or a meaning at all in the age of real-time technologies it is to keep our 
human relation with time open in the light of its potential foreclosure by such 
technology’.48 
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It is perhaps unsurprising that it is within research on technology that the 
issue of time is explored.
49
 Steve Dixon’s book (with contributions by Barry Smith) 
Digital Performance: A History of New Media in Theatre, Dance, Performance Art, 
and Installation offers, as its title suggests, a study of the history of Digital 
Performance, tracing it back to the early twentieth century. In its 24 page section on 
Time, Dixon discusses, after a brief look into the history of modern temporality, 
performances by Robert LePage, Richard Foreman, Uninvited Guests, among 
others, with reference to Sylviane Agacinski, Henri Bergson and Francois Lyotard. 
He goes on to stress the significance of thinking performance time in terms of 
extratemporality and notes: ‘The contrapuntal elements of intense live performance 
and temporally altered digital imagery sparks a feeling, not of time standing still or 
going backward or forward, but of the extratemporal – of stepping to one side or 
outside of time’50. The notion of being outside of time occurs in other writers’ 
descriptions too. Heathfield and Tehching Hsieh’s book on Hsieh’s work is titled 
Out of Now, suggesting implicitly perhaps that it is possible to be out of time, as if 
time was a place, that is to say something to be out of.  
5 Space and time 
The surge of writings on time and duration in performance studies, which have 
grown in recent years, is following a trend on the focus on space in performance 
studies. Scheer notes that it ‘may, as yet, be too early to adumbrate the end of the 
‘‘spatial turn’’.51 However, it is clear that temporality is becoming more and more 
prevalent in discourses of performance. In his introduction, Scheer sets 
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‘topographical approaches that assert a politics of territoriality, the sociology of 
globalized cities and nation states’ in opposition to ‘an ethics of the subjective, the 
transitory and the privately experienced time of the body’.52 Of course such an 
opposition is only one facet of these issues; a focus on either time or space is not 
mutually exclusive.  
In fact, some writing on space also ignores how space and time are 
interrelated. I would like to address a couple of instances where such an opposition 
is in play and point out the blindspots. In his book Non-places: Introduction to an 
Anthropology of Supermodernity, Marc Augé describes places such as airports, 
shopping malls and motorways as non-places where people are constantly (only) 
passing through without ever feeling at home (or at anywhere) in them. He writes:  
There is no room there for history unless it has been transformed into an 
element of spectacle, usually in allusive texts. What reigns there is actuality, 
the urgency of the present moment. Since non-places are there to be passed 
through, they are measured in units of time. Itineraries do not work without 
timetables, lists of departure and arrival times in which a corner is always 
found for a mention of possible delays. They are lived through in the 
present.
53
  
 
What Augé’s text does not consider is the ways in which spaces and places are 
negotiated and made by the relationships people have with them. An airport might 
seem like a place without history but people who pass through might have passed 
through it several times before. Thus, it is in the repetition of the encounter with a 
place that the place comes to mean and to have a meaning. Furthermore, the 
decision to build a new airport or a new motorway in most cases involves a process 
of destroying or removing something else that is at the time in that space. A 
construction of a new shopping mall might include a negotiation of what is the most 
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convenient place for such a building, what is in that space now and how to include 
neighbouring areas in the change that the construction will effect. It is in these 
questions that the history of a space and its continuing relationships with people 
who use that space become apparent.  
But what has all of this to do with theatre? I mention Augé here because his 
depiction of non-places has an echo of something more familiar to performance 
studies, Peter Brook’s description of theatre and its empty space. Brook’s seminal 
book The Empty Space begins with this now well-known passage: ‘I can take any 
empty space and call it a bare stage. A man walks across this empty space whilst 
someone else is watching him, and this is all that is needed for an act of theatre to be 
engaged.’54 However, similar to Augé, Brook does not consider that a place is never 
simply empty, that no place is ever completely without history. The stage is never 
empty but always a site of meeting between social, political and affective factors. 
Marvin Carlson takes Brook to task in his book The Haunted Stage: The Theatre as 
Memory Machine. Carlson notes, firstly, that a man walking across an empty stage 
does not yet constitute theatre, what is needed for that to happen is a contract 
between audience and actor, ‘an agreement that this action will be ‘framed’ as 
theatre’.55 Secondly, Carlson argues that, ‘Brook’s use of the term empty suggests a 
phenomenological ground-zero’.56 Carlson draws attention instead to the notion of 
‘ghosting’ whereby ‘the ‘something else’ that this space was before...has the 
potential, often realized, of ‘bleeding through’ the process of reception’.57 
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Miwon Kwon’s 2002 book One Place after Another: Site-specific Art and 
Locational Identity which is an account of site-specificity and the history of 
institutional art and its relationship to place has received similar critique. For 
example, Gregory Sholette has criticised the way ‘Kwon has swept away the 
corporeal trace of history, politics and other ideological texts’.58 However, what 
Kwon’s book does is draw attention to the way in which site-specific practices and 
works of art are invested in time-specificity. As Kwon notes, ‘the definition of site 
specificity is being reconfigured to imply not the permanence and immobility of a 
work but its impermanence and transience’.59 When the work is taken out of the site 
it ceases to be the work (a sentiment expressed by Robert Barry in 1969 and echoed 
by Richard Serra fifteen years later).
60
 Thus, Kwon’s tracing of the genealogy of 
site-specific art and institutional critique is significant for the way in which it begins 
to make a shift from space to time. It has two broad implications here, the first of 
which is the importance of the history of site-specific sculpture in Minimalist art 
which I will discuss in Chapter 1. The second is the questioning of the marketing 
and selling of impermanent work that site-specific art poses. I will consider these 
issues in more detail in Chapter 3. 
But one crucial point I want to make here via Augé, Brook, Carlson and 
Kwon is that we might think of the space of performance not as a palimpsest, a 
rewriting which partly erases what is left underneath it (as it has sometimes been 
read as
61
), but as flattened time. The concept, which I borrow from contemporary 
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archaeology, is one which replaces chronological time sequences with the idea of 
past and present being constituted in and by the present.
62
 Christopher Witmore 
argues that flattened time allows us to trace a succession of relations between 
people, things and landscapes and by so doing understand how things exert their 
own force in this network.
63
 Witmore proposes a way of looking, then, which helps 
us see the simultaneous strands of negotiation between different agencies. Such an 
approach to looking will reveal a host of factors that make space not empty. Things 
such as where people sit in the (not empty) theatre, why they have come to this 
particular building or area (is it conveniently near their house? Did they have to 
drive or take public transportation?), where they are sitting having something to do, 
in most cases at least, with how much they can afford to pay for a ticket. And all of 
this, of course, matters when considering the material conditions of making 
performance. 
6 Materiality, labour and precarity 
In examining the material conditions of performance I take my cue from Ric 
Knowles’ work on cultural materialism in Reading the Material Theatre in which he 
places meaning production as a result of a negotiation at the intersection between 
performance, conditions of production and conditions of reception. Knowles fleshes 
out the semiotics of a material theatre and the working conditions as well as the 
viewing conditions in the theatre. His reading of the spaces of performances and 
their neighbourhoods reveals the extent to which spectators and performance makers 
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go to, and might not go to, for theatre. What the scope of Knowles’ book does not 
cover, however, is consideration of the duration of performance, its limited activity 
or time-specificity.
64
 It is one of the aims of this thesis to contribute to this area of 
research. My use of cultural materialism encompasses the way our material 
conditions and environments affect how we do culture and how, in the instances that 
I analyse, performance is made, produced, watched and paid for (or funded). These 
are the conditions which surround, make possible and affect theatrical production. 
Here, the materials in question range from how long it takes to make a piece of work 
and how much time watching a performance takes from an evening to how much the 
artist is paid and the factors affecting their work (do they have another job, where do 
they show their work, are they emerging or established artist, and so on). 
In addition to examining the material conditions of performance, I also 
consider the materiality of performance. I will argue that the objects in performance 
allow us another way of looking at performance’s multi-temporality. By materiality 
I mean objects and ‘stuff’, matter and materials that affect us as human beings, 
sometimes without us even noticing. I examine the possible connections between 
performance and material culture in Chapter 5 as I consider the remains and re-
enactment of performance. In doing so, I follow Daniel Miller’s perception of 
material culture. Miller asserts that ‘much of what we are exists not through our 
conscious or body, but as an exterior environment that habituates and prompts us’.65 
Miller goes on to argue that objects ‘determine what takes place to the extent that 
we are unconscious of their capacity to do so’.66 I posit that it is unnecessary and at 
points impossible to distinguish between artefacts and natural objects and I include 
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all sorts of matter in my discussion. Thus, as my discussion moves from material 
conditions of labour to natural and man-made objects, everything is potentially 
included in this definition of materiality. In aligning this study with Miller’s work, I 
am setting up material culture studies as a methodology.  
Furthermore, I employ Marxist labour theory to investigate the structure of 
the relationship between the spectator as a consumer, the artist as a producer and the 
curating or producing organisation as a capitalist. I discuss what implications the 
duration of a performance might have when put into context of a working life. How 
do we structure time in our daily lives? How much of that time do we want or 
expect to use for leisure, or more specifically, for theatre? How might 
performance’s duration subvert a preconceived idea of time? How does the 
theatrical economy function and what is duration’s part in that economy? What kind 
of experiences of temporality do we look for (and get) in performance? 
Employing Marx in attempting to answer these questions is useful in the 
ways it allows me to take the focus off the event (of performance) and look at the 
operations and materialities of performance. More specifically, it gives a clear 
account of capitalist production in which, I argue, theatre and theatrical production 
partake. Using Marx facilitates an examination of those labour relations that are 
more than reflected in theatrical production. However, there are limitations to using 
Marxist labour theory within this thesis. In addition to the material conditions to 
theatrical production, I also wish to consider the experience of time in performance. 
It is here that one must concede that Marx’s theory of capitalist time and labour 
relations does not account for a more complex experience of time and temporality. 
While it describes in detail the conditions in which workers become alienated from 
the work they sell and how this process facilitates the development of new ways to 
30 
 
measure and compartmentalise time (work-leisure), it does not explain how time 
itself functions and is felt. In chapters 4 and 5 I examine work that has an interest in 
time rather than displaying chronophobia. In order to investigate that interest I 
employ Henri Bergson’s philosophy of pure duration which sees time as a psychic 
process. Time, for Bergson, is quality, while space is quantity, and the difficulty in 
perceiving time comes from not being able to think or see time without relating it to 
space. Bergson’s concept of pure duration considers what it means to experience 
time when we, for example, see a dancer move or when we are waiting for 
something to happen. It is this idea of time as a psychic process that becomes 
important in the second half of the thesis. 
The focus here on labour and capitalism is also a focus on precarity and the 
temporal characteristics of a precarious life in post-Fordism. Issues of precarity in 
performance have been prevalent in performance studies for the last few years. The 
connections between theatrical labour, the service economy and precarity are rich 
ground for an examination of the ways in which the notion of work and its demands 
have changed. One of the most notable changes is the focus on the emergence of 
immaterial labour. In her article ‘Just-in-Time: Performance and the Aesthetics of 
Precarity’, Shannon Jackson writes about the ‘turn to affective and immaterial labor 
in a post-Fordist economy’67 which took place ‘somewhere in the 1970s’68 
anticipated by shifts in the 1960s. Theoretical writings by authors such as Herbert 
Marcuse and new process based art practices began to articulate a mode of labour 
that was focused on relations around service. According to Jackson, during this 
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immaterial turn ‘labor became more service orientated and engaged in the 
production and exchange of affect’.69  
The title of Jackson’s article is an important one here as it draws attention to 
an aspect of flexible accumulation and late capitalism which will become central in 
the first chapter and in the argument of the thesis. Just-in-time production is one of 
the organisational shifts which facilitate the move from Fordism to flexible 
accumulation. I will give a more detailed account of the issues behind Fordist and 
post-Fordist labour practices in Chapter 2 but it is worth pointing out here that 
flexible accumulation is a term which David Harvey uses to describe the type of 
flexibility and the rise of new labour markets, such as the growth of the service 
sector which Jackson refered to above, that characterise late capitalism. Just-in-time 
production is an ‘inventory-flows delivery system which cuts down radically on 
stocks required to keep production flow going’.70  It therefore has the effect of 
decreasing turnover time which, when reduced considerably, results in higher and 
higher profitability. What is central to just-in-time systems is that they not only 
reduce turnover time in production but also reduce it in consumption. What this 
ultimately means is that the temporal gap between production and consumption is 
diminishing. 
A recent issue of The Drama Review makes a considerable contribution to 
the area of precarity and performance. In their editorial for the issue, Nicholas 
Ridout and Rebecca Schneider point out (via Angela Mitropoulos) that rather than a 
temporary situation, precarity is life in capitalism ‘per usual’. 71 In his article on the 
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precariat as a new class, ‘We Are All Precarious – On the Concept of the ‘Precariat’ 
and Its Misuses’ in New Left Project, Richard Seymour points out that a number of 
labouring groups were already precarious in the 1800s.
72
 What Seymour and Ridout 
and Schneider suggest is that the change that we see now is perhaps one where 
flexible accumulation decreasingly meets labour’s call for a liveable (Ridout’s and 
Schneider’s term) or sustainable life.73 
In examining performance work and its relationship with labour (dead and 
living, material and immaterial) I situate this study in a position of performance 
studies which comes out of the turn that Jackson points out. Thus, I do not follow 
Goldberg’s account of the history of performance art. Although I trace some of the 
interests in experiments in time in historical avant-garde performance, I make a 
distinction between that period and the work produced during it and the live art, 
performance, theatre, sculpture and visual art which I mainly focus on here. I posit 
that it is to some extent due to the immaterial turn that the performance from 1960s 
onwards has slightly different concerns from its previous forms. That is to say, 
performance during and after 1960s emerges out of a negotiation with the values of 
late capitalism. It is performance which is interested in making its temporality 
visible and often tangible. It is performance which is interested in the limits of the 
body, limits of duration and endurance. I examine how performance might or might 
not escape the art market. Harvey argues that, ‘Since money and commodities are 
entirely bound up with the circulation of capital, it follows that cultural forms are 
                                                          
72
 Richard Seymour, ‘We Are All Precarious – On the Concept of the ‘Precariat’ and Its Misuses’, 
New Left Project, 2012 
<http://www.newleftproject.org/index.php/site/article_comments/we_are_all_precarious_on_the_con
cept_of_the_precariat_and_its_misuses> (Accessed 23 May 2013). 
73
 Ridout and Schneider, p. 7 
33 
 
firmly rooted in the daily circulation process of capital’.74 Indeed, it is art’s (and 
here I also mean performance) relationship to the intensification or rise of just-in-
time production that distinguishes it from the historical avant-garde. 
7 Chapter outlines 
I start this study in the 1960s as I examine a chronophobia peculiar to that era. I link 
this chronophobia to the rise of just-in-time production, the eradication of the gap 
between production and consumption, and a rise of technology and media. I argue 
that the 1960s are crucial to understanding the developments of the performance and 
art practices that demonstrate an invested interest in the issue of time and duration. I 
examine some of the key texts from the period which debate the issue of temporality 
and time which puts the work I discuss into context. In this chapter I wish to 
highlight some of the instances of time becoming a central issue in art and examine 
how the theorisation of time in visual art can be said to have started during the 
1960s. In order to do so, I launch a detailed reading of Michael Fried’s essay ‘Art 
and Objecthood’ in tandem with a discussion of examples from Minimalist art, such 
as the work of Robert Morris and Donald Judd. I also examine different articulations 
of time in the work of Andy Warhol and Barnet Newman before moving on to 
performance work by Bruce Nauman and Yvonne Rainer. Discussing and 
examining various examples of both visual art and performance, I aim to map out a 
genealogy of art, and more particularly performance, in the 1960s interested in 
making its temporality visible and discuss how thinking about performance as 
ancillary to visual art has put performance in its historiographic place. Chapter 1 
thus frames the subject matter and scope of this thesis and sets a jumping off point 
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for further queries into performance’s engagement with temporality and experiences 
of duration. 
From the chronophobia of 1960s the thesis moves on to the present day and 
its always open, 24 Hour Society. I examine the speed of our never stopping 
consumer driven culture and ask how the temporality of performance interrupts or 
succumbs to the way we perceive and use time in our daily lives. I do this through 
engaging with durational performances, or performances of (fairly) long duration. I 
discuss four case studies, LABOUR (2012), Marina Abramović Presents… (2009), 
GATZ (2012) by Elevator Repair Service and two one-year long performance from 
Tehching Hsieh (one of them made with Linda Montano). I have chosen to examine 
these examples because each of them, either implicitly or explicitly, places the act of 
labour in focus. Through Marxist labour theory, I argue that the demand that 
durational performances make in an age of post-Fordist work practices is not a 
straight-forward one but a negotiation of how to approach different temporalities. I 
consider key terms such as duration and endurance and place them in context. 
From labour time in durational performances I move on to short 
performances and their material conditions. Employing my own experience as a 
participant of Brian Lobel’s project Carpe Minuta Prima (2011), I examine how 
short duration of performance work might present a problem to the economy of 
theatre which, I argue, is invested in what we might call its standard duration. That 
duration frames the event of theatre as a consumable product which nonetheless 
insists on its own ability to evade the art market. I focus on performances that are a 
few minutes in length to question the assumption that theatrical labour is immaterial. 
I also examine one to one performances in this chapter as an example of a duration 
that questions or problematises theatre’s investment in its own standard duration. I 
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also employ examples from visual art practices as such the work of Martin Creed to 
examine how the service economy is a fitting place to start for looking at both 
performance and visual art.  
Chapter 4 presents a shift in the thesis from a focus on economy, quantity 
and Marxist theory to quality and Henri Bergson’s philosophy. In this chapter I 
discuss a certain type of experience of time in performance and investigate how the 
work of Goat Island and Robert Wilson respectively might be read as pure duration 
as theorised by Bergson. I compare Wilson and Goat Island because they seem to 
share a common approach to time and slowness where information is withheld from 
the audience who are left (for want of a better word) to navigate their way through 
the work. I argue that despite appearances, their work is in fact very different from 
each other. In using Bergson’s philosophy of time, I also examine the difficulty of 
thinking about time without thinking about space and why a purer definition of 
duration might be beneficial.  
Chapter 5 continues with the emphasis on quality and moves from Bergson 
to Deleuzian philosophy. I will focus on the material objects of performance and 
argue for their temporality. Performance’s emphasis on the temporal act over matter 
has been turned into a fetishisation of its in-timeness which can be seen in debates 
such as that on performance’s remains and documentation. The most enduring one 
of these (somewhat ironically) is Peggy Phelan’s account of performance’s ontology 
in her 1993 book Unmarked: The Politics of Performance. Phelan positions the 
immateriality of performance in opposition with the material objects valued in 
cultural production and advocates the emptiness of performance as a political 
argument. For Phelan, performance cannot be recorded or captured. The way ‘live 
performance plunges into visibility – in a maniacally charged present – and 
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disappears into memory’75 is, according to Phelan, the basis of performance’s 
efficacy. Furthermore, rhetoric around the body’s presence and bodily transmissions 
inherent in theatre and performance often results in writing that equates 
performance’s time with the time of death. Kalb argues: 
Because theater confronts us with the physical, real-time presence of toiling 
performers as well as fellow audience members, it provokes a greater 
awareness of the body – and of the ticking clock of mortality – than recorded 
performances can.
76
 
 
Or, in other words, performance, in its limited time frame and with slowly dying and 
decaying human bodies, always pertains towards death and mortality. Alan Read 
notes that, ‘In countering [a] proclivity for the metaphoric and the dramatically 
disempowered, performance studies has become more interested in the ontological a 
priori of theatre: its liveness’.77 Read goes on to argue that performance studies is 
invested in its own ‘extinction theory’78 which can be seen in performance’s 
emphasis on failure, a point of focus gathering momentum in recent years.
79
  
I think through some ideas around decay and ruins as pertaining to lasting 
rather than disappearance and discuss the materiality and the material remains of 
performance. I do so through various case studies such as the work of Alastair 
MacLennan, The Dust Archive, a book project by Annie Lloyd and Alexander Kelly 
from 2008, and Doris Salcedo’s Shibboleth (2007) which was (and, I argue, still is) 
an installation at Tate Modern. I also discuss re-enactments and photography with 
reference to the work of Performance Re-enactment Society. While Phelan’s 
troubling of the focus on materiality is useful and valuable in discourses on 
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performance’s political power, I instead would like to trouble the linearity of time 
and think about the multiple time frames that are at work in performance. 
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Chapter 1 
From Phobia to Philia: Debating Time in the Art of the 1960s 
 
1 Beginning time 
The 1960s have remained in the popular imagination as the decade that brought with 
it a whole new world and it is by now an oft-repeated cliché that the 1960s were a 
time of radical change. An enduring symbol of the urgency of that change and the 
whole decade is of course the revolution. As Alvin Toffler, a popular futurologist 
and social critic, wrote at the end of the decade, the 1960s were ‘simultaneously 
experiencing a youth revolution, a sexual revolution, a racial revolution, a colonial 
revolution, an economic revolution, and the most rapid and deep-going 
technological revolution in history’.1 Furthermore, the 1960s saw a proliferation of 
writings and debates on the issue of time as several writers, not to mention both the 
counterculture and mass entertainment, tackled the notion of the temporal. It could 
be said the decade was experiencing a sense of an end and at the same time looking 
to the future. On the one hand the threat of nuclear war and the actual reality of the 
Vietnam War brought a sense of an end; the end, to be exact, of the world, while the 
space programme with its promise of a hopeful future and infinite stretches of light 
years proclaimed an endless time. And all the while future studies that became 
institutionalised in the mid-1960s revealed a marked anxiety about the present. 
In this chapter I wish to highlight some of the instances of time becoming a 
central issue in art and examine how the theorisation of time in visual art can be said 
to have started during the 1960s. Discussing and examining various examples of 
                                                          
1
 Alvin Toffler, Future Shock (London: The Bodley Head, 1970), p. 166. 
39 
 
both visual art and performance, I aim to map out a genealogy of art, and more 
particularly performance, in the 1960s interested in making its temporality visible 
and often tangible and discuss how thinking about performance as ancillary to visual 
art has put performance in its historiographic place. Furthermore, looking at 1960s 
art and its involvement and interest in the theorisation and experience of time 
facilitates a way of highlighting a series of leads and stepping-off points for later 
work discussed elsewhere in this thesis. Thus the 1960s are crucial to understanding 
the developments of those practices that demonstrate an invested interest in the 
issues of time and duration. 
But before focusing on the specificities of art, I would like to outline the 
broader popular debates and concerns around temporality at the time. Toffler’s 1970 
book Future Shock was not only a best-seller but also ‘exhaustively reviewed and 
debated’.2 In it, Toffler argues: 
We have in our time released a totally new social force – a stream of change 
so accelerated that it influences our sense of time, revolutionizes the tempo 
of daily life, and affects the very way we “feel” the world around us. [...] 
And this is the ultimate difference, the distinction that separates the truly 
contemporary man from all others. For this acceleration lies behind the 
impermanence – the transience – that penetrates and tinctures our 
consciousness, radically affecting the way we relate to other people, to 
things, to the entire universe of ideas, art and values.
3
  
 
For Toffler, ‘Transience is the new “temporariness” in everyday life. It results in a 
mood, a feeling of impermanence’.4 This temporariness which affects, among other 
things, our human relationships which are increasingly shorter in duration, is the 
main characteristic of what Toffler calls a throw-away society.  
One of Toffler’s supporters and fellow enthusiasts was Marshall McLuhan 
who, in 1964, argued in his book Understanding Media: Extensions of Man:  
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During the mechanical ages we had extended our bodies in space. Today, 
after more than a century of electric technology, we have extended our 
central nervous system itself in a global embrace, abolishing both space and 
time as far as our time is concerned.
5
  
 
For McLuhan, the slowness of the mechanical age meant that ‘the reactions were 
delayed for considerable periods of time. Today the action and the reaction occur 
almost at the same time’.6 Automation, McLuhan argues, 
ends the old dichotomies between culture and technology, between art and 
commerce, and between work and leisure. ... As the age of information 
demands the simultaneous use of all our faculties, we discover that we are 
most at leisure when we are most intensely involved, very much as with the 
artists in all ages.
7
 
 
What we see in Toffler’s throw-away society and MacLuhan’s automation is, in 
fact, the rise of just-in-time production. A throw-away society is one which is 
focused on consumption rather than production, demanding, through its very 
structure, faster and faster production and shorter durability of goods. The 
abolishing of time and space and ensuring that action and reaction happen almost 
simultaneously is the closing of the gap between production and consumption. 
 Technology might not have become the seamless extension of man that 
McLuhan claims it to be but its permeating effect in society had certainly become 
apparent. According to the Marxist philosopher Herbert Marcuse, ‘In the face of the 
totalitarian features of this society the traditional notion of the ‘neutrality’ of 
technology can no longer be maintained’.8 In his book One-Dimensional Man, also 
from 1964, Marcuse argues that technology has come to dominate not (just) through 
physical labour and production but on the level of an internalized principle. ‘The 
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technological society’, Marcuse writes, ‘is a system of domination which operates 
already in the concept and construction of techniques’9 and thus, ‘domination is 
figured into administration’.10 Technology then, as Lee elucidates, cannot be 
understood as merely ‘the stuff of invention’ or ‘operating from the usual bases of 
political authority’.11 Instead, technology, which is now organized around an 
administrative logic’,12  is itself organising us. Moreover, this administrative logic 
has its implications for higher culture. Marcuse claims: 
Today’s novel feature is the flattening out of the antagonism between culture 
and social reality through the obliteration of the oppositional, alien, and 
transcendent elements in the higher culture by virtue of which it constituted 
another dimension of reality. This liquidation of two-dimensional culture 
takes place not through the denial and the rejection of the cultural values but 
through their wholesale incorporation into the established order, through 
their reproduction and display on a massive scale.
13
 
 
Some of the decade’s art could be seen as a response to the challenge Marcuse is 
articulating here.  
Writing of kinetic art, Willoughby Sharp stated: ‘The new age, the electric 
age, has created an environment that has reconfigured our senses’.14 For Sharp, 
kinetic art was responding to a world where seeing has lost its importance as ‘the 
primary means of knowing’.15 Instead, ‘Our five senses are rapidly becoming more 
completely integrated’.16 For Susan Sontag ‘the conflicting tastes and odors and 
sights of the urban environment that bombard our senses’17 calls interpretation of an 
art work into question as the sensory experience that was once the basis of 
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interpretation cannot be taken  for granted anymore. ‘What is important now’, 
Sontag wrote in her 1964 essay, ‘is to recover our senses’18 and consequently re-
evaluate the task of the critic.  
In his 1964 book The Fall into Time, E. M. Cioran writes: 
From abstraction to abstraction, time shrinks because of us, dissolving into 
temporality, the shadow of itself. Now it is up to us to revive it, to adopt 
toward time a clear-cut attitude, without ambiguity. Yet how can we, when 
time inspires such irreconcilable feelings, a paroxysm of repulsion and 
fascination?
19
  
 
This grappling with time, which Cioran calls ‘a paroxysm of repulsion and 
fascination’, manifested in Minimalism, Pop, Op and Kinetic art as they were in 
their different ways concerned with newly articulated ideas of temporality and 
duration. It was with a type of impermanence that art responded to the demands of 
the throw-away society. For example, kinetic art, as Sharp argues, ‘is immaterial or 
disposable. Consequently, much of it is uncommercial’.20 Similarly, Happenings 
that had already started in the 1950s insisted on their ephemerality. Sontag wrote in 
1962: 
One way in which the Happenings state the freedom from time is in their 
deliberate impermanence. A painter or sculptor who makes Happenings does 
not make anything that can be purchased. One cannot buy a Happening; one 
can only support it.
21
 
 
And while some, such as Andy Warhol, embraced time in all its literalness, others 
displayed a considerable, in Michael Fried’s case even genre-defining, mistrust in it. 
Michael Archer argues that, ‘All of this work of the 1960s challenged the modernist 
account of art history most particularly identified with the US critic Clement 
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Greenberg’.22 At the core of the challenge was the proposition that ‘the meaning of 
an artwork did not necessarily lie within it, but as often as not arose out of the 
context in which it existed’.23 Often, and especially in the case of Minimalism, that 
meant that the context was the heightened durational nature of the encounter 
between the spectator and the artwork. ‘To look at art is not to ‘consume’ it 
passively’, Archer contends, ‘but to become part of a world to which both that art 
and the spectator belong’.24  
In her 2004 book Chronophobia: Time in the Art of the 1960s Lee considers 
‘the ascendant technocracy in the 1960s’ in terms of ‘an attitude peculiar to that 
moment, an attitude internalized socially, culturally, and politically, whose 
consequences stood in dramatic excess of technology’s literal representation’.25 Lee 
‘traces the ubiquity of the chronophobic impulse, considering how artists implicitly, 
even inadvertently, wrestled with new technologies’.26  In addition to Lee’s book, 
2004 saw the publication of another book on time in the art of the 1960s. In The 
Infinite Line: Re-making Art after Modernism, Briony Fer takes as her main interest 
the mapping of aesthetic strategies that shifted in the late 1950s.  Fer sees this shift 
as one from ‘collage aesthetic to a serial one’.27 Serial systems in art were prevalent 
in the 1960s and in 1967 artist and critic Mel Bochner organised, together with 
Elayne Varian, an exhibition in New York called Art in Series. For Fer, the turn to a 
serial aesthetic equals a ‘focus onto the problem of temporality’28 dramatising the 
temporal as it does ‘through animating and transforming the most everyday and 
                                                          
22
 Michael Archer, Art Since 1960 (London: Thames and Hudson, 1997), p. 7. 
23
 Archer, p. 7 
24
 Archer, p. 7 
25
 Lee, p. xix 
26
 Lee, p. xii-xiii 
27
 Briony Fer, The Infinite Line: Re-making Art after Modernism (London: Yale University press, 
2004), p. 2. 
28
 Fer, p. 3 
44 
 
routine habits of looking’.29 And it is the attempt at redefining of the relationship 
between an art work and the viewer’s body that comes to mediate the concerns 
around temporality in 1960s art.  
Lee begins her preface with a quote from Cioran’s book The Fall into Time: 
‘Defenseless, with no hold on things, we then face a peculiar misfortune: that of not 
being entitled to time’.30 And with that last line, for Lee, Cioran ‘gave voice to the 
acutely contemporary phenomenon of noncontemporaneity’.31 Lee contends that the 
experience of not being entitled to time is ‘historically specific to the 1960s’.32 
Stressing the emergence of communications and information technologies during 
that time, Lee sets out to discuss the decade where time and technology become 
‘twinned phenomena’.33 Claiming that ‘time becomes both a thematic and structural 
fixture, an obsession’34 within the art of the decade, the task Lee sets herself is to 
trace what she terms ‘a chronophobic impulse’ in the decade’s art. Lee states: ‘I 
treat the obsession with time in 1960s art in tandem with two indissociable shifts in 
the culture following World War II: the alleged waning of the ‘Machine Age’ on the 
one hand, and the concomitant advent of computer technologies, on the other’.35 
However, although Lee makes a strong and convincing case for discussing the 
operations of time in the decade’s art in tandem with technocratic rationality, her 
reasons for using the term chronophobia are left unclear. Lee chooses the word over 
chronophilia although admitting that ‘there is a fine line between a phobic obsession 
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with time and almost perverse fascination with its unfolding’.36 However, for Lee, 
the artists on whom the book focuses ‘remain suspicious of the conjunction of time 
and technology in sixties culture, some denying altogether the application of 
technology in their work’.37 That may be so but phobia about technology does not 
equate phobia about time. Continuing her rhetoric that technology and time are 
indissociable Lee thus concludes that to be suspicious of technology is to be 
suspicious of time. 
The first section of this chapter focuses on Minimalism and Michael Fried’s 
(in)famous essay ‘Art and Objecthood’. Fried’s argument against minimalist 
sculpture and its endless duration is of course a problem of the temporal but what I 
will discuss here are Fried’s three terms: temporality, theatricality and stage 
presence. By looking at how he used these terms that make up his argument this 
chapter begins to trace the terms in which temporality was theorised during that 
decade. The second section discusses Andy Warhol in tandem with an artist often 
associated with a different era, Barnett Newman. Teetering on the border between 
chronophobia and chronophilia, Warhol’s work encompasses seriality, repetition, 
mass production and even time capsules. I will discuss Warhol’s literalism on 
holding on to the passing of time with reference to his early silent films and screen 
tests. By placing Warhol side by side with Newman, who gained fame in the 1960s 
but who has been characterised ‘as an artist rooted in older Abstract Expressionist 
concerns’,38 I discuss how Warhol and Newman seemed to address similar concerns 
around time by using very different approaches. I suggest that while in Warhol’s 
work we see just-in-time in action (although he also manages to subvert it) 
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Newman’s work displays an important connection with Fried’s ideas on presence 
and duration. I will outline what this comparison between these two artists can 
contribute towards thinking about temporality more widely in the decade’s art. In 
the last section I take up the discussion on how performance has been theorised in 
art history as secondary to visual art and as a tool for examining sculptural 
problems. I will also examine how performance in the 1960s became a tool for 
grounding the experience of the body and how different experiences of time in 
different art forms were negotiated through performance. By looking at the 
performance work of Bruce Nauman, Robert Morris and Yvonne Rainer I locate a 
useful meeting point of varying approaches to shared enquiries. I will also 
investigate how different dimensions and shapes of time began to emerge and how 
artists employed temporal frames in their work and to what end.  
Finally, it is worth pointing out here that the 1960s as a period are elusive 
themselves as the definition is not really a decade. Instead, different periodisations 
have emerged. For example, Steven Watson argues that, ‘In the popular imagination 
the Sixties are a semi chronological period that began in the wake of Kennedy’s 
assassination in November 1963 and continued until the Vietnam War wound down 
in 1972’.39 Arthur Marwick, on the other hand, postulates a ‘long sixties’ that started 
in 1958 and didn’t end until 1974 when ‘the mass of ordinary people began to feel 
the effects of the oil crisis’ and the anti-war movement was finally ‘achieving 
victory’.40 Although most of the work discussed in this chapter was made during the 
calendric decade of the 1960s, the developments that created that decade are never 
far away in the distance. 
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2 Temporality, theatricality and stage presence  
‘Art and Objecthood’, Michael Fried’s article in the June issue of Artforum in 1967 
is perhaps the most famous and the most debated remnant of 1960s art criticism 
when it comes to the issue of time and duration. Not only was the essay’s reputation 
central to postwar art, as Lee notes, but ‘the importance of its reception within 
postmodern theories’ is also significant.41 Fried was certainly not the first to address 
the notion of temporality in art but was the most convincing to condemn it. 
Although, as Fer argues, ‘the critical field was already steeped in the idea of 
duration’42 in the reception of art, what Fried achieved in ‘Art and Objecthood’ was 
in fact to transform ‘a hitherto contentious field into a coherent entity’.43 James 
Meyer contends that ‘Fried’s essay more or less invented ‘minimalism’ for later 
critics’.44 Up until Fried’s intervention, the visual art of the day was variously called 
ABC Art or Primary Structures, titles taken from exhibitions of new work. In 
defining a whole movement, Fried certainly went further in his analysis of the new 
art than his contemporary art critic and mentor Clement Greenberg who had the 
patience to merely call Minimalism ‘Good Design’ and ‘retain hope’.45 Fried’s 
argument against minimal art is, by now, well known and extensively debated. But 
for all his anti-minimalist attitude Fried, as Hal Foster argues, understands 
minimalism.
46
 In particular, he understands it as a threat to modernism and this 
threat is embodied in the notion of temporality. What is so objectionable to Fried 
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about Minimalism is its inherent theatricality, how the duration of the experience of 
viewing goes on and on unlike in modernist painting and sculpture which is 
instantaneous in a way that ‘at every moment the work itself is wholly manifest’.47 
The time that the work of Robert Morris and other minimalists exists in is literal, 
banal time, not the sublime time of high art which makes the viewer forget herself 
and allow her to be lost in the art.  
But what exactly is behind Fried’s three main terms: temporality, 
theatricality and stage presence? Lucy Lippard wrote in 1964:  
There is a growing tendency, even in ‘straight painting’ exhibitions, to 
surround the spectator, whose increased physical participation, or immediate 
sensorial reaction to the work of art, often operate at the expense of the more 
profound emotional involvements demanded by New York School painting 
in the fifties.
48
 
 
Morris’ work is an accurate example of this, with its emphasis on the simple shape 
of the new work, the regular and irregular polyhedrons which he called unitary 
forms. They allow for the experience of a gestalt, indeed are ‘bound together as it is 
with a kind of energy provided by the gestalt’.49 For Morris, this emphasis on shape 
is not a diminution of the art object to a mere object. In fact, ‘Unitary forms do not 
reduce relationships. They order them’.50 What, then, becomes important is the 
relationship between the viewer and the work. Morris asserts: 
The object is but one of the terms in the newer aesthetic. It is some way 
more reflexive because of one’s awareness of oneself existing in the same 
space as the work is stronger than in previous work, with its many internal 
relationships. One is more aware than before that he himself is establishing 
relationships as he apprehends the object from various positions and under 
varying conditions of light and spatial context.
51
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And since the viewing is made up of several relationships, the ‘experience of the 
work necessarily exists in time’.52 Similarly, Annette Michelson wrote of Morris’ 
work: 
Cognitive in its fullest effect, then, rather than ‘meaningful’, its 
comprehension not only demands time; it elicits the acknowledgment of 
temporality as the condition or medium of human cognition and aesthetic 
experience.
53
  
 
Focusing on the cognitive element and anticipating Merleau-Ponty’s 
phenomenology, Michelson places the body in the centre of the experience of time. 
And for Morris too, ‘it is the viewer who changes the shape constantly by his 
change in position relative to the work’.54 When one views a six-foot cube, like that 
of Tony Smith’s Die (1962), for example, its invariable shape is that which is ‘held 
in the mind but which the viewer never literally experiences’.55  Thus the shape ‘is 
an actuality against which the literal changing, perspective views are related’.56  
Alex Potts argues that, ‘Any viewing of a three-dimensional work involves 
some form of repetitive looping’.57 Furthermore, ‘A Minimalist work tends to 
foreground the sense of looping because there are not many variegated incidents in 
the circuits one traverses’.58 As the viewer moves around the work or closer to it, 
she is moving along routes that have very little variance. And yet, one is constantly 
aware that one is never seeing the same thing from the same position. Such looping 
is built into Morris’ work, for example his L-beams in Untitled from 1965. The 
three L-shaped beams are all placed in different positions in the space, one lying on 
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its side, one standing on the floor in the shape of an L and one with its angle up in 
the air.  The viewer thus sees and comprehends three similar shapes but is always 
unable to see them as such. Instead they only present different sides, caught in the 
perpetual reappearance of unity. This indeed marks its crucial difference from the 
non-unified but singular condition of Modernist sculpture, such as that of Anthony 
Caro.  
Barbara Rose contends that an increasing amount of artists during that period 
were interested in ‘find[ing] variety in repetition where only the nuance alters’.59 
And it is this subtle change of looping, bound in the duration of the experience, 
which Fried understood as ‘time both passing and to come, simultaneously 
approaching and receding’.60 The endlessness in the literalist work, its ‘one thing 
after another’61, was evident in its attitude towards space. Eschewing rationalism 
and a priori systems, Donald Judd advocated ‘specific objects’, three-dimensional 
work positioned somewhere between painting and sculpture. Furthermore, for Judd, 
three dimensions obliterate the problem of literal space and illusionism because they 
‘are real space’.62 Quick to do away with ‘a sculptural illusionism which converts 
one material into the signifier for another’63, it was seminal to Judd that ‘Actual 
space is intrinsically more powerful and specific than paint on a flat surface’.64 In an 
essay titled ‘Excursus: Some Modernist Painting’ Stanley Cavell argues that in his 
method of painting, his all-over trailing lines, Jackson Pollock discovered 
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not exactly that a painting is flat, but that its flatness, together with its being 
of a limited extent, means that it is totally there, wholly open to you, 
absolutely in front of your eyes, of your eyes, as no other form of art is. 
65
  
The fact that Cavell’s reading of the consequences of flatness in Pollock’s painting 
is in accordance with Fried’s thoughts on modernist art is not surprising considering 
that Cavell and Fried acknowledge each other’s contribution to their own work. 
However, I propose that reading Fried and Cavell in tandem will open up useful 
ways to think about Fried’s use of the term theatricality. 
          Fried’s idea on time as simultaneously approaching and receding reveals a 
thinking of temporality that spatialises time, considering it in terms of a solid thing 
that moves around on its own accord. I will come to this issue of shapes of time in 
the last section when discussing 1960s performance. For now it would be useful to 
consider how space and time seemed to be intimately connected for Fried. Fried 
claims that ‘it is above all to the condition of painting and sculpture – the condition, 
that is, of existing in, indeed of evoking or constituting, a continuous and perpetual 
present – that the other contemporary modernist arts, most notably poetry and 
music, aspire’.66 Fried notes that this is especially difficult for music which shares 
with theatre the convention that is duration and, furthermore, ‘the physical 
circumstances of a concert closely resemble those of a theatrical performance’.67 
What Fried is suggesting here then is that the space is crucial in the experience, the 
darkened auditorium of theatre and concert halls being theatrical.  
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In fact, Fried contends: ‘It may have been the desire for something like 
presentness that, at least to some extent, led Brecht to advocate a nonillusionistic 
theater’.68 He goes on to note, however:  
But just as the exposed lighting Brecht advocates has become merely another 
kind of theatrical convention (one, moreover, that often plays an important 
role in the presentation of literalist work, as the installation view of Judd’s 
six-cube piece in the Dwan Gallery shows), it is not clear whether the 
handling of time Brecht calls for is tantamount to authentic presentness, or 
merely to another kind of “presence” – to the presentment of time itself as 
though it were some sort of literalist object.
69
 
In his essay on King Lear, ‘Avoidance of Love’, Cavell compares Shakespeare’s 
mode of drama to music and points out how the notion of development in music that 
started with Monteverdi has two obvious facts; ‘first, that one hears its directness; 
second, that one hears only what is happening now’.70 For Cavell, ‘perhaps it is this 
continuous presentness which we miss most in the difficulties of post-tonal music, 
more than its lack of tunes and harmony and pulse rhythm’.71 It is to be marked how 
Cavell associates presentness with music as well as theatre whereas Fried’s use of 
the term is only linked to painting. Cavell continues: 
It is as if dramatic poetry and tonal music... are made to imitate the simplest 
facts of life: that life is lived in time, that there is a now at which everything 
that happens happens, and a now at which for each man everything stops 
happening, and that what has happened is not here and now, and that what 
might have happened then and there will never happen then and there, and 
that what will happen is not here and now and yet may be settled by what is 
happening here and now in a way we cannot know or will not see here and 
now. The perception or attitude demanded in following this drama is one 
which demands a continuous attention to what is happening at each here and 
now, as if everything of significance is happening at this moment, while 
each thing that happens turns a leaf of time. I think of it as an experience of 
continuous presentness.
72
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Cavell’s use of the term continuous presentness locates the tragedy of Shakespeare 
in the same category as modernist art, a moment of sublime time where everything 
of significance is happening. However, Cavell argues that in King Lear ‘we are 
differently implicated’.73 Placed into a world neither like or unlike ours, we are 
‘somehow participating in the proceedings – not listening, not watching, not 
overhearing, almost as if dreaming it’.74 And yet, we are ‘participating, as at a 
funeral or marriage or inauguration, confirming something; it could not happen 
without us’.75  
This, then, seems to imply that this mode of tragedy somehow demands us to 
be there since it could not happen without us. It awaits us just like, according to 
Fried, minimalist work does. Here it would appear that the term theatricality as that 
which refers to the situation of theatre is in fact present in both minimalism as well 
as modernism, since, following Cavell, everything that happens happens now and 
yet could not happen without its audience. Moreover, Cavell states that, ‘A character 
is not, and cannot become, aware of us. Darkened, indoor theaters dramatize the fact 
that the audience is invisible’.76 For Cavell, ‘There is a fictional existence with a 
vengeance, and there is the theatricality which theater such as King Lear must 
overcome, is meant to overcome, shows the tragedy in failing to overcome’.77 The 
way to overcome it is by acknowledging the other, by ‘put[ting] ourselves in 
another’s presence’.78 This is done ‘[b]y revealing ourselves, by allowing ourselves 
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to be seen’.79 However, we cannot approach a character because ‘they and we do not 
occupy the same space; there is no path from my location to his’.80 However, we 
‘occupy the same time. And the time is always now; time is measured solely by 
what is now happening to them, for what they are doing now is all that is 
happening’.81 Therefore, we need to ‘find the character’s present’.82 ‘When we do 
not’, Cavell argues, ‘when we keep ourselves in the dark, the consequence is that we 
convert the other into a character and make the world a stage for him’.83  
In this case theatricality appears as something that must be overcome by 
acknowledging another’s presence by breaking the boundaries of darkened audience 
spaces. Theatricality, then, is something that confronts the audience as in fact 
Brechtian theatre does. Therefore, is not the kind of theatre both Cavell and Fried 
call theatrical the kind that shows everything at once, makes the space or the 
situation of the actual viewing disappear and does not account for the presence of 
the spectator in the way minimalist sculpture does? Nicholas Ridout argues that, 
Fried offers an account of theatricality that stresses distantiation and 
interaction over illusion and absorption, suggesting, I think very helpfully 
(and in almost complete accordance with the thinking of Bertolt Brecht), that 
the prevalent notion that theatricality can subsist under conditions of 
illusionism is an historical misunderstanding of the form. One implication of 
Fried’s account of theatricality that does not seem to have been followed 
through in this context is the possibility that the absorption he sees in 
modernist painting is the partner (rather than some kind of paradigmatic 
replacement) of theatrical realism. By this account, both modernist projects 
(realism and American abstract painting) seek to eliminate the spectator 
from the set-up, to hide the full extent of “the entire situation”.84 
Similarly, in ‘Excursus: Some Modernist Painting’ Cavell speaks of a quality in 
painting after Pollock which he terms as ‘openness achieved through 
                                                          
79
 Cavell, p. 333 
80
 Cavell, p. 334 
81
 Cavell, p. 334 
82
 Cavell, p. 337 
83
 Cavell, p. 334 
84
 Nicholas Ridout, Stage Fright, Animals, and Other Theatrical Problems (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2006), p. 10. 
55 
 
instantaneousness’85 which, for Cavell, ‘is a way of characterizing the candid’.86 
The opposite trait of the candid is ‘that it must occur independently of me or any 
audience, that it must be complete without me, in that sense closed to me’.87 Cavell 
continues: 
This is why candidness in acting was achieved by the actor’s complete 
concentration within the character, absolutely denying any control of my 
awareness upon him. When theatrical conventions lost their naturalness and 
became matters of mutual complicity between actor and audience, then 
serious drama had to deny my control openly – by removing, say, any 
“character” for the actor to disappear into (Beckett), or by explicitly wedging 
the mutual consciousness of actor and audience between the actor and his 
character (Brecht).
88
 
 
This would seem to suggest that the conventions of natural theatre are indeed a 
partner of modernist painting, since in the experience of literal art,‘[e]verything 
counts – not as part of the object, but as part of the situation in which its objecthood 
is established and on which that objecthood at least partly depends’.89  
The fact that everything counts in the situation in which literal art is 
experienced is evidenced, according to Fried, in Tony Smith’s account of his drive 
on the unfinished New Jersey Turnpike in the early 1950s: 
It was a dark night and there were no lights or shoulder markers, lines, 
railings, or anything at all except the dark pavement moving through the 
landscape of the flats, rimmed by hills in the distance, but punctuated by 
stacks, towers, fumes, and colored lights. This drive was a revealing 
experience. The road and much of the landscape was artificial, and yet it 
couldn’t be called a work of art. On the other hand, it did something for me 
that art had never done. [...] I thought to myself, it ought to be clear that’s the 
end of art. Most paintings look pretty pictorial after that. There’s no way you 
can frame it, you just have to experience it.
90
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Smith’s night drive on the endless road is like the endless, inexhaustible experience 
of ‘literalist’ or minimalist art, ‘of being able to go on and on’.91 It does away with 
painting and anything pictorial and places the viewer in the middle of the situation, 
aware of her place. After all, there is no way of framing it; experience is everything.  
For Fried, Smith’s night drive, therefore, ‘bears witness to theater’s profound 
hostility to the arts and discloses, precisely in the absence of the object and in what 
takes its place, what might be called the theatricality of objecthood’.92 In effect, the 
presence in literalist art is like ‘the silent presence of another person’.93 Waiting for 
its audience, its presence is never full until the viewer enters the room.
94
 In fact, not 
only does literalist art exist in time but, according to Fried, ‘the experience in 
question persists in time’.95 Its duration is endless, resulting in a presence which is 
not the presence, or presentness, of Modernist art but ‘a kind of stage presence’.96 
Taking Judd’s comment that the new art work only needs to be interesting, Fried 
opposes interest with conviction when he states that, ‘the concept of interest implies 
temporality in the form of continuing attention directed at the object whereas the 
concept of conviction does not’.97 The looping, which constantly but gently jolts the 
viewer out of her place, is in deep contrast to the modernist sculpture of Anthony 
Caro which Fried champions throughout the essay. Speaking of Caro’s work Fried 
states: 
It is this continuous and entire presentness, amounting, as it were, to the 
perpetual creation of itself, that one experiences as a kind of 
instantaneousness, as though if only one were infinitely more acute, a single 
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infinitely brief instant would be long enough to see everything, to experience 
the work in all its depth and fullness, to be forever convinced by it.
98
  
 
Here the modernist work convinces the viewer in an instant where everything is 
present at once.  
Fried’s argument is further complicated by employing such a historically 
contingent term as stage presence. Indeed, how does the notion of stage presence fit 
into Fried’s thinking of absorption and conviction? In suggesting that Minimalist 
sculpture not only has the presence of a person but the presence of a stage performer 
who controls the space and situation, Fried seems to concur with the basic idea that, 
as Jane R. Goodall notes, ‘Command over the time and space of performance marks 
out the performer with presence’.99 Fried posits stage presence as a form of 
continuing attention and as an event that needs the presence of a viewer whereas 
conviction is a brief instant. However, as Patrice Pavis argues, “To have presence’ 
in theatrical parlance, is to know how to capture the attention of the public and make 
an impression’.100 Pavis continues that, ‘it is also to be endowed with a je ne sais 
quoi which triggers an immediate feeling of identification in the spectator, 
communicating a sense of living elsewhere and in an eternal present’.101 This 
definition of stage presence, then, would seem to correspond more with Fried’s idea 
of Modernist painting’s conviction, or absorption, which is instantaneous.  
Furthermore, Fried’s emphasis on the notions of theatricality and stage 
presence carries the suggestion of the added notion of illusion. This is despite Judd’s 
call to get rid of ‘sculptural illusionism’ and the fact that presence can often be 
thought of as perhaps the only real, or non-illusionistic, aspect of theatre or 
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performance. Finally, quoting Johann Wolfgang von Goethe, who in the early 19
th
 
century stated: ‘an actor standing alone on stage should remember that he is called 
to fill out the stage with his presence’,102 Goodall contends that experience of stage 
presence is in effect the experience of the stage as ‘full’.103 But considering the work 
of Morris and Judd, for example, it would seem that rather than filling a space the 
Minimalist sculptures were aiming at leaving an empty space where the viewer then 
becomes self-aware. 
3 Present and future in the work of Andy Warhol and Barnett 
Newman 
If there is one figure emerging in the 1960s who could be said to embody the 
decade’s preoccupation with time, it is Andy Warhol. His mass production of silk 
screens, his fascination with consumer culture as evidenced by the subject matter 
(Coca Cola bottles, Heinz soup cans) of his prints and the fast changing world of 
celebrities and fame find their opposite in Warhol’s early films and screen tests 
which reveal an obsessive attempt to stop time or at least to slow it down. Warhol’s 
statements about his relationship to time were, as with all his statements, 
contradictory. On the one hand Warhol seemed to race through time to get to where 
the future will be. In his autobiography from 1975 Warhol states:   
I really do live for the future, because when I’m eating a box of candy, I 
can’t wait to taste the last piece. I don’t even taste any of the other pieces, I 
just want to finish and throw the box away.
104
 
 
On the other hand Warhol seemed to relish any opportunity to stop rushing forward 
and to capture everything there was to capture. His early films are nothing if not 
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meticulous recordings of time’s passage. Peter Wollen contends that it was 
Warhol’s belief ‘in a certain kind of literalism’105 that made him worried about 
losing moments when changing the reel in his camera during the filming of Sleep in 
1963. The film features the poet John Giorno sleeping in his own bed. Warhol 
filmed hundreds of feet of footage from different angles which was subsequently 
edited by Sarah Dalton, then a sixteen-year-old student. Some of the reels are shown 
in their full length while other ones are made of repetitions of short sections.
106
 The 
end result is a 16mm film appearing ‘to be one continuous night of sleep’107 running 
five hours and twenty-one minutes.  
          Warhol had already experimented with the form in his previous film Kiss 
from 1963 where several couples kiss for three minutes each, the film lasting fifty 
minutes in total. The film, which was shot at twenty-four frames per second, was 
projected at sixteen frames per second, as were all Warhol’s silent films. This 
resulted in, as Stephen Koch remarks, ‘an unchanging but barely perceptible slow 
motion’.108 The mesmerising and hallucinatory effect of the slowing down is a play 
between literal and represented time. As Lee notes, the films ‘are one and the same 
time both representation and experience of duration, both subject and object’.109 
Perhaps the most accurate and somewhat excruciating example is Empire from 
1964. Shot by Jonas Mekas from the forty-fourth floor of the Time-Life building, 
the film features the Empire State Building from early evening onwards for eight 
hours. Nothing much happens: dusk turns into night, the building is illuminated, a 
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pigeon flies by, and at one point Warhol’s reflection can be seen on the window. Of 
course, the absence of action is relative. In fact, a lot happens if one pays attention. 
Lee argues that ‘the building is both actor and clock; and much as the business of 
clock watching, it produces an anxiety around what may or may not happen, what 
may or may not occur in the not-too-distant future’.110 And it is the film’s ‘demands 
upon our patience’111 that produces its pull, if not excitement. Its sixteen frames per 
second projection speed, Koch argues, ‘is a technique that faintly dislocates the 
pressure of real time, extends it, and makes it just slightly Other, in a lush, subtle 
experience of movement and time possible only in film’.112  
Lee contends that ‘In its peculiar tracking of time in (fictive) real time, Empire 
offers a perversely meditative experience, fidgeting continuously between moments 
of sheer restlessness, boredom, and pronounced anticipation’.113 Warhol once said: 
I can see a murder mystery one night, and then see it a second time the next 
night and still not know who did it until the very last minute. [...] I guess time is 
actually the best plot – the suspense of seeing if you’ll remember.114  
 
Empire would seem to be the perfect film for a person like Warhol, then, who could 
watch the whole thing in anticipation. In reality, Warhol himself would leave only a 
few minutes into screenings of the film because he found it irredeemably boring.
115
 
Lee sees Empire as ‘a satiric litmus test for the distracted masses’ who were at the 
time also confronted with what McLuhan described as the “mosaic mesh” of the 
television.
116
 Empire’s duration was the ultimate experience of making sense of ever 
increasing fragmentation of 1960s culture. Warhol’s silent films are a canny partner 
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to his screen tests which comment more overtly on the growing television culture, 
especially the world of fame and celebrities. Made between 1964 and 1966 and 
totalling 472 films, the screen tests are three minute silent films of Warhol’s friends 
and acquaintances posing for the camera as if auditioning for a film. And while 
some of the sitters pose like professionals either silently or while engaging in talking 
or singing, others become more and more uncomfortable as the minutes roll on and 
their fidgeting becomes evident. The early portraits of Barbara Rose and John 
Giorno, for example, are almost completely without any movement. They are also 
carefully lit and thus resemble studio photography rather than moving images. On 
the other hand there are films with more performative qualities, such as Donyale 
Luna ‘demonstrating her modelling moves’ and Harry Smith ‘making Eskimo string 
figures’.117 When their three minutes are up the camera simply stops rolling. With 
their inaction, stillness and lack of a climax the screen tests follow the rhetoric of 
the long silent films. Their duration, however, is considerably shorter and precise. 
The three minutes are the shorter version of the fifteen minutes of limelight Warhol 
predicted everyone will have in his perhaps most well-known statement. 
The statement itself is an interesting illustration of the cultural context. Reva 
Wolf points out that Warhol’s statement ‘in the future, everyone will be world-
famous for fifteen minutes’ refers to the length of several television and radio 
programmes which remained fifteen minutes long until 1963.
118
  Warhol’s use of 
media and pop culture as his frame of reference for measuring time and his 
understanding of celebrity culture as the production of goods (celebrities) for instant 
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consumption would seem to follow the logic of just-in-time production. In some 
ways, then, Warhol’s work reflects the logics of both Toffler and MacLuhan. The 
speeding up of production and of consumption seems to be reflected in Warhol’s 
practice which he saw as a factory churning out art for mass consumption (although 
for celebrity prices). His impatience with the present and fascination with the future 
and immediacy (to have everything now and to throw away the chocolate box) is a 
counterpart of flexible accumulation. However, I will come to argue that Warhol’s 
work also questions that logic and it does so perhaps without really meaning to. But 
first I examine some of the similarities between the work of Warhol and Newman to 
examine how they responded to the same problems with different tools. 
          In his writing on a trip he made to Akron, Ohio in 1949, Newman describes 
his experience of the Miamisburg mound and the Fort Ancient and Newark 
earthworks in which he finds ‘the self-evident nature of the artistic act, its utter 
simplicity’.119 The trip was a turning point of sorts for Newman as it helped him to 
articulate the questions he had been exploring in his work. Questioning the emphasis 
on space in art, Newman declares his interest: ‘The concern with space bores me. I 
insist on my experiences of sensations of time’.120 In his article ‘The New American 
Painting’ in 1959 Lawrence Alloway wrote about how Newman’s and Pollock’s 
early big pictures ‘create space by occupying it literally’.121 Michael Auping 
suggests that ‘the most significant and ambitious contribution of postwar American 
art resides in an evolution in which form is subordinated to a monumental sense of 
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place’.122 However, what Newman was looking for in his vast paintings of 
monochrome fields and the famous zip was an experience of time, of being 
enveloped. Newman gave the name ‘zip’ to the stripes that inhabit his monochrome 
canvasses. Most often running down the canvas vertically, the zips began with 
Moment in 1946. Previous stripes in Newman’s earlier paintings start from the top 
of the canvas but either stop in the middle (Untitled, 1946) or narrow down as they 
reach the bottom of the canvas (The Beginning, 1946).  
However, it took two more years before the significance of the stripes 
became apparent to Newman. Painting Onement I in 1948 was ‘a founding moment’ 
and Newman spent several months contemplating the change the painting was 
asserting on his art. The simplicity of the deep red colour plane together with one 
central stripe was a powerful device for making the viewer present. Although the 
emphasis on space in the abstract expressionist paintings was also discussed with 
reference to Newman’s work, Newman certainly wrote more extensively than other 
artists or critics on the issue of time. In his notes on his Ohio trip, Newman writes: 
‘Only time can be felt in private. Space is a common property. Only time is 
personal, a private experience. ... Each person must feel it for himself’.123 As 
Richard Shiff argues, Newman considered time to be ‘a sensory and psychological 
phenomenon best understood through an artist’s experience rather than through the 
scientist’s analysis, the philosopher’s logic, or the historian’s rational 
interpretation’.124 Newman did not see himself as ‘a painter of ideas’.125 Irving 
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Sandler argues that ‘the effect of his color-fields is not intellectual but one of an 
engulfing chromatic sensation whose immediacy inhibits cerebration’.126 But unlike 
the paintings of other abstract expressionists such as Pollock, Willem de Kooning, 
and Mark Rothko each of whom, according to Meyer Schapiro, ‘seeks an absolute in 
which the receptive viewer can lose himself’,127 Newman wanted the viewer (and 
the painter) ‘to become self-aware’.128  
In his exploration of the idea of time in his art, Newman comes very close to 
Fried’s idea of the total situation. Unlike his Modernist and Abstract Expressionist 
contemporaries, Newman wanted his paintings to include the beholder, to make 
them a bodily presence within the work. He sought to be rid of given spatial 
abstraction and investigated non-picturesque places that could not be captured by 
formal representation. Those places included open expanses of prairie, the Northern 
tundra and conditions of thick, impenetrable snow or fog known as whiteout. For 
Newman, such empty expanses offered a situation where ‘You’re not looking at 
anything. But you yourself become very visible’.129 For Newman, Onement I did 
exactly that. The sensation of presence that the viewer should feel when looking at 
his paintings was an important idea for Newman. He insisted that the best place to 
exhibit his massive paintings would be in a small gallery. ‘At his first one-man 
show’, Michael Auping notes, ‘he had a note pinned to the wall asking visitors to 
stand between six and seven feet away from the paintings, a particularly short 
distance for viewing such large works’.130 In instructing the viewer on where to 
stand and how to view the work, Newman was actively thinking about the body of 
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the beholder, in fact in accordance with later concerns in Minimalist work. The 
viewer is part of the work and its duration. 
          It was in the late 1950s that Newman finally found his fame, or when the art 
audience found Newman. He had gone unnoticed to a large degree until his 1958 
solo show at Bennington College in Vermont. His subsequent exhibition in New 
York in 1959 brought him, as Sarah K. Rich contends, ‘more serious attention from 
critics’.131 It also made younger artists take notice. For example, Robert Smithson 
has acknowledged how his work from the late 1950s ‘grew out of Barnett 
Newman’.132 Richard Serra noted of Newman’s paintings:  
They’re great when you have to walk by them and immerse yourself in the 
divisions of their spaces... Then time becomes a factor: the physical time it 
takes you to see it and walk across it.
133
 
It is perhaps Newman’s comparison of ‘the “visual experience of the painting” to an 
“encounter with a person, a living being”’134 which illustrates Newman’s influence 
and the subsequent similarities between Newman’s work with its focus on presence 
and the work of the Minimalists. Shiff argues that, ‘Common opinion in 1969 was 
that Newman had fathered a reductive or minimalist look in large-scale painting and 
sculpture’,135 like those of Frank Stella and Donald Judd. It is here that one finds 
interesting similarities between Newman’s and Warhol’s work.  
On reseeing Warhol’s silent films, Jonas Mekas noted on meaning in 
Warhol’s work: 
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Yes, the duration, that’s the word. There are certain ideas, feelings, certain 
contents which are structured in time. The literal meanings you can spell out 
through climaxes... But the real meaning, the one that is beyond the literal 
meaning, can be caught only through structuring time. That applies equally 
to feelings and thoughts.
136
  
One might suggest that this quote from Mekas could easily apply to Newman as 
well. Subject matter was important to Newman and his abstractions were not mere 
formalism but one had to arrive at their meaning, arriving referring here of course to 
the duration it takes to come to something. In Newman’s case that was often the 
sense of the moment, the presence of oneself. Newman’s zip was a vital element in 
facilitating ‘a sensation of ‘presence’ in the viewer’.137 In her essay on the function 
and naming of Newman’s zip, Rich argues:  
Painted in hues that would allow them to be seen less as figures against 
ground and more as seams conjoining disparate fields, these stripes flattened 
the pictorial space of the painting, calling attention to the immediate surface 
of the canvas and to viewers’ direct engagement with it.138 
 
Warhol’s and Newman’s meanings could be said to be accessible on the surface. 
Warhol famously said: ‘If you want to know all about Andy Warhol, just look at the 
surface: of my paintings and films and me, and there I am. There’s nothing behind 
it’.139 Donna De Salvo argues that Warhol ‘understood the implications of surface in 
contemporary culture. ... The idea is to sell the sizzle rather than the meat. One can 
say that what Warhol painted was not the thing itself, but the feeling that it evoked; 
not the image, but the afterimage’.140 And it is an intriguing emphasis on surface 
that governs the viewing of Warhol’s silent films and screen tests.  
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However, unlike much of Warhol’s work before his silent films, this is not 
the stuff of conveyor belt production and seriality. In their insistence on slowness 
and unproductivity the films demand attention and like Newman’s paintings, make 
one visible. As Lee suggests in her reading of the work of On Kawara, one can find 
here ‘an ethic of slowness and commitment’.141 Lee sees this slowness as enacting  
an ethic of surviving, strategizing, under the sign of postmodernism, 
however much without fanfare, with a staunch diligence to the Everyday that 
runs counter to the seeming inexhaustibility of this present.
142
   
And yet, no one ever really sees all of it, all of the eight hours of Empire or the five 
hours of Sleep. Although the screenings of Empire in the 1960s were sold out 
sometimes, people spent their time going in and out of the theatre, spending more 
time in the lobby talking to their friends and occasionally going in to see a snippet 
of the (in)action. It became a back drop to a night out. As Lee argues, Empire 
‘stands as an allegory for time located elsewhere’.143 In that way Empire and all of 
Warhol’s early films occupy ground somewhere between resisting the time of 
production and yet commenting on and succumbing to its fragmentation. Indeed, all 
his work discussed here seems to be closest to the logic of Toffler and MacLuhan, to 
a throw-away society and the pervasiveness of media, but also inverting that logic 
while not quite consciously aiming to.  
          Newman and Warhol, I would argue, addressed similar concerns but used 
different approaches and tools to do so. Indeed, as similar as the effects Newman 
and Warhol achieved were, their methods could not have been more different. For 
Newman it was imperative that he himself made his own art ‘from beginning to 
                                                          
141
 Lee, p. 307 
142
 Lee, p. 307 
143
 Lee, p. 287 
68 
 
end’.144 He stated: ‘There’s something about painting which I don’t possibly feel I 
can turn over actually to anybody else’.145 Warhol, on the other hand, not only made 
his work with machines but had several assistants when doing both prints and film. 
In fact, Warhol famously expressed a desire to be a machine, it would seem both in 
the sense of entering ‘a world of pure seriality and standardisation’146 that Wollen 
suggests and in the sense of what Wolf refers to as actors being the machines of the 
film studio.
147
 Wolf notes how Marilyn Monroe once said: ‘[an] actor is not a 
machine, no matter how much they want to say you are...This is supposed to be an 
art form, not just a manufacturing establishment.’148 For Warhol it seemed to be 
important to think of art as nothing but a manufacturing establishment. The 
machine-like quality of his working methods makes apparent Marcuse’s 
administrative logic and thus questions the valorisation of the individual artist and 
authentic subjectivity. For Marcuse, ‘The artistic alienation has become as 
functional as the architecture of the new theatres and concert halls in which it is 
performed. And here too, the rational and the evil are inseparable’.149 However, it 
could be argued that it was the same logic that partook in the circulation of meaning 
in Newman’s work. In her discussion of how Newman ended up calling his 
signature stripes “zips”, Rich contends that ‘Newman deployed an idiom appropriate 
to the art world and popular culture of the 1960s’.150 Newman began to call his 
vertical stripes zips during the mid-1960s. Drawing attention to the onomatopoeic 
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nature of the word and its similarity with the ‘bangs’ and other short words used in 
cartoon Pop art like that of Roy Lichtenstein, Rich argues that Newman’s 
development of the term zip was initially intended to convey a metaphysical 
message through a vocabulary spoken in a new art world. It was a means of 
engaging Pop art on its own turf, with the primary intent of refuting its 
popular superficiality and commercial connotations.
151
 
 
However, as Rich notes, the term zip ‘may appear problematic as a proper name 
because the term carries connotations and names a class of objects rather than a 
singular entity’.152  Like Campbell’s soup it became a brand name guaranteeing the 
consumer consistent quality. Thus, Rich argues, ‘Newman produced a term that 
compromised the very operations of presence he valued’.153 Or in Marcuse’s words, 
‘they [have] become cogs in a culture-machine which remakes their content’.154  
4 End of endlessness: Beginning performance 
As we have seen, it was the body, whether the embodied encounter with a presence 
of another person Fried found in Minimalism or the viewer’s body made visible in 
front of Newman’s sublime and similarly Warhol’s ‘bored’ body, which came to 
mediate temporal concerns in the art of the 1960s. I will now focus on thinking 
about the body that emerged in the performance of that decade. Morris’ thinking 
about sculpture and its forms had begun to take shape in the early 1960s and was 
developed in tandem with his performance work. In 1961 Morris was given seven 
minutes of performance time with the Judson Dance Theater. His performance was a 
hollow column which stood still for the first three and a half minutes. It was then 
made to topple and lay on the floor for another three and a half minutes. Morris’ 
1965 performance Site involved him moving and manipulating white plywood 
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screens and gradually revealing the artist Carolee Schneemann reclining on a 
makeshift bed as Manet’s Olympia. In her phenomenological reading of the 
decade’s sculpture, Rosalind Krauss argues that theatre or performance became a 
way to re-position or re-plot sculpture. The kind of work such as Morris’ minimalist, 
unitary shapes are ‘central to the reformulation of the sculptural enterprise: what the 
object is, how we know it, and what it means to ‘know it’’.155 And ‘knowing it’ in 
phenomenological terms means that one is not capable of reconstituting the object 
‘regardless of one’s own position’.156 Indeed, ‘meaning arises only from this 
position and this perspective’.157 Thus, Minimalism used theatricality and 
performance in order to ‘produce an operational divide between the sculptural object 
and the preconceptions about knowledge that the viewer might have both about it 
and himself’.158  
Krauss’ positioning of performance as ancillary to sculpture might tell us 
something about performance’s place in the historiography of art. The artists whose 
work Krauss discusses as performance are mostly visual artists who use 
performance as a way to solve a sculptural problem. That is to say, or Krauss seems 
to say, performance is only useful when employed as a tool in the process of making 
visual art. However, the artists I have chosen to focus on here are the same that 
Krauss analyses, Robert Morris and Bruce Nauman. In choosing them I not only 
wish to point to how performance has been figured in the hierarchy of art history but 
through focusing on the work of Nauman and Morris in tandem with Yvonne Rainer 
I wish to present a useful meeting point which highlights the intertwining issues and 
concerns in different art forms. For Morris performance seemed to be a way of 
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finding an angle to approach his sculpture at later on whereas for Nauman 
performance led his later work to use the medium of film. As for Rainer, sculpture 
in some instances became a way to reconfigure dance (reversing somewhat Krauss’ 
trajectory). This nexus of overcoming and dealing with the issues is an important 
instance as it exemplifies the genealogy of making time visible. 
           While studying at the University of California at Davis during the mid-1960s, 
Nauman started using performance as well as video and film. One of his earliest 
performances in 1965  involved Nauman, as he describes it, ‘standing with my back 
to the wall for about forty-five seconds or a minute, leaning out from the wall, then 
bending at the waist, squatting, sitting, and finally lying down’.159  This sequence of 
seven different positions was then repeated four times, ‘standing away from the 
wall, facing the wall, then facing left and facing right’.160 Lasting for half an hour, 
the performance reconfigures sculpture by using the body as material, a central 
feature of Nauman’s work and one born out of necessity as that was often the only 
material Nauman found in his studio. The performance was made into a video in 
1968 and called Wall-Floor Positions. Another performance from the same year was 
entitled Manipulating a Fluorescent Tube and involved, as Nauman explains, ‘using 
my body as one element and the light as another, treating them as equivalent and 
just making shapes’.161 Also later made into a film, the performance establishes 
interesting connections between the work of Nauman and Morris as it ‘articulate[s] 
the artist’s deepest concerns about art as a durable form of labor and the implication 
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of the body in the execution of art’.162 Furthermore, around the same time that 
Morris was performing Site, Nauman made a film Manipulating the T Bar where he 
‘goes through a series of manipulations of two long plumber pipes in the form of a 
T’.163 Examining the relationship between object and body both artists explore the 
qualities of time in the experience of art. Many of Nauman’s videos and films 
involve the artist taking up an activity in the solitude of his work place. Film and 
video works such as Stamping in the Studio (1968), Walking in an Exaggerated 
Manner around the Perimeter of a Square (1967-68) and Bouncing in the Corner, 
No 1 (1968) present the artist engaging in simple activities like stamping or in more 
choreographed exercises like walking carefully along a square. But rather than 
seeing himself as a sculptor using dance, Nauman considered himself as solving a 
dance problem: 
...I guess I thought of what I was doing sort of as dance because I was 
familiar with some of the things that [Merce] Cunningham had done and 
some other dancers, where you can take any simple movement and make it 
into a dance, just by presenting it as a dance.
164
  
The performance activities in Nauman’s films and videos examine ‘the kinds of 
tension that arise when you try to balance and can’t. Or do something for a long 
time and get tired’.165  
          For Nauman, his films and videotapes constituted either performances or a 
record of a performance.
166
 Sometimes a solitary performance turned into a video 
                                                          
162
 Robert Riley, ‘Bruce Nauman’s Philosophical and Material Explorations in Film and Video’, in A 
Rose Has No Teeth: Bruce Nauman in the 1960s, ed. by Constance M. Lewallen, (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 2007), pp. 171 – 192, (p. 182). 
163
 Constance M. Lewallen, ‘A Rose Has No Teeth’, in A Rose Has No Teeth: Bruce Nauman in the 
1960s, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2007), pp. 7 – 118 (p. 38). 
164
 Nauman, in Lorraine Sciarra, ‘Bruce Nauman’ [1972], in Please Pay Attention Please: Bruce 
Nauman’s Words, ed. by Janet Kraynak, (London: The MIT Press, 2005) , pp. 155 - 171, (p. 166). 
165
 Nauman, in Willoughby Sharp, ‘Interview with Bruce Nauman’, in Avalanche 2 (Winter 1971), 
pp. 22 – 31, reprinted in Please Pay Attention Please: Bruce Nauman’s Words, ed. by Janet Kraynak, 
(London: The MIT Press, 2005) , pp. 133 - 154, (p. 142). 
166
 Nauman, p. 138 
73 
 
got turned into a performance again as in the case of Bouncing in the Corner which 
Nauman performed with Meredith Monk and his wife Judy Nauman at the ‘Anti-
Illusion’ exhibition in 1969 at the Whitney Museum in New York. One objective of 
Nauman’s work was how to make sculpture and video meet. For Nauman, one of 
the first successful pieces to do so was his Performance Corridor in 1969. The 
sculpture is a corridor made of two screen walls placed so that the remaining space 
between them is very narrow. The viewer walks down the corridor and approaching 
the end sees her back on a television screen moving away. The previous year 
Nauman had made a video entitled Walk with Contrapposto where he walks down a 
similarly narrow corridor swinging his hips. Although Performance Corridor was 
dependent on the viewer to realise it as a piece of work, it was important to Nauman 
that the situation was ‘as limiting as possible’167 and that the viewer could not ‘make 
their own performance out of [his] art’.168 Janet Kraynak argues that what the 
restrictions of the situation and the fact that the corridor was measured by the width 
of Nauman’s swaying hips meant was that ‘the artist’s performance is essentially 
repeated by the viewer – his/her actions physically limited by the confines of the 
space’.169 Kraynak goes on to argue that, 
the Corridor’s meaning issues not from an individual act of bodily 
intervention, performed by the viewer in the presence of the artwork, but 
from a compression of many moments: the past traces of Nauman’s 
‘original’ performance; their repetition in video; and their present and future 
reiterations by the audience.
170
 
 
Thinking of the performance as a repetition of layers added on by different 
‘subjects’ is possibly a powerful mechanism for reconfiguring the temporal in this 
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case. It points to an endlessness and yet requires an active participation to keep it 
going.  
         A certain sense of on-goingness or endurance is a key component in all of 
Nauman’s early films and videotapes. Whether three minutes or an hour in duration, 
they are all meant to run repeatedly and uninterrupted. For Nauman it was important 
that ‘one should be able to come in at any time and nothing would change’.171 Four 
films in particular align Nauman’s concerns over endlessness with those earlier 
presented in Warhol’s work. All made in 1969, Black Balls, Bouncing Balls, Gauze 
and Pulling Mouth were shot with an industrial high-speed camera. The result when 
played in normal speed is slow motion where nothing seems to move at all. 
According to Nauman, ‘you sort of notice the thing is different from time to 
time’.172 Running for about ten minutes, the films consist of repetitive actions in 
extreme close-up, such as putting black make up on testicles, stroking or bouncing 
testicles, pulling gauze out of the mouth and making faces. By slowing down time, 
the films turn performance into an endless loop situated somewhere in between 
photography and sculpture. 
          In her practice Yvonne Rainer was striving to make her dance more akin to 
sculpture. She notes: 
I remember thinking that dance was at a disadvantage in relation to sculpture 
in that the spectator could spend as much time as he required to examine a 
sculpture, walk around it and so forth – but a dance movement – because it 
happened in time – vanished as soon as it was executed.173 
 
In response to this need Rainer created a solo called The Bells which was performed 
at the Living Theater in 1961. In it she repeated the same seven movements for eight 
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minutes. She notes: ‘It was not exact repetition, as the sequence of the movements 
kept changing. They also underwent changes through being repeated in different 
directions – in a sense allowing the spectator to ‘walk around it’’.174 Rainer was at 
the time looking for new movement and found it in task-based activities which 
produced a pedestrian quality of movement and was focused on the real time of the 
body. She stated: ‘What is seen is a control that seems geared to the actual time it 
takes the actual weight of the body to go through the prescribed motions, rather than 
an adherence to an imposed ordering of time’.175 Her 1965 performance Parts of 
Some Sextets was a piece for 10 performers and a pile of twelve mattresses. It 
consisted of movement like running and walking, still formations of people, tasks 
like taking mattresses off the pile one by one as well as more choreographed 
phrases.  
The performance was structured by placing the different activities on a chart 
that had a vertical axis for the thirty-one choices of movement material and eighty-
four horizontal units for thirty second intervals of time. Rainer then scattered marks 
on each crossing of material and a time unit so that some actions could be performed 
by several people at the same time and the same activity could be repeated. Carrie 
Lambert-Beatty argues that in this crossing of the systematic and randomness ‘time 
is conceived as a strip or a linear container’,176 time as something to be filled rather 
than time generated by activity.
177
 Thinking of time as a structure was omnipresent 
in the 1960s and as Lambert-Beatty points out, one sees it in ‘Andy Warhol’s Screen 
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Tests and many other experiments throughout this period determined by the 
linear/temporal limits of a reel of film or videotape’.178 John Cage’s work had 
already displayed a similar way of thinking about time during his earlier works as he 
emphasised attuning to different modes of perception and thus bringing in the 
immediate environment. His 1952 composition 4’33 in its strictly marked-out 
durational structure, three movements for an orchestra who do not play a single 
note, the composition is, as Lambert-Beatty notes,  ‘a temporal unit’ ‘filled and then 
refilled in every performance’.179  
Similarly, some of the Happenings by Cage, Robert Rauschenberg, David 
Tudor and Merce Cunningham, which must be taken into account when talking 
about contributions towards thinking or theorising about time in this period, were 
made up of, what were called, compartments, which were sequences of time filled 
with predetermined, although chance-operated, material. As Michael Kirby 
elucidates: 
Compartment structure is based on the arrangement and contiguity of 
theatrical units that are completely self-contained and hermetic. No 
information is passed from one discrete theatrical unit – or ‘compartment’ – 
to another. The compartments may be arranged sequentially...or 
simultaneously...
180
  
Allan Kaprow’s 18 Happenings in 6 Parts which was presented in 1959 at the 
Reuben Gallery in New York is an example of just such structure. The gallery space 
was ‘subdivided into compartments; and every sequence of events occurred at a 
specific moment’.181  
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          Considering these different structures, the compartments in Happenings, the 
linear containers being filled and refilled, and the looping repetition seen in both 
Morris’ sculpture and his performance work, what becomes apparent are what 
George Kubler terms as ‘manifold shapes of time‘.182 Important to the thinking of 
such artists as Morris and Robert Smithson, Kubler, an architectural historian, 
argues in his 1962 book The Shape of Time: Remarks on the History of Things: ‘The 
aim of the historian, regardless of his specialty in erudition, is to portray time’.183 
Furthermore, Kubler contends, the historian ‘is committed to the detection and 
description of the shape of time’.184 For Kubler, an analysis of historical time that 
was ‘not mere transfer by analogy from biological science’185 meant articulating 
different shapes of time that would acknowledge that ‘[e]very action is more 
intermittent than it is continuous, and the intervals between actions are infinitely 
variable in duration and content’.186 By looking at the works discussed here, we 
begin to see different treatments of time that portray the concerns prevalent during 
this period as the events and changes of the 1960s created a decade where the 
temporal was characterised by different pulls from various contradictory directions.  
 In her reading of the decade and its art, Lee finds an endlessness that not 
only defines the 1960s but characterizes the art made during that period. ‘The sixties 
are endless’, Lee argues.187 In fact, ‘We still live within them’.188 She traces this 
tendency in the ‘on and on’ duration that Fried so detested in Minimalism, in Robert 
Smithson’s ideas on entropy and in particular, she finds an infinity in the works of 
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Warhol and On Kawara. For Lee, both artists, Warhol through the bad infinity of his 
silent films and Kawara through the longue durée of his Today Series, lay bare an 
‘interminable now: the present repeated as futurity’.189  However, Heathfield argues 
that ‘this association between a durational aesthetic and a sense of endlessness... is 
perhaps less secure when one considers duration in art in relation to the performing 
and (spectating) body’.190 As performance began to figure more prominently 
towards the end of the 1960s, becoming a major art form in the 1970s, its 
‘manifestations of corporeity’ brought, according to Heathfield, ‘something 
resolutely material and fleshy’.191 That is why, as Heathfield points out, 
performance is always ‘imbued with a sense of mortality and finitude’.192 Nauman’s 
desire for on-goingness in his films and videotapes presents a useful example here. 
His anger in a film entitled Bouncing Two Balls between the Floor and Ceiling with 
Changing Rhythms (1967-68) is a perfect example of the failure of endlessness. 
Losing his pace while trying to establish a rhythm by bouncing balls in his studio, 
Nauman throws one of the balls against the wall as he gets ‘really mad’.193 Feeling 
that there should be no beginning or end to the film and therefore the activity should 
never stop, Nauman’s anger comes from him ‘losing control of the game’.194 The 
human body has intervened and broken the rules.  
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5 Restaging the 1960s 
And so it ends. In his essay on McLuhan John Cage contends that he ‘has greatly 
influenced many artists simply by encouraging them to continue their work’.195 
Noting how McLuhan has revealed the cause of the then-current social change to be 
the effect of electronics on sense perception, Cage argued: 
Art and now music in this century serve to open people’s eyes and ears to the 
enjoyment of their daily environment. We are now, McLuhan tells us, no 
longer separate from this environment. New art and music do not 
communicate an individual’s conceptions in ordered structures, but they 
implement processes which are, as our daily lives are, opportunities for 
perception (observation and listening). McLuhan emphasizes this shift from 
life done for us to life that we do for ourselves.
196
 
 
The focus on doing things for ourselves was a prominent aspect both in the plastic 
arts as well as in performance. Another key feature of the art making of the time was 
bringing art and everyday together, particularly demonstrated by the Fluxus 
movement. George Brecht’s Time Table Event from 1961 consists of a railway 
station and a duration to be chosen from a timetable. As Ina Blom elucidates, ‘the 
piece consists of anything happening within that duration’.197 Furthermore, as Blom 
argues, here “event’ measures time just as much in terms of pre-existing phenomena 
or objects’.198 Time, therefore, ‘is conceived much like a sort of secret agent whose 
way of operating is either warp or continual metamorphosis’.199 The aim of this 
chapter has been to pinpoint some of the instances in the 1960s where time has 
become a central issue in art and all the work discussed has suggested varying ways 
of rethinking the temporal. By holding side by side some of those examples we 
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begin to find trajectories of ideas and concerns that run through the decade as well 
as stepping off points for work to come in later decades that have in one way or 
another grown from similar approaches. As discussed in the first section, it was 
Fried’s essay that most succinctly named the thing and labelled, at least for those 
looking at the decade retrospectively, the debate as a temporal problem. That ‘Art 
and Objecthood’ has since become a canonised text in art history is interesting when 
considering the spatialisation of time in the writing. It, in fact, poses a greater 
question of how to talk and write about time without thinking about it in spatial 
terms. It is a question which is a central concern in this thesis. I will come back to 
the spatialisation of time in detail in Chapter 4.
200
  
          The 1960s are endless in some sense, especially when one looks at the 
plethora of re-enactments of work from the decade. Simone Forti’s Huddle from 
1961 was performed at Museum of Modern Art in New York in 2009 as part of 
Performance Exhibition Series along with work by Yvonne Rainer’s. In 2008 Andre 
Lepecki took on the restaging of Allan Kaprow’s 18 Happenings in 6 Parts. And 
also in 2009, The Performance Group’s 1968 work Dionysus in ’69 was re-enacted 
in Texas by Rude Mechanicals. Discussing the trend in his article ‘”There’s 
Something Happenin’ Here...’ Richard Schechner notes that,  
restaging 18 Happenings put Lepecki – and by inference, audiences – 
directly in touch with Kaprow’s kaprowness. Or, to put it in another way, 
redoing the Happening was the only way to ‘know’ it as an artwork 
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analogous to how a museum viewer may ‘know’ a painting by seeing it 
(however out of context, however removed from in time from the occasion 
of its being painted). This sense of ‘first encounter’ is a core reason for the 
spate of restagings we are witnessing – and why we are bound to see a lot 
more of them.
201
 
 
The notion of the first encounter in Schechner’s argument will be taken up in more 
detail later on in this thesis in Chapter 5 but for now it is interesting to note how 
many of the restagings we are seeing today are of work from the 1960s. Schechner 
finds the reason for this in the possibility to engage in the feeling of creating 
something new that the original works had when ‘[u]topia was not yet a farce’.202 
Placing what he sees as some of the failures of the last decade next to the 
achievements of the 1960s Schechner concludes: ‘No wonder at the artistic level so 
many are fascinated with the past’.203 Growing out of nostalgia or not, what the 
trend of re-enactments highlights is that the 1960s of the 1960s is of course different 
from the 1960s of 2010. From October 2010 until January 2011, The Yvonne Rainer 
Project ran at BFI Gallery at the South Bank, part of which was a weekly 
performance of her most famous piece of work, Trio A. One cannot but notice how 
this piece has become established in the canon of performance art and dance history. 
Having developed out of Rainer’s concerns outlined in her No Manifesto (‘no to 
spectacle’, ‘no to the transcendency of the star image’), Trio A is now itself the star 
of the new dance of the 1960s.   
          In addition to the growing institutionalisation of studies on time and future, 
the 1960s also marked a new phase of theorisation on time in art prompted by a host 
of issues rising from the new systems of just-in-time production and the 
incorporation of media as discussed above. Krauss’ book Passages in Modern 
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Sculpture was the first coherent attempt to gather together the debates and 
discussion that had happened during the decade. However, considering the plethora 
of works tackling the issue of temporality in the 1960s, it is surprising that it took 
some years after Krauss’ book for the discussion on time in art and its experience to 
resurface again. Lee argues that the ‘engagement with time on the part of artists and 
critics’ in the 1960s ‘remains largely untreated in the decade’s general histories’ 
despite being ‘so foundational, so basic to any narrative’ about the era and its art.204 
And yet, it is telling that those writings on time in visual art, of which there has been 
a proliferation in recent years, often refer to work from the 1960s.
205
 The concern 
over the temporal has surfaced again in the last ten years not only because the 
beginning of a century and the end of one always sparks anxieties, chronophobia 
even, but perhaps also because of the undeniable acceleration due to the ever 
increasing possibilities brought about by technology. Looking at Warhol’s early 
films, for example, we have seen that when technology becomes omnipresent there 
is a search for a mode of time that is outside its acceleration. And as it is unlikely 
that there will be times of deceleration any time soon, slowness is still one of art’s 
biggest vehicles for resistance. For some that has meant using performance. As 
Lippard points out, ‘Ideally, performance means getting down to the bare bones of 
aesthetic communication – artist/self confronting audience/society’.206 Thus, 
performance’s investigation of operations of time can be seen as an attempt not to 
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succumb ‘to the process of technological rationality’.207 In an ever accelerating 
world an ethics of slowness has proved to be a valuable currency. 
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Chapter 2 
Stay a While: Performance’s Wasteful Duration 
 
 
1 24 Hour Society 
In this chapter I will continue to investigate how, what I called (via Lee) at the end 
of the previous chapter, the ethics of slowness continues to be articulated and 
employed in performance. To that end, I will discuss durational (or long) 
performances and their employment of duration as an invitation to experience a 
different daily rhythm or tempo. In order to do so, I am going to fast forward from 
the 1960s to the end of the 20
th
 century and investigate how by the mid-1990s just-
in-time production and its demands had contributed to the formation of a society 
that is constantly open for business.   
In his 1999 book The 24 Hour Society, Leon Kreitzman argues that, ‘The old 
time-markers – day and night, morning, noon and night, weekday and weekend – 
are losing their relevance. We are having to come to terms with a world that is 
always open’.1 For Kreitzman, a 24 Hour Society, although a slight exaggeration as 
a term, is a present reality. Shops are open later than ever before, while some of the 
supermarkets extending their opening hours around the clock, we work longer hours 
than ever and if nothing else, at least the internet will always be open and on. The 
flexibility of working hours has created a demand for flexibility in trading hours and 
access to consumer goods. As the temporal gap between production and 
consumption decreases so does the need to shop. Kreitzman notes that by the mid-
1990s there was a considerable increase in weekend shopping trips, as well as early 
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morning and late night supermarket use. This was partly made possible by the Shops 
Act 1994 which deregulated UK shopping hours.
2
 Far removed from the regimented 
time of an industrial world, the 24 Hour Society is a suspension of temporal control. 
Kreitzman argues that the 24 Hour Society ‘is about removing constraints’3 and the 
logic of the 24/7 temporal model could be traced to the financial liberation and the 
complete freedom of finance to move in and out of the economy. 
However, one could also argue that instead of a suspension of temporal 
control, the 24 Hour Society brings about an intensification of such control which is 
evident in the demands to constantly produce. For Sylviane Agacinski, such 
intensification is due to the ‘technical hegemony of the West’ which, through 
establishing its productions methods all over the world, unifies the measure of time.
4
 
Agacinski goes on to say that the adoption of the temporal architecture of the West 
also reduces time to its market value. She argues: ‘Western rationality has deployed 
an economics according to which time must be productive, useful, and profitable. 
We must forever ‘gain time’, because time itself gains us something else’.5 Thus, 
the only way to resist the logic of the general economy of time, according to 
Agacinski, is ‘to give our time, to spend it or lose it, to let it pass’.6 As I discussed in 
the previous chapter, this rhetoric around a resistance to capitalism and its economy 
of time is not alien to thinking of performance. For Adrian Heathfield, performance 
is a crucial tool in exposing and contesting the ‘powers that construct social 
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knowledges and experiences of time’.7 In subverting our usual time structures by, 
for example, scheduling performance works at unusual times or stretching the 
duration of performance, performance offers a critique of capitalist economies and 
its demand for productive time. Heathfield contends that in this capitalist culture of 
speed, ‘deploying a contemplative and ‘wasteful’ expenditure of time, performance 
continues its long wrangle with the forces of capital’.8 
So it is this long wrangle with capitalism that performance engages in that I 
examine in this chapter. I do this in reference to what is often termed durational 
performances, that is to say, performance-installations that last from several hours to 
several days (or in some cases for months) where the audiences are invited to come 
and go as they please while the performer(s) stays in the space engaged in 
continuous action. In particular, I examine the basis on which the duration of 
performance constitutes an offer on the part of the artist to the audience to attend. 
Marina Abramović notes that, ‘long durational performances should be [the] answer 
to the fast life’.9 I examine the premise of Abramović’s suggestion that durational 
performance could be an anti-dote of sorts to the speed of the 24 Hour Society. In 
developing the conceptual framework for durational work I examine three case 
studies which construct an audience experience premised on acceptance of certain 
rules of attending to performance duration. I ask what happens to the notion of the 
real in the experience of time in durational work and interrogate some of the terms 
used in discussion around performance’s temporality. In doing so, I analyse 
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Heathfield’s assertion that time can be productively wasted in performance and that 
this wasting produces a form of critique of the daily rhythms in late capitalism. In 
the first part I will outline a theory of performance time from both a theatrical and 
contemporary performance standpoint, and with a focus on durational performances. 
In the second part I launch a Marxist argument regarding time which I develop with 
reference to the Fordist labour model. In the third part I synthesize these ideas in 
relation to three case studies which engage with not only the waste of time (per 
Heathfield) but also the perception of time. 
The case studies include four performances from a live art context: LABOUR 
(2012), Marina Abramović Presents…(2009), and two performances from Tehching 
Hsieh: One Year Performance 1980-1981 and Art/Life One Year Performance 1983-
1984 with Linda Montano. All three performances have different demands and 
approaches to duration and I will examine how they all invite us to attend and 
whether that invitation is actually possible to respond to. I suggest that in LABOUR 
the audience are invited to either drop in for a moment or stay for the whole thing 
while in Marina Abramović Presents…it is seminal to the work that everyone 
attends the whole four hour duration. In Hsieh’s (and Montano’s) one year 
performances, however, staying for any considerable length of time is not a 
possibility and the access for the audience is in fact very tightly controlled. 
Alongside these live art practices I will consider long duration in theatre through 
GATZ (2012) by Elevator Repair Service, and examine the experience of duration it 
pursues and the issues that it presents around work, waste and theatricality. Through 
discussing these examples of durational, or long duration, performance work I wish 
to ask: What can performance’s long duration tell us about time and how we use it? 
88 
 
2 Durational performance 
Durational performance has become an influential part of current live art practices. 
Artists such as Alastair MacLennan, Abramović, La Ribot, Amanda Coogan and 
Kira O’Reilly frequently employ and examine long durations in their work. 
Durational performance has its roots in the practices emerging in the late 1960s such 
as in the work of Vito Acconci, Joseph Beuys, and Abramović and Ulay. As I have 
discussed in Chapter 1, interests and explorations of time were evident in the visual 
art practices in the 1960 and the notion of endlessness, or infinity, were present, for 
example, in the long films of Andy Warhol. According to Heathfield, long duration 
and ‘use of unregulated temporalities (chance operations, contingent forms and 
improvisations) was a means to assert ‘inassimilable’ values’.10 He goes on to say 
that, ‘For those artists whose investment in performance emerges from or is directed 
towards its status as social ritual, its capacity to connect distant times with the 
present, to slide into a liminal temporality, is one of its most vital elements’.11 There 
are two ways then, according to Heathfield, that performance interrupts time: one is 
its potential to interrupt the time of fiction and the other is the way it disrupts the 
time of the spectators. Durational performance is a form of these explorations and 
employments of time. As Heathfield notes, ‘The term “durational” is often used then 
to indicate an art work that draws attention to its temporal constraint as a 
constitutive element of its meaning.’12 Durational performances vary in length and 
can be anything from four hours (or depending on the task even two) to a year, such 
as in Tehching Hsieh’s and Linda Montano’s practices.  
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Similarly, reasons for making durational work vary. For Tim Etchells, 
durational performance is freedom from the tyranny of theatre’s economy which 
’forces one to deal with the ergonomic shape of an hour and a half – the pattern of 
‘start’, ‘middle’ and ‘end’ that produces a satisfactory feeling of closure’.13 But that 
tyranny is also two hours with an interval, in the evening, during a time that is 
designated as leisure time. It reflects the notion of culture as something that is 
allocated free time, a hobby.
14
 Durational performance, then, not only challenges 
theatre’s conventions but could also said to be confronting our use of leisure time. 
As Hans-Thies Lehmann states, in drama, ‘Time as such is meant to disappear, to be 
reduced to an unnoticeable condition of being of the action.’15  According to this 
logic, live art practices and durational performance in particular present a way then 
to expose the mechanics of that time that theatre is so keen to hide.  
For Abramović, durational performance is ‘an energy dialogue’16 where the 
spectators become invested in co-creation. This suggests a shared ‘time-out’, a 
moment of time the audience take, as if somehow together, out of their normal lives. 
In such work, there is an attempt towards spiritual exchange or charge, or, in 
Lehmann’s words, an unrepeatable ‘self-transformation’.17 In this sense, it differs 
from Jonathan Kalb’s statement that unlike theatre, durational live art practices (or 
performance art) consider themselves to have ‘little obligation to adjust to 
audiences, or even acknowledge them’.18 I think there is in Kalb’s account a lack of 
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consideration of the body and artists’ intention towards the co-creation of an event. 
In fact, Kalb is missing the significance of questioning the structure of the contract 
between artist and spectator in live art. In Contract with the Skin, Kathy O’Dell 
argues that through their work, the 1970s body artists ‘could dramatize the 
importance of a transaction that is often overlooked or taken for granted’.19 It is in 
fact this relationship or contract between performer and spectator that comes to the 
fore in live art. Kalb’s statement is somewhat odd when one considers that it is 
theatre, certainly realist and naturalist, which does not adjust to or acknowledge its 
audience. I would argue, along with O’Dell, that in live art, the relationship between 
audience and performer is one of complicity. However, O’Dell points out that the 
contract in live art is one ‘that we all make with others but that may not be in our 
own best interests’.20 In other words, the spectator is implicated in the action and 
carries a responsibility for taking part. This notion of the contract as something that 
does not carry an assumption that an audience needs to be entertained continues to 
be explored in current live art practices. I will discuss this further when considering 
Marina Abramović Presents… In so doing I will focus on the different agencies 
operating in durational performances and consider the overlapping times of the 
performer, spectator and the performance.  
Lara Shalson notes that ‘the distinction between theatre and performance art 
is routinely based in practices of bodily endurance, and such practices are 
commonly described as antitheatrical’.21 Shalson goes on to trouble this routine 
assumption by discussing the theatricality of bodily endurance in Forced 
Entertainment’s theatre work. Through my three performance examples I discuss 
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how what Etchells calls freedom from theatre economy’s tyranny manifests in 
durational performances and to what extent ‘real’ time as found in durational 
performances is antitheatrical. I am also interested here in making a distinction 
between the terms ‘durational’ and ‘endurance’, which I find to be crucial in this 
discussion. Indeed, durational performance continues to be topical because of its 
pursuit of temporality as something real, that is to say both performer and audience 
feel the flow or fall of time in real time. As Lehmann notes above, time is meant to 
disappear in drama. However, does not theatre in fact make the spectators more 
aware of the gap between the time of the stage (the action) and the time of the 
auditorium? Furthermore, I will examine the terms that are used to describe the 
experience of time in live art practices. 
3 Work time 
I begin by setting up a framework for thinking about current work practices in order 
to then examine how durational performance fits into the temporal structures of late 
capitalism. For Agacinski, the ‘temporal architecture’ of the West and its production 
methods is one where the value of time has been ‘reduced to the market value of 
work time’.22 The industrial age brought with it ever more strictly organised time 
frames such as workers’ time clocks in factories. Eva Hoffman argues that the 
introduction of time zones in the late 19
th
 century induced protests and anxiety: ‘For 
people who adjusted the pace of their activities to dawn and dusk, the regimentation 
of the clock seemed a great tyranny’.23 As the ‘true’ time of locality was disturbed, 
‘People felt squeezed and cramped by the imposition of grid time onto event time; 
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thrown off their own rhythms and equilibrium; unnaturally hurried and harried’.24 
Event time, the time it takes to do something, as the way to measure time, becomes 
the true time of locality of course only when contrasted with the imposed time of the 
industrial world.  
In Fordist production, pioneered by Frederick Taylor’s motion studies, every 
small detail of time use was calculated. Hoffman states that, ‘From these 
calculations, factory managers derived the ‘standard time’ required for the 
completion of relevant work at hand, dividing workers’ movements into ‘waste’ 
motions…and those which were necessary for the performance of a task’.25 
Therefore, time management became a key aspect of mass production and this 
‘involved the control no longer only of the workers’ lived time, but of their bodily 
rhythms and pace’.26  As Kreitzman argues, ‘Instead of being paid for the task, 
workers during the Industrial Revolution began to be paid for their time’.27  
Furthermore, Kreitzman goes on to say that workers’ time thus ‘became a 
commodity to be bought and sold’.28 Kreitzman’s conclusion that time has become a 
commodity is an interesting one as it articulates a misunderstanding (or a 
misreading of Marxist theory) that is common.
29
 
What is in fact commodified is labour. In Capital, Karl Marx argues that the 
worker, or the proprietor of labour-power,  
must constantly treat his labour-power as his own property, his own 
commodity, and he can do this only by placing it at the disposal of the buyer, 
i.e. handing it over to the buyer for him to consume, for a definite period of 
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time, temporarily. In this way he manages both to alienate [veräussern] his 
labour-power and to avoid renouncing his rights of ownership over it.
30
 
 
The worker and the capitalist (money owner) enter into a commodity exchange as 
equals. According to Marx, ‘they all work together to their mutual advantage, for 
the common weal, and in the common interest’.31 However, the labour process 
whereby the relationship between the capitalist and the worker is established 
displays two distinguishing features. The first of them is that ‘the worker works 
under the control of the capitalist to whom his labour belongs’.32 The capitalist is 
responsible for supplying the raw materials and ensuring that they are not wasted in 
the process. This is where the second characteristic is displayed. By incorporating 
the means of production into the labour, the capitalist thus not only owns the labour 
but also the product. The worker, ‘by giving his labour, does no more, in reality, 
than part with the use-value he has sold’.33 The effects of these two features of the 
labour-process, although not commodifying time itself, do have repercussions for 
the use of time. More precisely, they dictate who is in control of time. In the 
scenario that Marx presents to us, it is the capitalist who is in control of not only his 
time but that of the worker. Furthermore, by selling his labour-power and in the 
process the product of this labour, the worker is alienated from his work. According 
to Jane Bennett, ‘Marx makes it clear that the harm of commodification accrues to 
humans’34 as they are deprived of the ‘sensuously varied objectivity of articles of 
utility’.35 Bennett goes on to note that, ‘As commodities, labor and the labourer are 
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‘objectified’, an objectification that enables the swindle that is profit’.36 These two 
effects, one of alienation and one of control of time, will become important later on 
in my discussion.  
The information technologies emerging since the 1970s produced major 
shifts in the organisation of work and production. These have resulted in a transition 
from industrial methods of production to what David Harvey calls ‘flexible 
accumulation’.37 For Harvey, flexible accumulation (or post-Fordism) ‘rests on 
flexibility with respect to labour processes, labour markets, products, and patterns of 
consumption’.38 Furthermore, post-Fordism is ‘characterized by the emergence of 
entirely new sectors of production, new ways of providing financial services, new 
markets, and, above all, greatly intensified rates of commercial, technological, and 
organizational innovation’.39 In a 1988 article in Marxism Today, Stuart Hall noted a 
blend of characteristics of the post-Fordist labour market, including a ‘decline of the 
old manufacturing base and growth of the ‘sunrise’, computer-based industries’ and 
a ‘decline in the proportion of the skilled, male, manual working class, the rise of 
the service and white-collar classes and the ‘feminization’ of the work force’.40 
What is noticeable in these changes is the growing demand for a flexible work force, 
including part-timers, casuals, fixed term contract staff, temporaries and sub-
contractors. 
As noted above, the 24/7 society facilitates such working practices where a 
worker is available for work or is in fact working in some form all the time. In the 
job market created by flexible accumulation, Kathi Weeks points out, ‘Putting in 
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long hours can also be used as an indication of commitment, which can in turn be a 
signal of productivity’.41 There is an illusion in work here whereby those who work 
the longest seem to be the most productive even though the same amount of work 
could be done in a shorter time, with less time wasting. People who work at their 
office or designated workplace perform or pretend that they are working, or in other 
words, being at work involves a performance of working. Weeks goes on to argue 
that, ‘Whereas Fordism demanded from its core workers a lifetime of compliance 
with work discipline, post-Fordism also demands of many of its workers flexibility, 
adaptability, and continual reinvention’.42 However, post-Fordist work practices and 
particularly those that are flexible are still being conducted through logics and 
rhythms similar to Fordist production. Kreitzman argues that, ‘We still behave as 
though there is a natural world that begins when the sun rises and closes as it sets, 
and our days are still structured in this way’.43 This is why, according to Kreitzman, 
‘The workplace still dominates our lives and determines our social relations’.44 
People in jobs with flexible schedules increasingly come to feel like they ought to 
do work even outside their quota of hours.
45
 So there seems to be a certain waste 
already imbedded in some work practices where appearing to be working does not 
mean actually working.  
We might agree, however, that it is precisely work that shapes the use of 
time in late capitalism. Although the Industrial Revolution homogenised work time 
(to an extent) it also created very long days, up to 11 or 16 hours, six days a week. 
The eight-hour movement began to combat long working days, demanding an eight 
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hour working day with ‘eight hours of labour, eight hours of rest, and eight hours for 
what we will’.46 I examine in this chapter how the standard working day of eight 
hours in late capitalism is reflected in the case studies I have chosen here.  
In her book The Problem with Work: Feminism, Marxism, Antiwork Politics 
and Postwork Imaginaries, Weeks addresses the assumption in Marxist and feminist 
discourses that work is a naturalised or inevitable activity. Weeks notes that the 
demand for shorter working days has been an issue especially in debates that are 
asking for more family time. However, in demanding a shorter work day and more 
time ‘for what we will’, the eight-hour movement resists stipulating what we should 
do with the rest of the time. Weeks argues that this would let us spend more time 
inhabiting ‘the spaces where we now find a life outside of waged work’47 but more 
importantly also to ‘create spaces in which to constitute new subjectivities, new 
work and non-work ethics’.48 
Such non-work ethics are examined and advocated by post-work visionaries 
who argue that work is shaping us too much. In Post-Work Manifesto Stanley 
Aronowitz et al. call for a thirty-hour week of six-hour days without a reduction in 
pay. As non-work time is increasingly taken over by work time in flexible 
accumulation (whether through overtime, or managing several temporary or part-
time jobs), the authors of the manifesto argue that, ‘it is time for a discourse that 
imagines alternatives, that accounts for human dignity beyond the conditions of 
work’.49 This call for human dignity finds parallels with notions of alienation in 
Marx’s account of the worker’s life and could thus be read as a demand for more 
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control of our own time. Furthermore, the authors declare that, ‘it is time to get a 
life’.50 The colloquial phrase ‘Get a life!’ is one that is often used to suggest that one 
is spending too much time doing one thing. The demand in the Post-Work Manifesto 
positions life against work. In discourses on work, getting a life becomes, according 
to Weeks, a political project where imagining alternatives to work is an act of 
resistance of a kind. The emphasis here is that one gets not the life but a life; there 
are, in fact, several lives to be got.
51
  
Moreover, ‘getting’ in this context becomes a temporal mandate. Weeks 
argues that, ‘It is not a call to embrace the life we have, the life that has been made 
for us but the one that we might want’.52 Furthermore, and this is an important point 
to make, the project of life against work does not propose an absolute set of 
oppositions. As Weeks points out, there is no true or authentic life to be had outside 
of work. Life as an alternative to work is not outside of work but the two remain 
intertwined. The project, then, becomes about ‘contest[ing] the existing terms of the 
work society’ and ‘build[ing] something new’.53 
I start this investigation with LABOUR, which was a live exhibition of 
performances by eleven Irish and Ireland-based female artists.
54
 Co-curated by 
Helena Walsh, Chrissie Cadman and Amanda Coogan, LABOUR toured to London, 
Derry/Londonderry and Dublin in February and March 2012. The eight hour 
duration of the performance(s) corresponds to an average working day and thus the 
project, according to the press release, ‘interrogates the gendered representational 
frameworks prevalent within an Irish cultural context that produce, limit and 
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devalue various forms of female labour’.55 In London the durational performances 
visited ]performance s p a c e[, an artist-run venue in an industrial estate in 
Hackney. As I walked into the cold warehouse I saw people standing around, some 
of them the audience, some of them performers. Elvira Santamaria Torres was 
sitting near the front door tying red roses to black balloons. Near her, Anne Quail 
was struggling with a pile of tea bags, holding them, spreading them on the floor, 
lying on them. On the stairs, Amanda Coogan was walking up and down slowly 
looking like a caterpillar with layered white winter coats on her back. In one corner 
Ann Maria Healy was grinding rice between two stones and in another Chrissie 
Cadman was going through a laborious task of washing a big white sheet and herself 
in a bathtub.  
LABOUR sets out to investigate female labour in an Irish context. The 
history of female labour in Ireland is one which is marked by a struggle for political 
autonomy and a resistance towards patriarchal oppression.
56
 In particular, LABOUR 
needs to be read in context with the Magdalene Laundries in Southern Ireland, 
institutions for unwaged female labour. These for-profit laundries run by the 
Catholic Church, set up in the 19
th
 century with the last institution closing as 
recently as 1996, forced women and girls to work for penance for (supposed) moral 
impurity. Such ‘immoral’ women would include rape victims and unmarried 
mothers whose children were invariably taken from them. The women worked in the 
laundries in squalid conditions and with little hope of getting out. The trauma 
caused by the Magdalene Laundries is still affecting the country and the victims are 
still looking for redress. It is with reference to the Magdalene Laundries in particular 
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that LABOUR comes to represent and question the equality of work and labour in an 
Irish context. Cadman’s struggle with a white sheet in a bathtub is perhaps the most 
direct reference to this aspect of LABOUR’s theme. Another would be Aine Phillips’ 
performance. Using the so far untold stories of the women from the laundries, 
Phillips’ performance is a quiet testimony of the unseen and unheard. Walking 
around the space in a white outfit, Phillips is gradually covered in ink which is 
seeping out of her clothes. On her back and sewn into her clothes, a small speaker is 
playing the testimonies from Magdalene Laundries victims. The sound is quiet and 
soon there is a small group of audience members following Phillips around, craning 
their necks and cocking their ears to be nearer to the speaker.   
LABOUR thus aims to explore this delicate issue of forced female labour. 
What I am interested here is the way in which it can be read as exploring a more 
complex web of issues around post-Fordist work relations. The working patterns 
brought by flexible accumulation make it possible for ever more people to decide 
where and when to work. There might be less leisure time but it can be more 
flexible. However, what is important to notice here is that those whose working time 
is flexible (or to put it differently, those who are in control of their own time) work 
in certain professions and areas. Then there are those whose working patterns are 
rigid because they serve a different aspect of the economy where Fordist production 
methods are still in place. For example, Kreitzman points out how,  
Modern attitudes to industrial employees’ time are exemplified by the 
Oxford’s clothes factory (in Monticello, Georgia, USA). A system clocks 
every worker’s pace to a thousandth of a minute. The workers, mostly 
women, are paid according to how their pace compares with a factory 
standard for their job. Operators who beat the standard by 10 percent are 
paid a 10 per cent bonus over their base rate. If they lag 1 per cent behind the 
standard, they have 10 per cent knocked off their wages.
57
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Here, those who work in the factory have little control over their (work) time 
whereas those who run the factory have control not only of their time but that of 
their employees. As Marx argues, ‘The capitalist has bought the labour-power at its 
daily value. The use-value of the labour-power belongs to him throughout one 
working day’.58 Furthermore, Veronica Beechey and Tessa Perkins note how ‘some 
studies suggest that where the labor force is primarily made up of women, 
employers are more likely to use part-time workers to maintain flexibility; indeed, 
certain jobs are constructed to be part time because they are generally filled by 
women’.59 It is therefore women who most often are offered part-time work which, 
as Weeks argues, ‘is often low-paid and has few or no benefits and few 
opportunities for advancement’.60 Weeks goes on to argue that part-time work thus 
‘continues to be rationalized by reference to women’s assumed position as 
secondary wage earners and primary unwaged reproductive labourers’.61 Thus, it 
seems that despite the increased flexibility and control of time in certain job sectors, 
women are not often reaping the benefits. 
While the position of women in the current economy of work is distinctly 
different from the forced labour in such institution as the Magdalene Laundries, 
LABOUR in some ways makes us think about the position of women in the work 
market (certainly in the manual labour sector).
62
 But moreover, LABOUR is also 
pointing to the interesting relation between work time and leisure time in current 
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work practices. At its different locations it was programmed quite differently and I 
wish to discuss what types of spectatorships and conditions those different 
performance times engendered. Firstly, if LABOUR’s eight hour duration is 
referring to the standard working day it feels important in some way then to stay 
with the performance for the whole duration. Or at least, staying for the whole 
duration draws parallels between the economy of labour and the work of 
performance. However, while its eight hour duration references and replicates the 
standard working day, those eight hours are positioned, at its London performance, 
which is where I saw it, not 9pm to 5pm but 1pm to 9pm. Therefore, LABOUR is 
not demanding that we spend our working day at the performance, nor is it asking 
for any specific amount of duration on the spectator’s part. Nor is it asking for 
endurance.
63
 The structure of this durational performance (and we might say that 
this is often true of durational performances of this kind) was one where the 
spectator was free to come and go throughout the installation. It, therefore, seems to 
be asking of the spectator a flexible use of time. I went to this performance at 1pm, 
and stayed for an hour. But I could have gone at 5pm and stayed until the end, or I 
could have gone for the whole duration. This type of performance, as I will be 
discussing further in the next section, is relying in some ways on the flexible use of 
one’s work time. Or, it is not replicating completely the standard day of 9 to 5 so 
that everyone, even if they work 9 to 5, can attend the performance at some point 
during the day. Those demands then, of popping in for a bit of the show or staying 
for the whole duration, are different and it is important to draw the distinction. 
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]performance s p a c e[ is an artist-run venue in an industrial estate in 
Hackney which is an apt location when one thinks what industrial estates are for: the 
building of a dedicated infrastructure to facilitate a more effective production and 
the segregation of work from urban living areas. Industrial estates confine the act 
(and converse the smells, noises and the sight) of labour within a space that is a 
comfortable distance away from people’s daily lives in the city. To go to an 
industrial estate, then, to watch this exhibition is to emphasise not only the labour in 
this performance but its eight hour duration. But what LABOUR made difficult for 
the spectator on its London visit was the possibility of returning to see the 
performance during the day. Due to the location of ]performance s p a c e[ it is 
nearly impossible to leave the performance to go back to one’s work place, for 
example, and return. Once you went you stayed unless having a short break outside 
or a slightly longer one at a café a five-minute walk away, reflecting a break in a 
work day. When LABOUR visited Dublin, however, the performance took place not 
in the middle of most people’s working week but on a Saturday. The gallery hosting 
the work had a large glass front facing a busy shopping street. Here, the fact that the 
exhibition is a weekend event emphasised the notion of leisure as many people 
watched the performance(s) through the front window without even going in. A 
form of window shopping, it blended with other activities in the shopping area. This 
created a very different mode of spectatorship from the likely expert audience in a 
cold warehouse in London. The labour in this performance of LABOUR became the 
labour of the cultural worker.  
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4 Marina Abramović and the rhythm of Fordism 
The different modes of spectatorship at LABOUR’s performances, the Saturday 
shoppers behind the glass front in Dublin and the audience I witnessed in London, 
asks the question, who is durational performance durational for? How much time do 
we spend in durational performances and how does its temporality enter our day? 
There is an interesting question here about programming durational performances 
and the time people can effectively spend with the work. Who attends durational 
performances, and more specifically, who can and does attend them in their 
entirety? Marina Abramović’s 2002 piece The House with the Ocean View ran for 
twelve days at the Sean Kelly Gallery in New York and despite the artist living in 
the gallery for the whole of the 12 days the audience could only attend between the 
gallery’s opening hours of 11am to 6pm. Abramović states that it is vital in her work 
that the audience ‘have to make this radical step of not being an observer anymore, 
or a passive thing, but being participants. It’s essential. They have to be creative to 
finish the work’.64 
This aspect of her work was addressed in a durational performance she 
curated in 2009, entitled Marina Abramović Presents… The four-hour performance 
at the Manchester International Festival included fourteen invited artists performing 
simultaneously in the Whitworth Art Gallery. The audience were asked to stay in 
the performance for the whole duration. The marketing for Marina Abramović 
Presents… made it clear that audience members would be required to wear white lab 
coats throughout the event and sign a contract stating that they will give their mobile 
phones and other personal items for safekeeping and will not leave before the end of 
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the four hours. Suspicious of such strict rules and their practicality, I was somewhat 
relieved to see that no contracts or handing over of personal items was required on 
the day. The audience left their coats and bags in the foyer at the beginning of the 
performance and were indeed allowed to come back to them as well as leave the 
building after the first hour which involved a drill led by Abramović.  
This first hour included a brief talk by the artist and some concentration 
exercises such as pairing up and staring into each other’s eyes for five minutes and 
walking slowly across the floor as a group. Such exercises were done to prepare the 
audience for the experience that was to come, namely three hours of uninterrupted 
and simultaneous performances in different spaces in the gallery by Amanda 
Coogan, Alastair MacLennan, Kira O’Reilly, Nikhil Chopra, Ivan Civic, Yingmei 
Duan, Marie Cool and Fabio Balducci, Jamie Isenstein, Nico Vascellari, Terence 
Koh, Melati Suryodarmo, Fedor Pavlov-Andreevich and Eunhye Hwang.  
After the hour of exercise and preparation we are released into the galleries 
to use our newly learned skills of concentration. In the grand staircase, O’Reilly is 
falling down the stairs while wearing nothing but black leather cycling gloves. 
O’Reilly’s performance, which I read as a take on Duchamp’s Nude Descending a 
Staircase, challenges in subtle and curious ways our approach to looking. As 
O’Reilly falls down the staircase in an immensely controlled and slow manner, she 
contorts her body into positions that present itself to the spectator in a way that both 
draws one in and makes one think where to look. Her falling is echoed in the centre 
of the building where Coogan is climbing another staircase and jumping onto a big 
yellow mattress, giving her body over to the fall, over and over again. In another 
room of the gallery, Civic is climbing on the wall. He is moving in and out of scenes 
of his homeland projected onto the wall, as if hiding under a table in one moment, as 
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if engaged in a conversation with the people in the film in the next. Somewhere in 
the building, echoing through all the galleries, a constant bang starts. It comes from 
the basement where Vascellari is ‘striking a rock with the bronze knot of a 
compressed church bell’.65 I only know this from reading some of the 
documentation after the event. I do not go in since I fear the loud noise. But its 
constant presence throughout the performance is a reminder of what is going on 
around me. The performances all have their own strategies of either inviting or 
demanding our time but the framing of Marina Abramović Presents…makes the 
spectator acutely aware of these intertwining times that make up the experience. 
The multiple and simultaneous performances in both LABOUR and Marina 
Abramović Presents…demand that we stop acting like consumers. My discomfort in 
these performances, I realise, comes from the fact that I cannot see all of them as 
much as I want. I go around the different performances and want to ‘consume’ 
everything instead of focusing on only one. However, the lack of direction from 
outside ourselves coupled with the array of performance work going on around us is 
bewildering and I lose momentum. A slight panic sets in when I think that to get the 
best result out of this I must see as much of everything as I can. After a while, faced 
with 13 performances to see, museum fatigue sets in. Gareth Davey notes that the 
traditional view of museum fatigue posits that visitors lose interest in an exhibition 
after approximately 30 minutes’ of concentration and that this results in ‘cruising 
through galleries, relatively rapid rates of viewing without rest periods, and 
increased selectivity towards exhibits’.66 Davey suggests that the aspects 
contributing to museum fatigue are due to both visitor attributes (physical fatigue, 
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cognitive processes) as well as environment attributes (exhibit design factors). For 
example, ‘mere-exposure effect’ is a cognitive process whereby ‘over-exposure may 
lead to ‘wear out’’.67 Looking at similar shapes (say, paintings that are the same size 
and hung on similar level) repeatedly will make the visitor stop paying attention. 
My own museum fatigue was certainly due to physical fatigue (the five-hour coach 
trip up to Manchester that morning inevitably contributed to my feelings of fatigue) 
but also to the sense that there is too much to see (or that I am expected to see all of 
it).  
However, instead of giving up and leaving to go sit on the inviting green 
grass outside, I stay for the whole duration waiting for a transformation brought on 
by this feat of endurance. Or, to quote Lehmann again, ‘an unrepeatable self-
transformation’.68 And yet, I am not able to enjoy and immerse myself in the 
durational performances happening in the gallery emptied of its usual collection. 
Instead, I sit in one corner telling myself not to fall asleep, to attend as best I could. 
Amelia Jones noted that ‘the entire event felt coercive’69 as the audience milled 
around in white lab coats they were obliged to wear. My feeling was similar as I 
tried to fight my fatigue and increasing boredom brought on mainly by the sense 
that I was not supposed to leave.  
Marina Abramović Presents…  requires from the spectators that they attune 
according to the disciplined nature required in the drill. Evocative of Taylor’s 
motion studies it is an attempt to teach the spectators a new (effective) bodily 
rhythm. I am taught how to attune during the drill, and my subsequent failure to 
attune and find the here and now feels like I am not doing this job of watching or 
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witnessing well at all. However, it soon becomes clear that rather than putting 
spectators under duress or coercion, the demand that the show makes is for 
endurance in a period of regimented time more familiar to Fordist production than to 
the 24/7 world. In fact, the distinction that needs to be made here is one between 
attention and time frames. That is to say, the attention required in both of 
Abramović’s works that I am discussing here is similar whereas their temporal 
structures are somewhat different. The come and go structure of The House with the 
Ocean View is an invitation to pay attention, to attune, and to attend amidst one’s 
working day. Thus, The House with the Ocean View (and, in fact, LABOUR), which 
asks spectators to come and go, is compliant with and could be said to characterise 
the 24/7, always open, society where the boundaries between leisure and work are 
blurred. You can come and go because that is what you do all the time, you drop in, 
you drop out, you dip into this and go and see that, you work a bit while you watch 
this and so on. Marina Abramović Presents…, on the other hand, demands a use of 
time that is more akin to a restricted and disciplined work time.  
It is this demand which might, in this instance, contribute to museum fatigue. 
There is a sense that this is work, that this is something I should not be doing in my 
leisure time. In Jean-Luc Godard’s Band of Outsiders (1964), the three protagonists 
run through the Louvre to beat the nine minute record set by ‘an American’, 
enjoying a quick but perfectly satisfactory look through the museum’s collections. 
The joke here is perhaps that one is not allowed to run in a museum. But more 
importantly, that one is not supposed to run in one either. A museum viewer is 
expected to walk slowly, to peruse the collections thoroughly, to spend time and 
give attention to each work. For Odile, Franz and Arthur in Godard’s film, nine 
minutes is enough to spend in a museum, for them seeing the art works quickly 
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while running is, again, enough. Martin Creed, whose work I will discuss in the next 
chapter, notes how he enjoys running through museums. Creed states that 
sometimes it is ‘good to see museums at high speed. It leaves time for other 
things’.70 Creed’s comment might seem like a throw-away musing on his own 
work,
71
 but it in fact points to the ways in which we approach (or are told to 
approach) museums. And that is the demand that museums make to us to spend our 
leisure time productively. In his essay on Valéry, Proust and the museum, Theodor 
Adorno argues that, ‘it is no longer possible to stroll through museums letting 
oneself be delighted here and there’.72 More and more, museums ‘emphatically 
demand something of the observer’.73 In museums, ‘Art becomes a matter of 
education and information’.74 In their work on culture industries, Adorno and Max 
Horkheimer posit that ‘Amusement under late capitalism is prolongation of work’.75 
The worker looks for entertainment or amusement in his leisure time to balance out 
the mechanised work process the worker goes through at work in a factory. 
Furthermore, Adorno argues, there is no free will in free time: ‘In a system where 
full employment itself has become the ideal, free time is nothing more than a 
shadowy continuation of labour’.76 Thus, running through the museums as Godard’s 
protagonists and Creed does, is a way of resisting the museum’s demand for 
attention, its demand that leisure time is work. Museum fatigue, then, is an attribute 
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of this phenomenon where we get tired of being at work, of working while at 
leisure. It is this same attribute of museum fatigue that I find in Marina Abramović 
Presents… In these four hours, with newly acquired training in attuning, I am asked 
to give my time, to put it to (good) use. 
However, it is this same framing of the show which makes it akin to Fordist 
working practices that also facilitates or allows the spectator to be acutely aware of 
the intertwining times that make up the experience. Moreover, it is in fact this 
intertwining of different times that occurs in Marina Abramović Presents… that 
might tell us something about the specific character of time in performance. Writing 
of the approaches postmodern and post-dramatic performance employs towards 
time, Lehmann articulates a perhaps common misunderstanding around the notion 
of time as experienced. He argues that,  
The new concept of shared time regards the aesthetically shaped and the real 
experienced time as a single cake, so to speak, shared by visitors and 
performers alike. The idea of time as an experience shared by all constitutes 
the centre of the new dramaturgies of time: from the diverse distortions of 
time to the assimilation of the speed of pop; from the resistance of slow 
theatre to theatre’s convergence with Performance Art and its radical 
assertion of real time as a situation people live through together.
77
 
 
What does Lehmann mean when he says time is shared like a cake? Is time 
something material like a cake is, something tangible? How does one share in other 
people’s experiences of time? How does one live through time together? What does 
this passage say about Lehmann’s concept or thinking of time? Is time not only, as 
Agacinski argues, the measurement of movement? And if we agree with 
Agacinski’s assertion that we should ‘accept not having time oneself’78 then how 
can we share or live through time? And more importantly, how do we share time in 
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performance then? Would that be to say that we experience it the same way as the 
person standing next to us?  
In Marina Abramović Presents… one could note an implicit agreement 
between spectators and performers to share a time out. Heathfield calls this ‘a 
liminal temporality’.79 This same idea is evident in the title of Heathfield’s book on 
Hsieh’s lifeworks, ‘Out of Now’. So what do all these terms mean? How is, or can 
one be, out of time? One can run out of time, I suppose, but can one be outside of 
time? This is a very different proposition from the contract to share a time out which 
implies that spectators are taking a period of time out of their usual schedule and 
focusing on something else. But can they all focus on one thing, namely time itself? 
Do they in other words share it or experience it the same? In the same way, I would 
question how a group of people can share time, or ‘live through it’. The 
misunderstanding in Lehmann’s statement, then, is that time can somehow be shared 
as if it was an object to be divided into sections. I would therefore suggest that when 
we say we share time, what we really mean is that we share space. Furthermore, for 
Lehmann, ‘The novelty [in body or endurance art practices] resides in the fact that 
there is a transition from represented pain to pain experienced in representation’.80 I 
wonder if there is such a thing, then, as ‘real time’ experienced in representation and 
if this is the time that Lehmann is actually referring to when he assumes that we are 
able to share time. In other words, this real time that is happening, that we are 
sharing, is only happening in representation.  
Writing about the type of thinking that is particular to theatre, or the way in 
which theatre could be said to think, Joe Kelleher notes that, ‘each performance is 
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terminal, and terminally silent, as if somehow its thinking – the thinking of the 
performance – were calculated to resist the thinking…that feeds upon it for its 
speech’.81 For Kelleher, the type of thinking that happens in theatre, or in theatrical 
performance, is one of stopping, or stopping and starting. He goes on to write:  
one thing we can take from theatrical performance – I think – is that it does 
stop, that it involves a time limit. And here I am including theatrical 
performances that seem to go beyond the limit, all sorts of limits… Simply 
put, it is possible to arrive late at the theatre, even to be there early, anyway 
to be unpunctual.
82
 
 
I suggest that this is true of durational performances, even the very long ones (I am 
thinking here of Tehching Hsieh’s work which I will discuss later) and it is the 
bottom line of performance. It is of course possible that within that time limit 
something about or within that performance goes beyond some other limit, in other 
words the limit of endurance. And since theatre stops it is possible that we are late 
for the theatre. Therefore, we have missed some of it. Although, we might have also 
missed some of it even when we are watching it but not paying attention. Theatre is, 
then, a limited activity. It asks us to pay attention at a certain time, for a certain 
period of time. But the other facet of Kelleher’s argument is that something stops us 
at the theatre. Kelleher finds in the theatre 
the sort of negation that stops to think, as if to register what the texts and 
images can’t or can no longer say; or else that halts along the way to bring 
wandering thought back to where the performances, the texts, the images and 
everything else have stopped in front of us, and stop us in our places. Not 
unlike the way beauty might stop us. Or the writing on the wall might stop 
us. As such, the sort of thinking that belongs to the theatre.
83
 
 
Stopping is a way of thinking for theatre. And it is a stopping that creates repetition 
and lingering. Although performance asks us to pay attention at particular points, 
                                                          
81
 Joe Kelleher, ‘The Writing on the Wall: Performances of Thinking, Terminal and Interminable’,  
keynote paper given at How Performance Thinks, PSi Performance and Philosophy Working Group 
conference, 13
th
 – 14th April 2012, p. 8 
82
 Kelleher, p. 6-7. 
83
 Kelleher, p. 6 
112 
 
and to be punctual, I suggest (along with Kelleher) that it is improbable that 
spectators pay attention to everything all the time. Something might stop us and 
make us think of something else, our thoughts wandering to a different direction. Or 
a thought that occurs in front of us (on stage) repeats and repeats in the mind until 
we realise we have not been listening and decide to start again. It is as if we get off 
the moving train (of thought?) at times and then get back on again, having missed a 
short part of the journey. Thus, while we could say that we share time for a short 
time while we are in the performance, we can only say that we share time in the 
sense that we are punctual, in the sense that there are limits. Within those limits of 
punctuality we are only sharing space while our time is ours alone. My time is 
multiple but not shared. 
And this is what Marina Abramović Presents… ends up emphasising, despite 
its insistence on a communal experience of duration. Although the spectators do 
spend the same time in the performance(s) (apart from those who possibly left 
before the end), the experience is solitary, like the experience of viewing art in a 
gallery, one where other people, rather than being in the same place, get in the way. 
One where you do not go and see a particular painting (or you hesitate to go) 
because someone else is standing in front of it. Furthermore, Abramović often 
works in a ‘tableau vivant’ mode of durational performance where spectators do not 
see the end or the beginning. When we finish our drill, walking slowly across the 
room as a group and disperse into the different rooms of the gallery, the 
performances are already going on. O’Reilly is already falling down the stairs, 
Coogan is falling on her yellow mattress and Civic is climbing on the wall. 
Everything is already ‘on’ and happening and we join the artists after they have 
already begun their work. The performance is an image hanging in the air, simply 
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always there. It is endless. At the end (the end of spectating) we pile out of the 
gallery and the artists… I don’t know what they do. The assumption (or illusion) is 
that they carry on. Thus, the ‘shared time’ (or real time experienced in 
representation) is only shared up to the point where the spectators leave. The 
theatricality of the tableau vivant model supports Shalson’s claim that ‘both theatre 
and performance art continue to endure [the] taint’84 of theatricality.   
I also find durational performances wasteful in the way they demand my 
time without telling me how long I might spend in them. Going to see GATZ for 
eight hours is different from going to see a durational performance of eight hours if I 
have not got eight hours to spend with it. So going into it I don’t know how long I 
will spend with it. Or, to put it differently, the time we spend with durational 
performance is determined by the time we have available. I might stay five hours if I 
really have all that time or I might leave after an hour because I must go to a 
meeting. We slot durational performance into our lives, but is that what it is meant 
for? Here it is revealed that wasting time has different consequences when working 
in a 9-5 job than when working in a 24/7 model where time is less regimented. The 
use of time is looser, thus being more impervious to waste. 
In her book Network Culture, Tizianna Terranova discusses free labour in 
the digital economy which ‘is characterized by the emergence of new technologies 
(computer networks) and new types of worker (such as digital artisans)’.85 
Terranova focuses on this economy for the way in which Internet users are in many 
cases producing the content. AOL, for example, is run by 15,000 volunteers. 
Furthermore, ‘The ‘open-source’ movement, which relies on the free labour of 
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Internet tinkers, is further evidence of this structural trend within the digital 
economy’.86 In such an economy, then, ‘[l]abour is not equivalent to waged 
labour’.87 Both old (e.g. television and print) and new (Internet) media industry use 
free labour which is not, as Terranova points out, ‘necessarily exploited labour’ but 
mutually beneficial.
88
 However, the digital economy ‘challenged the post-modern 
assumption that labour disappears while the commodity takes on and dissolves all 
meaning’.89 The Internet, in fact, demands a continuous labour to uphold it. But 
because the labour within the digital economy, for example, is mutually beneficial 
in ways that are not necessarily quantifiable, collective knowledge work presents a 
problem to capital which seeks to ‘extract as much value as possible…out of this 
abundant, and yet slightly untractable terrain’.90 However, although free or 
volunteer, the labour in the digital economy that sustains the Internet is nevertheless 
productive. It would then be possible to argue that within the post-Fordist 
organisation of the 24/7 world it is ever harder to waste time since doing things in 
order to waste time (such as using the Internet) turn out in the end to be productive.  
Elevator Repair Service’s GATZ, an eight-hour reading of F. Scott 
Fitzgerald’s The Great Gatsby, presents an interesting case study which reveals a 
network of relations between work, waste and theatre.
91
 On stage, we see a non-
descript office, slightly run down, looking like it smells of damp, like it did not 
really matter to whoever owns it. Then, some noise outside and lights come on in 
the corridor leading to the door to the office. A man in a long overcoat, played by 
Scott Shepherd, arrives to work in this dreary office. After all the necessary 
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manouevres (coffee cup down on the table, coat on the coat rack, turn on the 
computer) Nick sits down at his desk, only to realise his computer is refusing to 
switch on. He turns it off and then on again. After a couple of futile attempts, a sigh 
- like he’s been here before. It is not only as if he has been here before, and for a 
long time, but that this place has been there for a long time, unchanged, an office 
like any other office, a place without a name or specific time. As Nick waits for the 
computer to do its thing, he flips open an index card holder to find, not index cards 
(although one could assume from looking at this place they could still be in use) but 
a book. Nick tries the computer again but as it does not seem to co-operate he starts 
to read the book, The Great Gatsby, out loud. Soon other people come in to the 
office, an office dogsbody, a secretary in her booth, Nick’s manager or a more 
authoritative co-worker, going about their business, while Nick keeps reading. 
Gradually Nick’s co-workers become characters in The Great Gatsby, saying their 
lines, acting out scenes. The drab office environment is turned into 1920s New York 
City and Long Island’s North Shore. 
Watching the way Nick enters the office and prepares for the working day 
one cannot help but think that he is not passionate about his work, or that there are 
other things that he could be doing with his time. The whole mood of the office 
reflects that. Nobody seems to mind him reading a book during his (and 
everybody’s) work day. The story of Jay Gatsby, a self-made millionaire who likes 
to throw lavish parties at this mansion, presents the escapism out of the humdrum 9 
to 5 office jobs we see on stage. Nick, and his co-workers, are drawn into the 
reading of the book not only to get away from their menial tasks but into the lives 
and stories of the rich in the roaring 1920s. But GATZ also draws attention to the 
relationship between labour and leisure in theatre. It does so, for example, through 
116 
 
the show’s eight hour duration which, like in LABOUR, corresponds to the eight 
hour standard working day. In GATZ it also reflects the working day of the office 
workers while making the actor’s labour more obvious. There is an interesting mix 
of real and theatrical labour in the way it draws attention to the actors’ labour (the 
endurance involved in Shepherd’s reading) and conceals it in acting (this is not 
‘about’ endurance). 
  The show is divided into sections which last up to two hours each. It has a 
dinner break of an hour and a half in the middle of the production with fifteen 
minute breaks between its four sections. In some ways, time-wise, it feels like 
watching one production, having dinner and watching another production. In 
another way, it feels like going to work, having lunch and going to work for the 
afternoon. It also begs the question whether spending eight hours in the theatre is a 
waste of time we could use more productively or whether these eight hours are 
indeed the kind of life we should be living were we not wasting our time working. 
Due to the long duration of the performance, the actors have found their own 
strategies of managing that duration which is also for most of them (apart from 
Shepherd) divided into smaller sections. In between their appearances on stage, the 
performers spend their time in different ways, apart from Kate Scelsa who plays the 
secretary and spends most of her time on stage in her little cubicle. Scelsa has been 
in the production since the company started working on it in 2005. Her character has 
no lines and mainly walks on to distribute paper work to her colleagues. So in order 
to spend her time while sitting in the cubicle, visible from shoulders up, Scelsa used 
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to work on her book in the earlier tours of the show.
92
 Scelsa puts her wasted time 
on stage into good use in her ‘double working’. 
GATZ is, then, both about duration and endurance. Although the dinner 
break half way through the performance, as well as the few smaller breaks, ensure 
that spectators, and performers, remain as comfortable as possible, following such a 
long performance does take its toll. Elevator Repair Service’s performance theatre 
(Sara Jane Bailes’ term) habitually breaks the conventions of theatre. Or, lingers 
between antitheatricality and theatre. Its antitheatricality is one which, using 
Nicholas Ridout’s categorization, insists ‘on the presentation of ‘realness’ rather 
than the representation of the real’.93 In GATZ it is the acknowledgement along the 
way that we are listening to a novel, a device that breaks the illusionism of theatre. 
GATZ presents realness as it presents us with a real book, being read in real time. In 
GATZ, the peculiar dynamic of reading a whole novel on stage pulls the spectator in 
and demands a different type of concentration. It is a gentle unravelling which 
brings to our attention a different temporality. We know this is going to take a 
while, since Shepherd is not even half way through his reading. 
The power of this approach is the multiplicity of temporal frames which are 
in play here. According to Bailes, GATZ is one in a series of Elevator Repair Service 
works which  
examine ways in which theatre can translate the solitary intimacy and 
interiority of the literary imagination (and the equally intimate relations 
between writer, text, and reader) into a public theatre spectacle, focusing 
upon the collective exteriority of the encounter demanded by stage.
94
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By bringing into focus both the duration of the reading, what we might call here real 
time and thus align the company’s position with those interested in the term within 
live art, and the fictional time of the novel (and perhaps another fictional time of the 
office, the working day that is being wasted here), the production is tackling the 
question of shared time in performance. There is a sense of intrigue after seeing 
GATZ that one should read the novel now. But of course we have read the novel 
now. Or at least we have heard the novel, we might have seen something else. 
GATZ is not, then, an adaptation nor is it a reading. In fact, Bailes refers to this as a 
process of translation rather than adaptation.
95
 Furthermore, it is a process of 
translation that is interested or invested in its own failure. It explores the 
(im)possibility of opening up or sharing the interiority that is, as Bailes notes, 
distinctive of literature.  
Elevator Repair Service’s approach to The Great Gatsby brings to mind 
Gertrude Stein’s trouble with theatre and its syncopated time. Stein writes: ‘Plays 
are either read or heard or seen’.96 In GATZ, though, as I argued above, all of those 
things happen on stage. And they happen in their own tempo, or in Stein’s words, in 
a tempo that is out of our control as an audience. When one reads a book one can go 
to the end of the book and read the end and still be excited by the book as one reads 
along. When watching GATZ, one might know or not know how The Great Gatsby 
goes but in either case, one cannot go ahead of the performance and get to the end. 
One hears and sees something being read and cannot rush ahead but is in fact in the 
syncopated troubled time of the theatre. Furthermore, Stein notes that there is ‘a 
strange doubling’ in a book which attempts ‘to make the people in the book familiar 
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with each other and to make the reader familiar with them’ too.97 It is double time. 
Thus, we see not only double time here but multiple time: the characters in the book 
making themselves familiar with other characters as well as with the audience, the 
labour of the actors working on the stage, the labour of Scelsa in her double work. 
 
5 Techching Hsieh and passing the time 
Contrary to the demand in Marina Abramović Presents… that the audience should 
stay for the whole duration, in Hsieh’s work there is in fact very little room for the 
audience. It is impossible to stay for the whole duration (without becoming the 
work) and in fact the work has a clearly structured and limited audience 
relationship. Hsieh’s One-Year Performance 1980-1981 was an extreme form of 
being available to time where he assigned himself a one year long task of repetitious 
punctuality. Dressed in a grey uniform, Hsieh would punch a worker’s time clock on 
the hour every hour. After each clocking-in he would stand next to the clock and 
shoot one film frame with a camera hanging from the ceiling. Like his other one 
year performances, this one was highly demanding, based on very strict rules that 
impose confinement and restrictions. Hsieh was only able to sleep for 50 minutes or 
so at a time and was unable to go very far from his New York loft. His act of 
punching-in, performed in a uniform with a label of Hsieh’s name and a number 
sequence of the starting and ending dates of the performance and his short, almost 
military hair at the beginning of the project can be seen as a symbolized 
performance of labour in capitalist society. Heathfield argues that, ‘Hsieh’s physical 
conditions in this time are an exaggerated version of the altered biological 
conditions of shift labor; he is pressed into an extreme state of broken dreaming and 
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subdued consciousness, where the primary function of the body is simply to 
produce’.98 Hsieh contends that, ‘Wasting time is my basic attitude to life; it is a 
gesture of dealing with the absurdity between life and time’.99 By proposing a gap 
between life and time, Hsieh draws attention to the unstoppable onward march of 
time. According to the artist, the one year pieces were not blurring art and life but he 
made his life follow art.
100
 The struggle then becomes about how to pass time, or 
how to survive.  
What is left of this year of punctual punching-in is 366 yellow time cards 
and a film of Hsieh standing next to his time clock. During the year, he missed 133 
punch-ins due to sleeping or being either too late or too early. The subsequent film 
totals six minutes and 4 seconds and is a peculiar testament to Hsieh’s arduous task. 
Every frame presenting an hour, it is a convulsion where we see his body moving 
and swaying as he stood slightly differently every time and we see his hair grow 
over the year. First it is difficult to see the hair growth as it goes from a shaved head 
to a centimetre of hair. After that it is more obvious until the end again where 
Hsieh’s hair has reached his shoulders and it is more difficult to see it grow. The 
clock hands on the time clock next to Hsieh whir around and the numbers on the 
time cards behind him climb up as each day progresses and start from the bottom 
again as a new day starts. Hsieh states that his work ‘is not about documentation’.101 
According to Hsieh, ‘the document is secondary... [because] the document can 
hardly restore art’.102 And yet, the film and the few rare but perfectly succinct 
photographs of this work (and his other one-year performances, all immaculately 
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presented in the voluminous publication edited by Heathfield) seem like a very well 
thought-out and executed series of documentation. In fact, they are necessary as 
Hsieh points out: ‘To get the message of my art, an audience’s presence is not vital. 
As long as audiences know my concept and the real action I did, they can use their 
own experiences and imagination to feel these artworks’.103 This is thus a work that 
demands very little of its audience in terms of durational engagement. Instead, there 
is a demand for relating to the work on the level of thought and experience. In some 
ways, Hsieh’s art is for him, an isolation. Hsieh states that if he ‘became too social 
with an audience’ during the performances ‘it would break the work’.104 He goes on 
to say, however, that, without his audiences his performances simply wouldn’t exist. 
So there is a need for someone to be there at the allocated times, during the days 
when the audience is invited to come and see the work. This makes the audience a 
co-operator who maintains the work’s nature as work and also as art. 
However, all the pictures of the work, the film frames and the time cards 
document only the time of clocking in. What is left of the year is six minutes and 
four seconds. I would therefore suggest that although this work is about, and 
requires, endurance it is not durational. If one were to ask ‘Where is this work?’, as 
one viewer did when going to see Hsieh’s One Year Performance 1978-1979 during 
which Hsieh lived in a cell built in his loft,
105
 the conclusion would be that the work 
is a series of single instances, punches of the time clock and clicks of the camera 
reel, totalling not a year of time spent but only six minutes and four seconds.  The 
time outside of these instances is the auxiliary time we experience in performance: 
getting ready to go, travelling to the venue, waiting for it to start, waiting in 
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between… Therefore, does Hsieh really give his time excessively? Or does he give 
it (spend it) in short instances? The duration of the piece was decided as a year since 
‘One year is a basic unit for human beings to calculate their life, and it is also the 
time the earth takes to circle the sun completely’.106 Hsieh states that he could have 
done the piece for longer but that it was not necessary: going beyond a year would 
not prove anything useful.
107
 There is, in fact, an interesting aspect in Hsieh’s One 
Year Performance 1980-1981 whereby the work seems to be about marking time 
through measuring and calculating it and yet there is an attempt at passing time. 
Hsieh states that the work is not a lived experience, in other words it is art. 
With uninterrupted commitment to this repetitious task Hsieh’s performance 
also addresses the in-built efficiency of Fordism’s motion studies: Clocking in was 
meant to reduce time waste, yet Hsieh gives his time excessively.
108
 His time 
becomes not his time but the worker’s time, in fact it becomes the clock’s time. 
Hsieh goes on to say: ‘I had to let time waste in order to prove how hard I was 
working’.109 Heathfield suggests that Hsieh’s performance can ‘be read as a 
systematic critique of the temporal logic upon which the social and cultural 
organization of late-capitalism is founded’.110 According to Heathfield, Hsieh 
critiques this temporal logic through his non-production. Punching-in demarcates or 
brackets a period of time when something is produced and that period of time is 
monitored and controlled in order to make it the most productive it can be. 
However, Hsieh’s hourly signing on is just that, simply an act of signing with 
nothing to show for it. By using such a highly efficient and calculated production 
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method to produce nothing, Hsieh enacts a peculiar kind of ghost version of 
capitalist production. But how does such an enactment of the process function as a 
critique of it? According to Heathfield, ‘Hsieh gives his personal temporality as a 
matter of record to an apparatus of accounting and exposure; he gives it over to 
another order; that of capitalized time’.111 In other words, Hsieh’s personal 
temporality, his rhythm is taken over by capitalist production and his rhythm 
becomes that of capitalist time. But it is a misreading of capitalist time that allows 
Heathfield and others to see it as a commodity.  
Heathfield asserts that practices exploring long duration in 1960s were aware 
of the cultural logics of late-capitalism where ‘time itself is a commodity that must 
be exploited to its maximum potential.’112 In his writing on Hsieh, Heathfield 
further pursues and confirms this same reading where time is made into a 
commodity through it being dissected, spatialised and economised.
113
 But how can 
time be a commodity when, as Agacinski points out in the quote above, time is ‘only 
the relative measurement of a movement’? Time is the measurement of labour 
which is in turn a commodity. Or to quote Marx: ‘What exclusively determines the 
magnitude of the value of any article is therefore the amount of labour socially 
necessary, or the labour-time socially necessary, for its production’.114 We cannot 
sell or exploit our time as a commodity. At times Heathfield seems to contend as 
much, for example when he writes:  
[Hsieh] gives his time to the work of art, and forms this gift as a giving over 
to the machine (to the orders for which it operates) as if time itself were in 
his (or its) possession. One might say, then, that this is an impossible gift: he 
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gives something that cannot be owned and in so doing he gives the gift of 
nothing.
115
 
 
So, Hsieh’s gift of time is an impossible gift because time cannot be owned. And 
yet, in other places there is a revealing misplacement of terms in Heathfield’s 
writing where time has become a commodity because it has become corrupted by 
capitalism.  
Furthermore, a sense of mourning pervades Heathfield’s text where time as 
something pure has been lost. It is now (nothing but) another product on the market. 
Similarly, Christine Wertheim and Margaret Wertheim repeat this misunderstanding 
in their reading of Marx when they argue that, 
it is not, as Marx points out, essentially our labor that we sell in the market; 
it is our time, like any commodity, the condition for man’s selling ‘his’ time 
is that it be constituted as something both quantifiable and detachable. Clock 
time is the mechanism by which this constitution is effected. Objectified, 
regularized, alienated and automatized, the clockable units of modern man’s 
time are more than just an effect of the free-market, they are its raison 
d’être…116 
 
However, as Marx argues, ‘In order to become a commodity, the product must be 
transferred to the other person, for whom it serves as a use-value, through the 
medium of exchange’.117 It is not the worker’s time that is a use-value for the 
capitalist, but the labour. This systematic critique then that Hsieh engages in is 
dependent on a logic that says: according to capitalism we have or own time, in 
other words, time is something that we can give. Therefore, Hsieh gives his time 
(excessively) over to the machine (of capitalism). Thus, wasting time only makes 
sense in this configuration of capitalist time.  
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Hsieh’s art/life is made possible, of course, by him working to earn a living 
that would support his year-long performances. In addition to his carpentry work, 
Hsieh held cleaning and dishwashing jobs before and between his performances. In 
addition to getting some financial support from his family in Taiwan, he also rented 
out his 5000 square feet Tribeca loft flat to several people and this income (150 
dollars per month) made his futile art labour possible.
118
 Hsieh can waste time 
(through his art) because he has time to waste. This waste has been made possible 
by manual labour (good old true work). 
His fourth and final one year performance was done in collaboration with 
Linda Montano. During Art/Life One Year Performance 1983-1984, the pair were 
tied together with a rope that measured five and a half feet when stretched to its 
maximum between them. Customary to Hsieh’s previous works, at the beginning of 
the performance, the pair released a declaration stating the rules and shaved their 
heads. Two witnesses signed a statement proving that they had inspected the lead 
seal at each end of the rope. According to the rules of the performance, Montano 
and Hsieh were not allowed to touch each other during the year despite having to be 
in the same room at all times, when indoors. The photographic documentation from 
the year show the two artists lying on their single beds next to each other, doing 
DIY together, Montano brushing her hair in the bathroom while Hsieh is showering 
behind the shower curtain next to her, Montano standing by the window that Hsieh 
is washing outside on the window ledge, the pair cycling, Hsieh standing with his 
back to a wall being photographed with the rope extending to the edge of the 
picture, the pair installing an exhibition, the pair with friends, Montano standing 
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with her back to a wall being photographed with the rope extending to the edge of 
the picture, the pair jogging in the streets of New York. The only other piece of 
documentation that survives from the year are cassette tapes that were used to record 
the conversations that Hsieh and Montano had during the year. These cassette tapes 
were never planned to be heard and survive less as a form of documentation than a 
legitimate part of the performance.  
The loss of intimacy during the year long performance caused considerable 
tension between Hsieh and Montano and their first few months have been reported 
to have been tumultuous. The strict rules of the performance did not prevent the two 
artists from continuing to make their work in other contexts. Montano earned money 
doing some teaching while Hsieh did carpentry. Although, being tied to another 
person certainly made them change their routines and the speed with which they 
lived. As Montano notes, ‘I am forced to remain alert and attentive because I am 
doing something different from what I ordinarily do […] the task of being tied is so 
difficult and absorbing that I can only do just that’.119 In some way the effects of 
duration can be read in the relation between Hsieh and Montano. Or in other words, 
duration becomes evident as an echo that bounces between them. The contract that 
we saw between Abramović and her audience here becomes a contract between 
Hsieh and Montano.  
Furthermore, Hsieh’s and Montano’s relationship parallels, and to some 
extent goes beyond, the collaboration between Marina and Ulay. There are 
interesting connections to be made, for example, between Night Sea Crossing 
(1981) and Hsieh’s and Montano’s rope piece. There is a picture among the 
documentation from 26
th
 July where Montano is sitting by her desk writing in a 
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notebook while Hsieh is sitting at his, typing on a typewriter. But contrary to Night 
Sea Crossing, a performance where Marina Abramović and Ulay sit opposite one 
another separated by a table for extended periods of time, Hsieh and Montano are 
not sitting opposite but with their backs to each other. There is a perfect symmetry 
in this photograph and it is similar to the symmetry finds in Night Sea Crossing, 
although in reverse. And yet, there is a clear tension between them. 
In her interview with the artists, Cynthia Carr contends that, ‘Montano thinks 
of art as ascetic training. Hsieh thinks his art is often misunderstood to be ascetic 
training’.120 Hsieh considered Art/Life One Year Performance 1983-1984 as 
representing a symbolic struggle; the ‘central image of two people tied together 
symbolized people’s survival (dependency) needs’.121 For him, it was not about the 
sexual politics between man and a woman but about two equal people. Montano, on 
the other hand, was interested in that precise aspect, the ‘power structure of their 
relationship within the work’.122 For Hsieh, his art is not about enduring but existing 
or surviving. Jill Johnston calls it ‘hardship art’.123 Hsieh’s formalism, his strict 
belief that his art is a task to survive, hits against Montano’s view of the work as 
something personal. It also butts against the focus on longing and melancholy in 
Heathfield’s writing on Hsieh’s work. In this writing time as something pure is lost 
and therefore constantly mourned. Time in late capitalism is time spoilt by clocks 
that demand so much of us, by demanding constant productivity.   
However, since time is nothing, or not a thing, it cannot be lost. Time, in 
such writing, seems to be a substitute for life. In other words, we are aware, or 
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afraid, that there is a life out there somewhere that we are not living. The rhetoric 
around the importance of wasting time is in accordance with the rhetoric by which 
there exists between us and our work a form of alienation and it is produced by the 
fact that we exchange our labour for a wage. Being alienated from our work, we 
mourn the lost time that we could be living were we not working for a wage. This 
would seem to be the project of the post-work imaginaries, the ‘Get a Life’ 
advocates. Thus, working hard to waste time, or paying excessive attention to things 
done outside our work, is a way of reaching out or regaining some of that lost time.  
In this chapter I have discussed durational performances and their demand 
for an altered mode of watching or witnessing performance. I have chosen my 
examples of live art and durational performances because they complicate or offer 
useful suggestions to the question concerning duration and endurance. The demand 
felt in LABOUR is that we as spectators partake in endurance. It also seemingly 
invites the spectator to come and go but the remote location of the venue makes it 
difficult to integrate the performance into the rest of my day. Furthermore, 
LABOUR’s eight-hour duration seems significant as an index of a standard working 
day and it would therefore make sense to stay for the whole duration. I have 
suggested that the come and go structure of durational performance is compliant 
with the always open 24/7 world where we are constantly multi-tasking, always 
equally ready for work and leisure. I began this chapter with a question on whether 
durational performance ‘wastes’ time and if so, acts as a form of resistance to the 
general economy of capitalist time. Placing the durational performance works 
discussed here in parallel to changing post-Fordist work practices, they also say 
something about the wastefulness of work time. Rather than resisting the general 
economy of time such performance practices (and these works I have been talking 
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about in particular) have come to reflect in some ways the economies of duration in 
varying work patterns in which boundaries between different types of time (work, 
leisure, etc.) is increasingly blurred. I have also discussed the degree to which 
durational performance in some ways attempts to slot itself in to the working day or 
the times allotted for such activities. In so doing I have also questioned for whom 
durational performance is durational. How do audiences witness these works or 
what are the possibilities given to them to watch them in their entirety? Marina 
Abramović Presents… confronts that question with an insistence that the audience 
stays through the whole performance. In so doing, it presents a model more akin to 
Fordist production where efficiency is key. I have included Hsieh’s one year 
performances in this discussion because of their extreme duration. But a closer look 
at his One Year Performance 1980-1981 turns out not to be durational although it is 
about, and requires, endurance. Furthermore, Hsieh’s practice receives a peculiar 
gloss from Heathfield for whom time has been tainted and become a commodity to 
sell on the market place of capitalism.  
I begin the next chapter with a description of a performance by Brian Lobel 
in which the selling and buying of both time and performance is examined through a 
literal interpretation of selling time. In so doing I move from durational 
performances to very short performances which, I argue, present their own 
challenge to performance’s economy. 
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Chapter 3 
Instances: On Consuming Encounters 
 
 
1 What to do with a minute? Taking part in Carpe Minuta Prima  
I didn’t expect it to be so quick. Not the actual minute that I sold but the whole 
experience. There is something very urgent in that experience. Brian Lobel invites 
you to step into his make-shift office where he explains the rules of the transaction: 
he records a minute of your time, which you sell to him. The recording happens in a 
small black space behind a curtain with a computer camera above eye level. Lobel 
explains what you need to do (push the button on the wall, a light will flash three 
times and that is when the camera starts to record) and says you can do anything for 
a minute. ‘All I ask’, says Lobel, ‘is that you use your minute well’.  
Lobel leaves and I am struck with a slight panic. What am I going to do with 
my minute? Prior to my appointment at Carpe Minuta Prima,
1
 I hadn’t really 
thought about how I would use my minute. I knew that I had very few skills that I 
could use and even fewer tricks to do in a minute so I simply decided to do nothing. 
Just to stand there. To take a minute for myself. Or, if the mood struck me, read a 
passage from a book that I knew would last approximately one minute. I knew that 
because I tried it out, because I rehearsed it. And that was just it, a rehearsed reading 
of a book on Beckett didn’t quite seem like the thing to sell. Too dramatic. Trying 
too hard. Too boring. Therefore, a minute spent not doing very much seemed like 
the best option at the time. I wracked my brains for a few moments, thinking that 
doing nothing might not be an option here after all, that I would let Lobel down if I 
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didn’t do anything, that I would fail at this game, that I would not know how to do 
this performance. But no matter how hard I thought I couldn’t come up with 
anything to do that I thought worth selling. So I simply stood and stared at the 
camera, feeling more and more anguished about my inactivity as the seconds rolled 
by. In the end the minute felt quite long and yet exactly like a minute should feel.  
I left the small black space and sat down in Lobel’s office again. I decided to 
sell my minute and wrote and signed a contract, giving Lobel exclusive rights to put 
the recorded minute in a vending machine for people to buy. I took my one pound 
coin and left, puzzled by the exchange. Had I done the right thing? Had I spent my 
minute well? And as I was walking to the underground that was going to take me 
back to central London, I wondered whether I had spent my time well coming to 
Brixton Market in order to sell my time. Was it really worth it? It was all so quick. 
The questions that are raised by the exchange are intriguing ones. How do we spend 
our time and what part of our time is worth selling? I had reasoned to myself that 
since I spend a lot of my time gazing into the distance, not doing anything, this was 
the type of time I could sell since it wasn’t useful for me. I have, I thought to 
myself, several of these minutes that I could use more effectively so why not get rid 
of them. And perhaps, even if I had a skill that would make a minute worthwhile, I 
wouldn’t want to sell that. Maybe that is worth more than a pound. Yet, Lobel’s 
words about using my minute well keep ringing in my ears. The future buyers of our 
minutes won’t know what they’ll get until they have bought it. There is no 
information on the cover of the DVD about the person selling their time, only a 
picture of them holding a pound coin. So while there is little pressure to do 
interesting things with your minute in order to get it sold, to market yourself, there is 
the pressure of making a good impression, to give it your all, your ultimate best. 
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Someone out there might buy my minute and get a person staring at them. However, 
who is to say I didn’t do anything? Or that consequently, my recorded minute won’t 
do anything to its future owner? However you look at it, however I look at it, I gave 
my time. I was there. Actively present. Effort invested.  
The experience of nowness, as Andy Lavender calls it, is a vital element in 
taking part in Carpe Minuta Prima. For Lavender, 
We both own more of the world, as shoppers and shareholders, and less of it, 
as individuals in increasingly denationalized and corporatized economies. 
Something similar has happened to our experience of time. We have more of 
it. And there is, to put it anecdotally, never enough of it. Which means that 
the experience of nowness has become a defining feature of our relationship 
to time.
2
 
 
Lobel’s request that we use our minutes well strikes to the heart of the matter. For 
Lavender, nowness and liveness, which he sees as siblings, ‘are the temporal 
equivalent of goods and possessions’.3 In this economy, of course, time is money, 
and time spent well is possibly even more money. As Lavender points out, whether 
we spend more leisure or ‘quality’ time or are determined to ‘live in the now’, we 
are increasingly concerned with pursuing time as a commodity.
4
 By asking how to 
make our time more valuable, Carpe Minuta Prima questions the value of time in 
this economy of rushing around. Ten days after my appointment to sell my minute, I 
go back to Brixton to buy somebody else’s minute from the vending machine. I look 
at the faces on the DVDs and end up choosing a lady with red hair who looks nice. I 
think to myself she looks like a person who spends her time well. I think I will 
probably get my money’s worth. During her minute, the red-haired lady called 
Claire introduces herself and explains why she’s come to Brixton that day, how she 
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saw this art project and became interested, that she started studying last autumn and 
how this project relates to her studies. She is cut off at the end of her minute, she 
would have had more to say. I am happy with the minute I’ve purchased. It’s a 
useful minute.  
However, the emphasis on performance’s nowness often results in claims 
according to which, as Nicholas Ridout argues, ‘the evanescence of performance 
represents a way of avoiding capture within circuits of economic exchange’.5  For 
example, Joshua Sofaer contends: ‘By the very nature of the work – temporal, 
fleeting, often conceptually based – [live art practices] struggle to enter into the 
world of exchange capital. They do not accrue value. They are not investments, they 
can not be sold on’.6 However, as Ridout has shown, ‘The exit from the art market – 
a market in manufactures – is not an exit from the market as such, but merely a 
relocation of operations from a market in goods to a market in services’.7 In his 
discussion on the service economy, Ridout argues that, ‘contemporary performance 
practice does more than reflect shifts in the operations of capital and labour. It 
participates actively in the logics of the service economy’.8 Ridout paraphrases 
Maurizio Lazzarato to define ‘immaterial labour’ as ‘work that does not produce 
goods, but instead produces social relations, communication, [and] the movement of 
information’.9 Furthermore, this ‘labour of the service and knowledge economies’10 
is, according to Lazzarato, ‘split between conception and execution, between labour 
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and creativity, between author and audience’.11 The split, writes Ridout, is ‘most 
visible in the divided sociality of the traditional theatre set-up’.12 He goes on to 
argue:  
The second half of the twentieth century saw the inauguration of a shift from 
an industrial/theatrical model of artistic production to one in which the 
performance of services predominated. This shift is perhaps most evident in 
those theatrical innovations that sought or seek to reconfigure the relation 
between stage and auditorium (or, as we might now say, between production 
and consumption).
13
 
 
Ridout suggests that this shift to a service economy ‘is perhaps more evident in 
recent developments in immersive theatrical experiences’14 and attempts at audience 
participation, such as one to one performances. The split is certainly there in Lobel’s 
Carpe Minuta Prima where it is the viewer who does the work, produces a 
performance and applies creativity. As monetary exchanges go, Carpe Minuta 
Prima’s deal of one minute for one pound seems, at a first quick glance, fairly 
straight-forward and transparent.
15
 And yet, considering my anxieties around how to 
do this performance, how to spend my minute and whose minute to buy, it seems it 
is also a very puzzling transaction. Lavender argues that ‘[a]n experience of liveness 
[and nowness] is partly a question of being in fuller possession of this moment, 
having and holding it more completely’.16 Considering Ridout’s statement that 
performance does not exit the market place and Lavender’s description of nowness 
as (equivalent to) goods and possession, what is this experience of nowness that we 
buy in the form of performance? Do we go to performance in order to buy time to 
hold it more completely, as Lavender suggests? In fact, how is time spent, sold, 
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wasted, invested and bought in the theatre economy? I focus on short performances 
in this chapter in order to trouble some of the assumed conditions of performance. 
How might short duration (and I will define the term ‘short’ in this context in the 
next section) interrupt that economy and make time strange? Indeed, what are the 
conditions in which performance gets produced, programmed and circulated? What 
does a focus on short duration reveal about that economy? Furthermore, how does 
short performance emphasise the experience of nowness?  How to ‘hold it more 
completely’? In order to approach these questions, this chapter investigates the 
material conditions of performance and theatre. In addition to examining Carpe 
Minuta Prima and its hidden costs, I will also concentrate at some length on one to 
one performances because I see them as interrupting the way performance is usually 
programmed. The limited audience capacity of such work means that one to one 
performances are often (encouraged to be) half an hour or less. I also extend these 
questions into the visual art world and gallery-based performance and examine 
Martin Creed’s Work no. 850, where runners sprinted through the Duveen Galleries 
in Tate Britain every 30 seconds for four months and his Turner Prize winning Work 
no. 277, or Lights going on and off.  I will examine the duration of these art works 
and in so doing explore the act of waiting in these works. I also consider the type of 
economy that the art world inhabits and how visual art institutions conduct their 
models of business.  
2 The material conditions of performance 
In exploring the material conditions of performance I follow the model of cultural 
materialism as outlined by, among others Jonathan Dollimore, Alan Sinfield and Ric 
Knowles. In so doing, I focus on how the social and economic aspects affect both 
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the production and reception of performance. For Knowles, cultural materialism 
‘understands meaning to be produced in the theatre as a negotiation at the 
intersection of three shifting and mutually constitutive poles’: performance in one 
corner, conditions of production in the second and conditions of reception in the 
third.
17
 Within this triangle, ‘A wide range of material factors frame, contain, and 
contribute to the ways in which audiences understand theatrical productions’.18 I 
wish to investigate these factors in order to understand what audiences are paying 
for and why and how what I called in the previous chapter the ‘wasteful duration’ of 
performance fits into capitalist economy. I wish to take the focus off the event of the 
performance and instead look at materialism. As Dollimore and Sinfield argue,  
‘Materialism’ is opposed to ‘idealism’: it insists that culture does not 
(cannot) transcend the material forces and relations of production. Culture is 
not simply a reflection of the economic and political system, but nor can it 
be independent of it.
19
 
 
Alongside cultural materialism I will continue with Marxist theory as discussed in 
Chapter 2. Here I will discuss use and exchange value more explicitly and the labour 
time necessary for their production. According to Marx, ‘The usefulness of a thing 
makes it a use-value’.20 Furthermore, it is the physical body (iron or corn etc.) of the 
commodity ‘which is the use-value or useful thing’.21 In Marxist theory of labour, 
the substance of value is labour and the measure of its magnitude is labour-time.
22
 
Or to put it differently, ‘As exchange-values, all commodities are merely definite 
quantities of congealed labour-time’.23 So, what happens if we look at the 
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relationship between the performance maker or artist, the spectator and the 
producer? Do we find here the relationship between the worker, producer and the 
capitalist? According to Marx, the capitalist ‘has two objectives: in the first place, 
he wants to produce a use-value which has exchange-value, i.e. an article destined to 
be sold, a commodity; and secondly he wants to produce a commodity greater in 
value than the sum of the values of the commodities used to produce it’.24 What 
follows, then, is an examination of how a performance (of immaterial labour) is sold 
and produced as a commodity and who or what might the capitalist be in this 
network of labour relations. 
I have chosen to focus on Carpe Minuta Prima here in order to examine the 
material conditions of performance and theatre and in so doing to situate the 
production and reception of short performances in the wider economy of theatre. I 
consider Lobel’s project to be a useful example in the ways it highlights the issues 
around value, especially monetary value, within performance. Firstly, its one minute 
duration amounts to what I would describe as a short performance. (Even 
considering the short time on either side of the performance where the participants 
visit Lobel’s office first to learn the rules of the game and then to sign the contract 
and be paid, the whole experience only lasts approximately five minutes.) I also 
employ it here as an example of a performance that reveals its own conditions of 
production. To this end, I will discuss the costs and the funding of the project later 
in this section. To begin, I will  outline how a standard time of performance is often 
formulated and in so doing consider in what contexts a performance could be 
considered to be short, as any such term is highly relative and dependent on how 
and where it is presented and framed.  
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The question of venue and audience is an important one when it comes to 
thinking about the material conditions or the context of more traditionally staged 
performance and theatre. In Reading the Material Theatre, Knowles compares the 
funding structures between commercial and not-for-profit theatre and contends: 
Not-for-profit theatre is neither structured to pay dividends to private investors 
nor to reward its creators and producers financially with anything other than 
wages or standard royalties negotiated through agents or professional 
organizations. In theory at least, this would suggest more flexibility in 
programming, and the opportunity for more aesthetically or politically 
alternative productions to contribute more directly or more successfully to the 
production or negotiation of cultural values than is available in the culturally 
affirmative world of the commercial theatre.
25
 
 
Thus Knowles would seem to suggest that short performances, if considered in 
terms of being aesthetically alternative, would sit better in a not-for-profit theatre. 
Knowles goes on to note, however, that public funding ‘is not without its own 
constraints’.26 Similarly, producer Kate Yedigaroff makes a clear distinction 
between programming for a regional theatre and more experimental venues such as 
festivals. Yedigaroff works as a producer both for the Bristol Old Vic and for 
Mayfest, an annual two-week performance festival, also in Bristol. Speaking of the 
Bristol Old Vic, Yedigaroff asks: 
There is an income to be made, so how do we programme imaginatively 
without isolating the core audience group who in Bristol are older, perhaps 
conservative in their taste? They’re the high net worth, which means that 
they’re the people who’ve got more money.27 
 
Yedigaroff’s question touches on several factors that are at play at a larger, regional 
theatre. Firstly, there is a strong indication here that the core audience group have 
the most ‘buying power’. As Yedigaroff suggests, it is that group who come to the 
theatre most regularly and are willing to spend their money. As regular theatre-goers 
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they probably have expectations of what they wish to see in that particular venue. 
For Yedigaroff, it is a question of trust: 
My assumption is that there would have to be so much work done with an 
audience to understand what that [an unusually short performance] means, 
that there’s a thing about trust there and not feeling ripped off, or feeling like 
you don’t really understand what’s happening. 
 
Therefore, the question of what kind of work a venue regularly and traditionally 
programmes is of great importance here. On that point, Yedigaroff goes on to note, 
‘We’re pretty stuck in the structures of how we present work… There’s a kind of 
imaginative link missing in terms of you could invite someone over a year to come 
and do their very short thing, [where] they’re resident there rather than touring’. 
Furthermore, in Knowles’ discussion on the space of reception there are strong 
indications of why theatres might not be inclined to stage extremely short shows or 
why audiences might not ‘bother’ coming to see them. As Knowles argues, ‘the 
theatrical event begins long before the house lights dim’.28 In other words, the time 
that spectators take to get to the performance venue is already a part of the 
experience. Paraphrasing Robin Phillips, the director of Stratford Festival in 
Ontario, Knowles notes that ‘the production began when the spectator arrived at the 
edge of town’.29 Thus, audiences are, I suggest, reluctant to drive to an event that is 
considerably shorter than all the time taken to get to it. As such, audiences might not 
drive to a venue, have drinks, see a very short show, have dinner and then drive 
home. Whereas they would probably drive to a venue, have drinks, have dinner and 
then drive home. Theatre, therefore, needs to be able to sustain the social aspects 
which surround it. Another aspect which is highlighted by short performances 
especially in regional theatres is ticket prices. Can the audience be charged as much 
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as they would be for a two-hour show and if not, how to cover production costs? 
Yedigaroff points out the importance of an interval in venues such as the Bristol Old 
Vic:  
[T]hat’s a moment when you possibly have 500 people buying drinks and 
that’s a major source of revenue for any kind of theatre or regional theatre. 
To make a case for something that doesn’t have that is quite difficult. […] 
And again, the tickets in that space are priced differently and they have to be 
more expensive so I suppose there is a caution there to ask somebody to 
spend 30 odd quid on something that is really short. […] So everything, the 
way that work is produced there, is cost centred right back to the show. So it 
has to in some way make sense together. 
 
Therefore, the seminal elements of an interval and the tradition of programming 
certain type of work in a venue mean that a standard duration of a performance in 
regional theatres is around one to two hours. 
It is perhaps not surprising, as Yedigaroff argues, that ‘there are very few 
people [in theatre programming] who will take a risk on taking something that’s not 
tried and tested as a model’. For Yedigaroff, ‘festivals are where it can happen’. In 
theatre, short plays and monologues often get programmed as an evening of several 
short performances, or such plays and monologues might accompany a longer, full 
evening performance. Festivals, on the other hand, are freer to programme work of 
shorter duration as they often already have an audience and a whole day to fill. 
Having several short performances especially outside of the big studio spaces during 
a day would seem like a viable way to fill a programme. Or to have one short 
performance run several days throughout the day, such as the one to one games of 
Edward Rapley, where a single audience member tries to see Rapley’s face while he 
tries to hide it,
30
 or sitting in front of Rapley with his eyes closed only to be told the 
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first thing that comes to Rapley’s mind when he opens his eyes.31 Therefore, there 
would seem to be more flexibility for festival programmers to have shorter shows in 
a day of performances rather than theatres who have to fill an evening which comes 
with its own demands for all the different elements and professionals who work in 
the theatre (for example, technical team, front of house staff, box office). Indeed, 
speaking of one to one performance Sam Rose argues that, ‘regarding programming, 
most events encourage as many audience members access to the work as possible, 
therefore it is sometimes very difficult to gain commissions for a one to one 
performance that lasts for over half an hour’.32 On the other hand, studio shows for 
larger audiences that are around 15 minutes to half an hour often get put into a 
double bill with another ‘short’ show. So there are two different ways here then that 
festival venues negotiate different temporal frames: repeating a more installation-
based and/or limited audience capacity piece of work and double-billing studio 
shows. For Yedigaroff, ‘it depends very much on the thing and what the experience 
is for the performer’.  
However, the possibility of programming a considerably shorter studio show 
to play only once is not a straight-forward matter. And here again it is ticket prices 
that come into play. Yedigaroff notes how Mayfest often programs short work of 
about half an hour duration and charges around £5 and would, indeed, feel awkward 
to charge more. Yedigaroff goes on to say: ‘If it was an international company with 
a name it would be easier to charge more because as an audience you’d be buying 
an experience of something that has a pedigree’. The same is true of longer pieces of 
work. For example, the tickets for Robert Wilson’s four and a half hour opera 
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Einstein on the Beach which visited the Barbican in London in May 2012, twenty 
years after its last production, started at £35 and went up to £125. For comparison, 
at SPILL Festival 2011 at the Barbican, less established, emerging artists Sylvia 
Rimat and The Kings of England were programmed in a double bill with a 
combined ticket of £12.
33
 Their performances were an hour each. Of course there 
are differences in the costs of the shows. Wilson himself notes that in fact ‘Einstein 
on the Beach at the Metropolitan Opera cost $90,000 per performance. Just to run a 
show that was already created’.34 Also, Einstein on the Beach was in the main 
theatre and Rimat and The Kings of England were both in the smaller studio and 
were commissioned and supported. However, the ticket prices also reflect the 
position of the artists as the most highly priced tickets at £125 offer more than a 
better view, they offer an experience of what Yedigaroff calls pedigree.  
The pricing of short performances is even more interesting. Franko B’s 11-
minute studio performance of Don’t Leave Me This Way charged quite differently in 
different venues. For example, at the Arnolfini in Bristol a normal ticket cost £4 
whereas at the Greenroom in Manchester the same performance cost £9. The one to 
one performance with the same title that lasts around three minutes cost £5 at the 
ICA.
35
 For comparison, at Queen Mary’s Outside AiR festival Mehmet Sander’s 
five minute performance Uncomfort Zone cost £10.
36
 The purpose of these 
snapshots is to note the differing pricing that takes place in different venues. As 
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Yedigaroff notes, ‘There’s this weird, slightly archaic ‘how much bang do you get 
for your buck’ problem’, which I think is evident in these examples and it seems the 
different venues have negotiated that problem in their different ways. Indeed, how 
much can be charged for a half an hour performance, or a five-minute one? When is 
performance good value for money? How much are we willing to pay for 
performance? Ridout argues that in performance ‘we apprehend something of our 
relationship to labour in an acute sense of our position as consumers in the presence 
of a producer who is working for us and at our behest’.37 We feel discomfort when 
we see the service we have paid for be provided or performed in our presence. So 
how much of this immaterial labour do we perceive as material (or with real 
material conditions) and therefore as needing our financial support? In other words, 
when we experience the affect of discomfort while witnessing performance do we 
have a sense of the exact financial sacrifices we are making? Again, then, how much 
are we willing to pay for performance and why? 
This is one of the questions Carpe Minuta Prima poses and it does so by 
removing (to some extent at least) the discomfort out of watching someone provide 
a service for us as it is the spectator who effectively does the (creative) labour. 
Instead, some of those anxieties are replaced by new ones (as I discussed in the 
introduction above) about how to earn one’s money in this type of situation. 
Furthermore, its one pound per minute exchange is only seemingly transparent. I, 
with many others, received a pound for my time and I subsequently spent it on a 
minute of somebody else’s time. Thus Carpe Minuta Prima makes everyone’s time 
equal, no one’s minute is worth more than anyone else’s. But there are of course 
many other costs incurred in this non-profit making process. In fact, as Lobel points 
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out, it is a process which is ‘only possible because of arts funding’.38 When the 
project was presented at festivals for an evening, the artist received a fee which was 
approximately £50 per night. When I visited the show in Brixton, its two week run 
was funded by a Small Arts Grant from the Jerwood Charitable Foundation. The 
grant was £4800 and although the space was free, the project went over its budget 
and Lobel’s fee in the end was approximately £200 instead of the initial £1500. 
Some of the money was lost when 25 minutes of material did not record properly 
and therefore the money spent by Lobel on the minutes could not be made back 
through the vending machine.
39
 Furthermore, the initially alluring prospect of 
buying and selling a single minute for £1 in fact becomes a less viable exchange 
when thought in terms of longer duration as one hour would cost £60. All of these 
aspects in fact make Carpe Minuta Prima relatively expensive.  
Furthermore, the financial details of Lobel’s project above also highlight that 
the cost of one to ones are different from the performer’s perspective. A day of one 
to ones for the performer is, after all, durational. To sustain a day or at least several 
hours’ of performing brings with it financial implications and considerations that a 
spectator of one to ones do not see. A working day requires breaks and subsistence. 
Here we come to what Marx terms socially necessary labour-time. This is the 
‘labour-time required to produce any use-value under the conditions of production 
normal for a given society and with the average degree of skill and intensity of 
labour prevalent in that society’.40 In other words, it would not make it more 
valuable if an unskilled labourer spent a long time producing the commodity. 
Instead, Marx argues, ‘What exclusively determines the magnitude of the value of 
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any article is therefore the amount of labour socially necessary, or the labour-time 
socially necessary for its production’.41 Marx uses the example of a diamond to 
explain the connection between value and the labour time socially necessary. 
Diamonds, although small in most cases, are rare and therefore to find them one 
must use a great deal of labour time. Thus, Marx argues, ‘much labour is 
represented in a small volume’.42  
Susan Bennett argues that, ‘Ultimately theatre is an economic commodity. 
Money is generally exchanged for a paper ticket which... promises the audience two 
performances: one is the show itself and the other is the experience of being in a 
theatre. To both performances is attached the anticipation of pleasure’.43 This 
question of (seeking) pleasure is also one of the reasons why we go to the theatre in 
the first place (although, as I have pointed out, it is also an experience of 
simultaneous uneasiness or embarrassment.) We, of course, go to see a performance 
but we also go to be seen and to have a night out. The core audience at Bristol Old 
Vic, for example, expect a certain type of theatre when they go, not only because 
they like it but because they expect the whole night to be a familiar experience. 
Many audiences go for pre- or post-show drinks and/or dinner and thus getting 
ready for the night is also for many an important and time consuming activity. 
Therefore, considering the effort an audience member makes to get to a venue for a 
night’s entertainment (and here, of course, the location of the venue is crucial as 
discussed above with reference to Knowles) and the investment made, which is not 
only monetary, it is perhaps commonsense to conclude that showing or seeing a 
performance taking a considerably shorter time than the time around the event does 
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not make financial sense or is not satisfying in other ways. Of course, this raises 
another question around how we as a society spend our leisure time. Bennett 
contends that, ‘Western industrial societies, for example, assign a specific role for 
leisure and this supports an economically important entertainment industry. In this 
way, there is a predetermined need to seek out and maintain audiences for the 
arts’.44 Furthermore, E. P. Thomson argues that, ‘In mature capitalist society all time 
must be consumed, marketed, put to use; it is offensive for the labour force merely 
to ‘pass the time’’ and this goes for leisure as well.45  
In the world of current labour habits, leisure has become a problem. For 
Adorno (as discussed in the previous chapter) hobbies, for example, are nothing but 
another productive activity, done because ‘Organised freedom is compulsory’.46 In 
this configuration, then, Lavender’s proposition that our hobbies (our quality time) 
are an attempt to ‘live in the now’ seems to suggest that to desire an experience of 
nowness is only another form of organised freedom. Thus, as I stand in the black 
booth at Carpe Minuta Prima, conscious of the seconds rolling by but unable to do 
anything, I refuse to spend my time well. In this situation, something one could call 
‘in the now’, I wonder what kind of time is worth selling. I decided to sell my spare 
time, time that I normally use for gazing out of the window because that type of 
time is not useful for me. That is to say, I do not want to sell my work time because 
that is too useful. I equally do not want to sell a skill (even if I felt I had one) since 
£1 does not seem like enough to pay for talent or expertise. Therefore, caught in a 
situation where I paradoxically do not want to sell my work time or my skill for a 
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mere pound, my inactivity, my act of wasting of time, becomes only a small 
resistance of sorts. 
3 One to one performance 
Of course, none of these boundaries between theatre and performance and 
dichotomies of evening/festival that I have discussed above are solid. Seeing a short 
performance as part of a day’s programme in a festival might not be any different 
from seeing a short play or performance or monologue in a programmed evening at 
the theatre. But it bears considering what the constraints of those particular areas of 
production and site are. The standard duration of theatre, which, as I have discussed 
above, is usually two hours, is determined not only by the overheads the production 
needs to cover but also the time that is allocated to free time in a worker’s day. The 
traditional working pattern of 9am to 5pm confines leisure time to the evenings. The 
standard time of theatre is thus configured around the working day. Festivals on the 
other hand are in some ways a suspension of control, a period of time that people 
spend without rigid patterns and are thus free to spend extended durations engaged 
in leisure. One to one performances offer an interesting case study for the 
economies of duration in performance context. Rachel Zerihan contends that one to 
one performances ‘generally last for around five or ten minutes, though they have 
been known to take anytime from one minute to one hour’.47 I would like to 
examine one to one performances here because they in fact interrupt the economy of 
performance in a different way. As Rose argues above, it is sometimes very difficult 
to gain commissions for a one to one performance that lasts for over half an hour.
48
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Their limited audience capacity means that their short duration is encouraged so that 
as many audience members as possible can see them.  
Furthermore, although often scheduled in performance festivals on their 
own, there is also a current trend for festivals or evenings of one to one 
performances. In close examination, such programming reveals interesting and 
problematic issues about the relationship between programming and assumptions 
about performance’s time frames. Stoke Newington International Airport, for 
example, used to run evenings of one to one performances entitled Live Art Speed 
Date, which like the name suggests were structured like speed dating events, with 
every performance happening in a booth and lasting four minutes, a duration set by 
the organisers. While supporting and giving opportunities for the makers of one to 
one performances, the format also emphasises and focuses on the sexual 
attractiveness and intimacy of the one to one encounter, which can be problematic 
and uncomfortable both for the audience and the performer, thus eliminating or 
undermining any other attributes of a particular performance. The experience of 
attending Live Art Speed Date is one of long duration, waiting and dipping in and 
out of performances, all homogenous in their length, although it is interesting to 
note how differently each performance manages the four-minute duration. Battersea 
Art Centre’s One-on-One Festival is another example of interesting festival 
programming. In its second year in 2011, the festival was designed as a tapas menu 
with each session consisting of three performances. There were ten sessions in total 
and each one was given a title, such as ‘Challenging’, ‘Intimate’ or ‘Reflective’, 
attempting to describe the overall feel of all the three performances. The decision to 
group the performances under overarching themes meant that the spectator could not 
choose to go and see the performances she wants since the choice had already been 
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made for her. Therefore, if the spectator wants to go to all of the performances that 
interest her, she will have to attend several sessions, a somewhat clever ploy by the 
programmers. 
Furthermore, there is another troubling aspect that comes with this mode of 
programming. Similarly to Live Art Speed Date’s offering of a four minute 
encounter of underlying sexual tensions, BAC’s choice to give the performances 
themes and titles results in the reductive over-emphasis of one aspect of the 
performances, an aspect that might not be similarly identified by every spectator or 
indeed even by the performer/maker. In fact, the whole festival is in danger of 
simplifying the fact that they are one to ones by focusing on it. For Yedigaroff, 
BAC’s festival is like ‘having loads of desserts’. Instead of programming a festival 
with shows with several varying durations where a 10 minute performance is set 
against a show lasting an hour and a half, BAC’s choice to keep the length of the 
one to ones fairly homogeneous resulted in an experience for the viewer that was, 
like Yedigaroff suggests, too much of one thing.   
The programming of BAC’s festival is also highlighting an interesting 
assumption about the duration necessary to sufficiently constitute a proper 
performance. The three performances grouped in a session are divided into a main 
course and two side dishes. The main course in most sessions lasted for about 25 
minutes while the side dishes were around ten minutes. Although there were a few 
exceptions with shorter main courses, there is an assumption made here about the 
amount of time required for a performance to be considered a ‘main’ course with a 
disparaging attitude towards the shorter performances that are mere side dishes. I am 
not attempting here to define the value of theatre or performance per se, but I do 
think that a closer look at the duration of performance and its brevity in particular 
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throws into high relief assumptions about how to price performance and therefore 
the value of time and performance (or performance’s time). At first glance, the 
choice to base ticket prices partly on the duration of the performance seems as 
arbitrary and therefore as rational a choice as any (since somebody somewhere has 
to pay something and that is more often than not the spectator and the cost of the 
production and its funding aside, how else does one price performance?) But at a 
closer look it indeed becomes less viable since it often means that shorter pieces of 
work are not getting the attention and support from programmers and audiences that 
they might deserve. Furthermore, one to one events such as those at BAC and Stoke 
Newington International Airport are examples of the negotiation to make short 
pieces fit into more traditional frames of programming. Bertolt Brecht’s term 
‘culinary’49 theatre seems an apt way to describe these evening length events. They 
are easily consumable and do not disturb standard work-leisure time patterns. It is 
also in this configuration that it becomes clear that when it comes to one to one, or 
other limited audience capacity, performance’s thirty minutes in fact becomes 
subversive, in other words long duration becomes a problem. Time seems to look a 
little strange. 
The performances I have discussed above are all framed in a specific 
performance context, that is to say performances that have an audience who make 
an effort to come to the venue to see a particular performance. There are of course 
other modes of performance that are less reliant on such factors, such as cabaret and 
interventions. For example, Ange Taggart’s and mydadsstripclub’s 
intervention/performance Coke Fuck (2005) consists of Taggart fucking Coca-Cola 
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vending machines in different sites in city centres with a strap-on dildo made from a 
Coca-Cola bottle. Due to intervention art’s site-specific nature, place is a crucial 
element in this genre. Its duration, however, can vary from several day long protest-
like interventions to passing moments on the street. Short interventions like Coke 
Fuck depend on their ability to catch attention of passers-by, to intrigue, to make 
them question and to intervene in their daily lives, and not to be caught by the 
police. Concerns about finding an audience for this type of work are mostly erased 
by its functioning not on a level of marketable theatre or performance but of 
activism. The effect of its brevity is much due to its already existing, unsuspecting 
audience. Cabaret on the other hand relies on an existing audience but an audience 
who generally have come for a night’s entertainment at a club rather than for a 
specific performance. The fact that such performances are not the only 
entertainment of the evening requires a performance that is short and fitting with the 
light mood of the venue. At Duckie at Royal Vauxhall Tavern, Saturday nights are 
programmed as cabarets with one to three acts during the evening. The acts usually 
last around eight to twelve minutes and the artists are paid up to £150 while a ticket 
for the cabaret is £6. Although Duckie gets most of its funding from The Barbican, 
City of London and the Arts Council, its Saturday cabaret is paid for by its box 
office takings. Thinking strictly in numbers, Duckie’s £150 fee for a short 
performance might seem like a profitable deal for an artist but that proposition is 
immediately undone when considering that the process of making performance 
work is rarely as straightforward as that.  
As the discussion on Carpe Minuta Prima has demonstrated so far, the 
making of even the shortest performance piece is a complex process to calculate. A 
£150 lump sum as an artist fee nominally covers, but does not actually include, the 
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cost of a rehearsal space, materials, technical equipment, music or the labour time 
used to make a performance. For example, Lobel points out that during Carpe 
Minuta Prima’s six-day run (totalling 48 hours) he only took 20 minutes break time 
in total. Not only does artist fees often exclude material costs but also does not 
factor in the artist’s break time. How can we then think about artist’s free time?  
There is also a strong argument to be made about the amount of time 
‘necessary’ for the development of a piece of drama. How long is long enough to 
establish dramatic tension, or in the case of more narrative-based theatre, a story and 
characters? In an art form that is essentially about time, how long does it take to 
explore a dramatic idea? For example, Samuel Beckett’s short plays such as Come 
and Go and Act without Words I are a few minutes, while his shortest, Breath, is a 
mere 35 seconds. However, Beckett’s work is an exception in this case; other short 
plays, such as those by David Mamet, are often near the 10-minute mark. It is 
perhaps unsurprising that live art has found it easier to deal with duration 
considering its background in task-based performance and the foregrounding of 
image. One to one performances, for example, often fall into two types: One 
involves encounters, such as Rapley’s The Face Game mentioned above. The 
performance is a meeting between the artist and spectator with an expectation of an 
exchange, whether the spectator knows ‘the rules’ or not. The other involves 
fleeting images, like Don’t Leave Me This Way (also mentioned above). The 
spectator enters a (dark) room where Franko B sits on a chair. Suddenly a strong 
light flashes up behind the artist facing the spectator. The sudden flash of light burns 
an image onto the retina. The performance, which lasts around 35 seconds, is a 
presentation (for the lack of a better word) of an image and does not require active 
participation. The longer version of Don’t Leave Me This Way is set in a studio for a 
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larger audience and lasts eleven minutes. The duration is determined by the fact that 
Franko B’s earlier bloodletting work lasted eleven minutes because that was the 
maximum time the artist could bleed safely enough. Therefore, the logic goes, other 
work does not need to be any longer. This logic then that determines the duration of 
his work is one which is not concerned with the question of necessary aesthetic 
labour. 
The experience of attending the BAC’s One-on-One Festival, on the other 
hand, is one of waiting. The experience is also very long. Since most of the 
performances are five to ten minutes, the time is spent mainly waiting between 
performances. The menu given to the spectator on arrival encourages either to 
reflect on the one to one the spectator has just seen or to visit extra, off the menu, 
performances that are spread around the building. The programme also instructs 
spectators to arrive at the place of the next performance five minutes in advance. In 
the end the whole experience amounts to nearly two hours. In fact, most of the time 
one is either waiting by the door, waiting somewhere else (at the bar, perhaps?) and 
sharing one’s experiences with the ushers whose chit-chat invariably concerns what 
one has seen before or/and is going to see later. There is a constant reiteration of 
one’s experiences of the performances in a way that does not often happen with 
evening length performances. These one to ones are short enough to be discussed 
over and over again, filling the space between these short one to ones. The waiting 
and anticipation is also present in the actual experience of the performances. 
Because one is so aware of the brevity of the encounter there is an intensification of 
the tensions that characterise attending performance. One is very aware that 
something will happen and because there is a limited amount of time it will 
probably happen pretty quickly, it will happen now.  
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The fast and speedy nature of everyday life in the 21
st
 century might be a 
factor in a growing trend for very short performance work. As I have shown above, 
this ‘now’ is not an escape route for performance out of the art market. The problem 
is not of course that we pay for performance but that work like Carpe Minuta Prima 
reminds us that we do. It makes explicit the attempt to escape the market while 
rooting us very firmly in an economy based on exchange value. This in turn calls for 
a closer scrutiny on the conditions of the economy in which performance circulates. 
What I have highlighted above is a complex network of issues all contributing to the 
programming and making of performance work. The size of a venue, the amount of 
funding a venue receives, the consideration of a core audience and the reputation of 
the artist all play their part in the economy of the theatre. Yet, it seems that short 
performances present a problem for this economy that is rooted in assumptions 
about the necessary or correct time frames of performance. Of course, we might not 
be seeing many performances under 10 minutes because the medium of performance 
lends itself better to longer duration. And yet, I suggest, those short performances 
might not get made because they do not fit into the current model of programming. 
Furthermore, examining performance and its material conditions in parallel to those 
of theatre is to emphasise the emergence of performance as a discipline. 
Performance’s recent emergence, despite RoseLee Goldberg’s arguments that 
performance was ‘a catalyst in the history of twentieth-century art’,50 challenges 
some assumptions and conventions about its position in the consumer economy in 
useful ways. When placed in parallel to theatre models performance refuses to fit in.  
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4 What does it sell? Museums and galleries 
The examples which I have discussed so far reveal that the price of performance 
(the price paid for the work) is not in fact related to the value of labour time. 
Therefore, time is not explicitly purchased. This question becomes important in the 
next example where I examine these questions within visual art and gallery-based 
performance. Unlike performance, visual art has a history of explicitly selling work 
and investing money but are the material conditions around visual art any clearer? 
Below, I will look at how the visual art world functions and what it sells. 
Olav Velthuis argues that, ‘The art market is characterized by a dense 
network of intimate, long-term relationships between artists, collectors and their 
intermediaries’.51 Velthuis goes on to contend that, ‘whereas some scholars are keen 
on making a sharp distinction between an (ideal) gift economy and a (corrosive) 
market economy I argue that this distinction is untenable, for circuits within the art 
market are characterized by economic transactions that are not quid pro quo, but 
involve mutual gift giving and delayed payments’.52 In order to examine some of the 
differences in how value is determined in performance and visual art I focus on 
Martin Creed’s work which, in its insistence on instantaneousness, highlights the 
question of absorption and duration. I discuss here how Creed’s museum-based 
performance/installations Work no. 850 (2008) and Work no. 227 (2000) can be 
thought of as both durational as well as series of individual performances. Work no. 
850 consists of runners sprinting through the Duveen Galleries at Tate Britain. The 
work is of course both durational as the sprinters keep coming around the corner 
consistently throughout the day one after the other (every 30 seconds) as well as the 
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duration of a few seconds. Work no. 227 from 2000 is similarly both a durational 
performance and a series of individual events. The work consists of the lights in a 
gallery going on and off every five seconds. I consider how much time is actually 
spent watching the work and how much time is spent waiting for it. Like Live Art 
Speed Date, it is an experience of waiting, but an experience of waiting, I suggest, 
that is intrinsic to the work. I will also discuss the business models within gallery-
based work and raise the question of investment. 
Creed’s use of an empty gallery and its lights in Work no. 227 is a prime 
example of his practice where the materials he works with as well as the world he 
works in are mainly left as they are. Creed’s works are in effect ready-mades. Yukie 
Kamiya notes:  
Confronting preconceived notions of artworks as creations executed with 
painstaking skill, the presence of things, literally as they are, can even be 
challenging. It also exemplifies Creed’s approach: a deliberate attempt to 
banish any concept of hierarchy between ‘things’ and ‘art’, to assert art and 
ordinary life as equal in every respect.
53
 
 
Creed’s art exists in the world (almost) without adding anything to it. Works like 
filling a room in a gallery with balloons, placing all the items of a gallery into one of 
its rooms or crunching a piece of A4 paper into a ball add ‘to the world, yet since 
the artist is only using what’s there, nothing is added’.54 And in similar ways, as 
Darian Leader continues, ‘[t]hey add while not changing anything, yet at the same 
time they obviously change something’.55 So how and what do they change? Leader 
argues that ‘The same logic organizes Creed’s on-off works’, such as Work no. 
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227.
56
 ‘At one level’, Leader contends, ‘the work resolved the artist’s inability to 
decide whether to have the light on or off: they now did both and simultaneously 
denied privilege to any one part of the room’.57 Leader goes on to say that, ‘At 
another level, he was aiming “to make something without adding anything”. The 
room was left as it was and the oscillation of lights meant that, as Creed put it, 
“there’s no line between the work and the world here, between the work and 
everything in it. You can’t say the work begin or ends here.”’58 
For Creed, running is instantaneous. As Creed notes, unlike painting which 
is still and somehow fixes the viewer for a long time, ‘Running moves on and lets 
you go’.59  Indeed, Work no. 850 ‘runs past you, leaving you free to move on’.60 For 
Creed, the best way to see museums is to run through them at high speed. But in 
Work no. 850 the artwork is the one doing the running. In fact, the spectators at Tate 
Britain are instructed, for health and safety reasons, not to run with the runners. 
Massimiliano Gioni suggests that ‘Creed’s art lives in the interval between the event 
and its negation, between its violent bursting forth, immediate suspension and 
subsequent repetition.’61 For Gioni, the system that sustains Creed’s works is ‘the 
tension between the expectation of an event, its occurrence and its symmetrical 
negation.’62 There is something here in Gioni’s descriptions of Creed’s work that 
suggests an instant where the work happens and catches, or absorbs, the viewer. 
Both Gioni’s and Creed’s accounts of the work seem to correspond with Michael 
Fried’s distinction between visual art as instantaneous and therefore good and 
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performance or theatre as something involving temporality and therefore bad. The 
work appears, Gioni suggests, in the short burst of the work’s eventhood and its 
negation. However, I suggest that although Creed considers running ‘a spectator 
sport just like art’,63 the sprinting operates in a frame of time that belongs to sport 
events rather than the durational element of art. The energy dispensed is that of the 
work and not the viewer. Here the work is doing the work, the viewer views. The 
viewer is, for most of the time, in waiting, in a suspended time. In fact, the work, 
unlike everything else in the gallery, makes the viewer wait for it and once it is 
present denies any extended acts of perusal. 
In fact, I would argue that both Work no. 227 and Work no. 850 refuse a 
viewer any access to them. The waiting that occurred in Live Art Speed Date here 
becomes an anticipation that does not resolve itself. The long duration of the work 
does not allow the spectator to see the whole thing and yet the short instant is an 
unlikely duration to be experienced. Thus the work escapes one’s ability to take it 
in. As such, the work is akin both to land art in the way it is either too big to 
experience as well as to most video art in galleries where one comes in at the middle 
of the video’s loop and either stays to see the whole (but in the wrong order) or 
leaves again. Writing of Michael Heizer’s earthwork sculpture Double Negative 
(1969), Rosalind E. Krauss argues that the work ‘suggests an alternative to the 
picture we have of how we know ourselves’.64 Because the earth sculpture is so vast 
one can only get a picture of the whole thing by standing on one side and looking at 
another. For Krauss, Double Negative thus ‘causes us to meditate on a knowledge of 
ourselves that is formed by looking outward toward the responses of others as they 
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look back at us’, forcing an eccentric position where we are no longer at the centre 
looking out.
65
 Creed’s work achieves or produces this same state of experiencing the 
work from a decentralised position from within ourselves. However, in Creed’s 
work the waiting and anticipation amounts to yet something more and produces a 
type of boredom. On his essay on children and boredom, Adam Phillips argues:  
Boredom…protects the individual, makes tolerable for him the impossible 
experience of waiting for something without knowing what it could be. So 
the paradox that goes on in boredom is that the individual does not know 
what he was waiting for until he finds it, and that often he does not know 
that he is waiting.
66
 
 
In Creed’s work, however, the viewer does not get to experience the thing that she is 
waiting for when it does come. Instead, the spectator feels that there is something 
more that will come later and so the waiting continues. It is in this boredom that the 
work happens. As Phillips argues, ‘Boredom is integral to the process of taking 
one’s time’.67 In these works, the work and the viewer take their time. In fact, in 
Work no. 227 and Work no. 850, the fragment is the whole experience. 
As discussed in the performance examples in the first section, labour time is 
not explicitly purchased in performance. And it is certainly not purchased in the 
ready-mades, which do not reflect (traditional) artistic skill but, as Krauss notes, 
pose questions.
68
 So how are Creed’s ready-mades consumed and circulated? Work 
no. 227 was acquired by the Museum of Modern Art in New York in 2007. Work 
no. 850, on the other hand, was a commission by Tate Britain. The conditions 
around the business models of gallery-based performance and visual art have 
recently attracted attention. In 2011 Marina Abramović was looking for six 
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performers to perform in her 2002 piece Nude with Skeleton. The piece was to be 
performed at the annual gala of the Museum of Contemporary Art in Los Angeles 
where the six nude performers were to lie at the centre of tables for approximately 
four hours while the gala guests had dinner around them. The artists were paid $150 
in total for the performance and fifteen hours of rehearsal. A seat at the dinner cost 
up to $100.000. Artist Sara Wookey who auditioned for the piece but eventually 
refused the offer to take part states: ‘I was expected to ignore (by staying in what 
Abramović refers to as ‘performance mode’) any potential physical or verbal 
harassment while performing’.69 Wookey highlights the exploitative and abusive 
circumstances as something creative workers come across too often. In another 
example, Tino Sehgal, an artist known for his performance-based work, or 
‘actualised situations’, insists that his purchased work not be documented or their 
instructions be written down. When Sehgal’s Kiss was acquired by MoMA in 2008, 
twelve people (museum personnel and attorneys) had to memorise the instructions 
for the work which consists of actors recreating iconic kisses from art history. 
Sehgal also insists that the acquisition is only a verbal agreement and that there is no 
receipt. Instances such as those with Abramović and Sehgal, which take into 
account not only the labour time of the artist but also his material (in these case 
performers) question the art institutions’ capacity to evaluate their business forms 
and to be transparent about how they spend their money.
70
   
Moreover, when is an acquisition of an art work a good investment? For 
example, Creed’s Work no. 88, a sheet of A4 paper crumpled into a ball, can be 
purchased online for £150 and is an unlimited edition. In the art world, a piece of 
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work from an unlimited edition would not count as a good investment because it 
lacks rarity. Gavin Turk’s art work Tea Stain, a sheet of paper with a tea stain, is 
sold in a limited edition of 1000 for the individual price of £120. Nic Forrest argues 
that, ‘with 1000 of the works on the market there is never going to be enough of a 
demand on the secondary market to produce an increase in their value significant 
enough to categorise the work as a good investment’.71 Performance on the other 
hand, as evident in Sofaer’s quote discussed above, has not been explicitly situated 
in the world of investments. For example, as both Yedigaroff and Rose argued 
above, one to one performances are often encouraged to last no more than half an 
hour so that as many people as possible can see them. Immaterial labour inherent in 
the service economy means that value is determined in labour time and not in its 
consumption. It is here that the issue of value versus price is articulated. 
 La Ribot’s ‘distinguished pieces’ are an interesting example of art 
accommodating the market place. Each distinguished piece is a short performance 
that has been bought by a ‘Distinguished Proprietor’ for £600.  A proprietor will get 
free entry to the piece they own as well as their name credited in the programme 
every time the piece is performed. These tactics employed by La Ribot and Sehgal 
disturb the assumptions that there is nothing to own in art or performance, that its 
value is that of emptiness, or wasting. They pose the question: What does 
performance sell?  
La Ribot has also employed franchising in her work. The artist pays 
performer Sian Williamson to perform the work when La Ribot is not able to due to 
other commitments. Franchising as a model is commonplace when it comes to 
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dramatic texts (a playwright writes a play, several people produce the play at 
different times in different places). Performance, however, finds such business 
models highly suspicious if not totally inappropriate. But if La Ribot’s work can be 
performed by someone else, or several people at the same time in different places, 
surely one to ones could be similarly franchised? Doing so would reveal and draw 
attention to the fallacy of their uniqueness. Such fallacy depends on the affirmation 
and reproduction of the sense that this one to one that the spectator is experiencing 
is the only one when in fact the same performance is performed several times that 
day. But what would it mean to make a performance of, say, one or two hours that 
only one person would be able to witness? And how much could a ticket for that 
unique performance cost? Would not the rarity of such a performance event make it 
very valuable indeed? This also raises the question of what one gets from being 
there. Such a question could be asked of any circuit-based racing where a Formula 1 
car or horse, for example, passes the spectator fast and where one can never see the 
whole (as seeing on television, for example). But it is, in fact, the experience of the 
fragment that is the answer; that is, the fragment is the whole. 
5 Gift, giving, time 
This chapter has focused on short duration in order to investigate the conditions in 
which performance is circulated and programmed. Short performance reveals how 
duration is negotiated within the economy of performance and how time begins to 
look a bit strange when considering such limited audience capacity performance 
models as one to ones. As Carpe Minuta Prima has shown, there is very little 
correlation between the price of performance and the labour used to make it. Indeed, 
both Lobel’s project and Creed’s work reveal that when we think about what we are 
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paying for in performance we think about the wrong time: we do not pay £125 for 
nearly five hours of Robert Wilson’s work; we pay for the necessary amount of 
labour time that it took to make the performance. In fact, I suggest that after the time 
taken to make the performance it makes no difference if that performance then lasts 
for five hours or thirty five seconds. This fallacy of the correlation between 
performance’s duration and its value is in contrast with the idea of value in visual 
arts. Whereas we expect to pay more money for longer performances we do not 
expect the same when it comes to objects. In fact we often pay considerably larger 
sums for considerably smaller objects, such as diamonds (as Marx points out).  
Furthermore, investigating the material conditions surrounding performance 
also highlights the uneasy relationship between producer and consumer in a service 
economy. As Shannon Jackson contends, ‘Duration is all the more palpable when it 
is exchanged for a wage’.72 This is exactly what Carpe Minuta Prima attempts to 
articulate. The literal selling on time that the project evokes ends up emphasising the 
fact that we are not selling time, but our labour. I have also raised the question of 
nowness and how this relates to perceiving time as a commodity to purchase. It 
would seem then that when examining the question of pursuing time as commodity, 
performance is an apt place to focus on, and vice versa, examining performance 
reveals how we erroneously attempt to pursue time as commodity.  
I have also attempted to approach the question of the value of performance, 
or the question of how much we are willing to pay for performance. I have 
suggested that this question is complicated by the discomfort we feel when paying 
for a service. How could we think, then, about performance as economy and re-
evaluate the question concerning the value of performance? Furthermore, I think 
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this issue is also linked to the question of what one gets from being there, in person. 
Jacques Derrida offers a suggestion in his writing on the notion of gift. For Derrida, 
there is a clear distinction between gift and economy. Unlike economy, the gift 
‘must not circulate, it must not be exchanged, it must not in any case be exhausted, 
as a gift, by the process of exchange, by the movement of circulation of the circle in 
the form of return to the point of departure.’73 And as the gift cannot circulate (in 
order to remain a gift), it interrupts the economy: ‘in suspending economic 
calculation, [the gift] no longer gives rise to exchange’.74 The gift is, in fact, the 
impossible, but not impossible, because ‘For there to be gift, not only must the 
donor or donee not perceive or receive the gift as such, have no consciousness of it, 
no memory, no recognition; he or she must also forget it right away’.75 Furthermore, 
time ‘always sets in motion the process of a destruction of the gift: through keeping, 
restitution, reproduction, the anticipatory expectation or apprehension that grasps or 
comprehends in advance’.76 In other words, the gift stops being that at the instant 
when it is perceived (or even remembered or anticipated) as such. Therefore, the gift 
is really the gift of giving. It is here that the notion of gift becomes important to the 
questions raised here. For Derrida, one thing that cannot be given as gift is time 
because it is nothing and therefore ‘it does not properly belong to anyone; if certain 
persons or certain social classes have more time than others – and this is finally the 
most serious stake of political economy – it is certainly not time itself that they 
possess’.77 However, since time is nothing and the giving of gift entails giving 
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something that is perceived as nothing, then the ultimate gift would be time. And 
yet, how to give time? Derrida argues: 
The gift is not a gift, the gift only gives to the extent it gives time. The 
difference between a gift and every other operation of pure and simple 
exchange is that the gift gives time. There where there is gift there is time. 
What it gives, the gift, is time, but this gift of time is also a demand of time. 
The thing must not be restituted immediately and right away. There must be 
time, it must last, there must be waiting – without forgetting [l’attente – sans 
oubli]. It demands time, the thing, but it demands a delimited time, neither 
an instant nor an infinite time, but a time determined by a term, in other 
words, a rhythm, a cadence. The thing is not in time; it is or it has time, or 
rather it demands to have, to give, or to take time – and time as rhythm, a 
rhythm that does not befall a homogeneous time but that structures it 
originarily.
78
 
I suggest that what goes on in the waiting and in the fragment is this demand of 
time, a time that has its own rhythm. Lavender states that nowness, or the moment 
of actuality, is a desire to possess the present moment fully, to hold it completely. 
Derrida’s notion of the gift might be, at least partially, answer to how to achieve 
that. And this might also be a way into thinking about investment in performance’s 
economy. In other words, the taking or demanding of time that the gift entails for 
Derrida, is not a straightforward critique of or a resistance to capitalism’s time as 
some performance discussed here might suggest. Instead the idea of the gift suggests 
another approach to time that recognises time’s immateriality on one hand (it does 
not belong to anyone) while paying due attention to its material implications. Along 
these lines I have suggested that immaterial labour does not escape its material  
conditions but that there are blind spots in the perception of labour time. As I have 
shown here, the immateriality of performance suggests a transformation or refusal 
of commercialisation, yet nevertheless benefits from a complex system of valuation 
and marketisation. In so doing I have attempted to highlight what is at stake in 
exposing the market for some works of performance (and other apparently flimsy or 
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unsubstantial artefacts), by demonstrating the fallacy of the relation between the 
work itself (use value; related to its labour-time) and its price (exchange value). 
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Chapter 4 
Space and Pure Duration: Looking for Qualitative Time 
 
1 Henri Bergson and pure duration 
In this chapter I move from examining the economic implications of durational and 
short performances to performances which evoke a different type of slowness and 
experience of duration. It is in effect a move from or beyond quantity towards 
thinking about quality. I will examine theatrical performances which seem to offer 
an experience of time that is asking its audience to attune in a specific way. The 
discussion focuses on work which is more traditionally staged (in that the 
performance happens in the performance area and the audience is expected to stay 
for the whole duration). I use as my case studies the work of Goat Island and Robert 
Wilson. In doing so, the discussion will centre on a certain type of slowness evident 
in the performances. It is easy to see the experience of time these performances offer 
as similar. Both practices engage in non-narrative performance where time seems to 
be the focus of investigation. There is a sense of waiting in the works of both 
Wilson and Goat Island that does not necessarily lead to anticipation or a climax. 
 In this chapter I also move from chronophobia to chronophilia. I have 
already studied some of these tensions in Chapter 1 where I discussed Lee’s 
definition of the term chronophobia. For Lee, a fear or anxiety about time is 
connected to the rise of technology that we might not feel in control of. 
Furthermore, the distinction between phobia and philia in this case is not definite 
and fixed for Lee and one might in some cases become the other. For example, in 
Chapter 1 we saw how Andy Warhol and Barnett Newman exhibited an interest in 
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time that was more like a philia which drew them to it. Warhol’s work is, as I 
discussed, contradictory in its interests in the operations of time. While he is bored 
of the box full of chocolates and cannot wait to get rid of the chocolates and the box, 
he is also resolute to capture every moment in his long films, to stop time from 
escaping. In the next two chapters we will see no anxiety about time but an interest, 
perhaps even a fascination, in its passing. The works discussed in these chapters 
employ time as a tool. It is a dynamic borne out of the impossibility of holding time; 
holding time being something performance is some ways is trying so hard to 
understand – a problem of the present.  
Goat Island began working together as a company in 1987. Of the founding 
members, Lin Hixson and Matthew Goulish carried on working in the company 
through to the final year in 2007. By then they had been joined by Bryan Saner, 
Karen Christopher, Mark Jeffery and Litó Walkey. The company produced theatre 
performances which explored, through their structure, the experiences of 
temporality we might have in performance. For Goulish, ‘[t]he organisation of time 
communicates to the audience to some extent what they are not experiencing: 
chance or improvisation’.1 Goulish goes on to describe how the performance 
suggests different paths or routes for the audience to take to navigate their way 
through. He argues: ‘The fact that the performance is a loosely closed system, 
inscribed and encircled with limits, however porous, and that this closure’s visibility 
signifies the presence of an author, carries its own associative meanings’.2 In 
balancing between creating tight structures and having space or emptiness within 
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those structures, the work of Goat Island offers a type of duration that results from 
an experience of waiting and not knowing.  
Wilson’s work is similarly invested in making its audience wait for 
something, a climax, a change. This waiting is triggered by the long stretches of 
time that are passed by with the use of lighting, music and set, or in other words, 
images. Leo Bersani argues that, ‘[t]he irresponsible and exhilarating lesson of 
Wilson’s theater…has frequently been that we don’t have to know anything; we 
have only to be ready to enlarge our repertory of desirable spectacles’.3 Wilson’s 
Einstein on the Beach from 1976 was made in collaboration with Philip Glass who 
composed the music. The pair’s collaboration led to an initial break up after disputes 
over the authorship of the work in the 1970s. Bersani describes Wilson’s work as 
‘[t]emporally discontinuous, obsessively repetitive, indifferent to rationality and to 
the discursive or informational function of language’.4 Einstein on the Beach is a 
four and a half hour opera about and not about Albert Einstein. Lacking a coherent 
narrative, it is exemplary of Wilson’s work where there is, in some ways similar to 
Goat Island, an emptiness or space for the spectators to assert their associations.  
I will explore these works with reference to Henri Bergson’s notion of pure 
duration which Bergson defines as ‘succession without distinction’.5 For Bergson, 
time is qualitative and therefore cannot be measured. Hence our inner duration is a 
heterogeneous reality consisting of a multiplicity of psychic mental states which 
permeate one another and flow. This chapter will investigate how some performance 
work invites an experience of time in the state of pure duration. I examine whether 
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that experience is possible in the space of performance. I will argue that it is in fact 
through employing Bergson’s thinking that we begin to see the difference between 
Goat Island’s Bergsonian approach to duration and consequently, Wilson’s very 
anti-Bergsonian focus on the spatialisation of time. Through considering these 
performance works, I will also address issues of repetition in performance and the 
effect of space on the experience of time.  
Matthew Goulish articulates a common misunderstanding concerning Goat 
Island’s work in his account of an encounter with a producer who after the 
performance of It’s Shifting, Hank asked Goulish: ‘What is the reason for all this 
repetition?’. Goulish’s reply was simply: ‘What repetition?’.6 For the company, it is 
a question of perception – to perceive not ‘a single moment repeating’ but ‘a non-
repeating series of similar moments’.7 According to Heike Roms, ‘Repetition 
transforms poetry into inhumanity. But Goat Island demonstrates how something 
more human may be gained from repetition’.8 What I want to do here is to look at 
the deployment of time and repetition, or what might be more accurately termed 
non-repetition, in Goat Island’s work in order to suggest what their function might 
be and how reference to Bergson’s ideas about duration might augment this 
investigation. How does the work invite one to experience time or to experience the 
state of pure duration? Is that experience possible in the space of performance? 
What is at stake when we say that ‘a cause cannot repeat its effect since it will never 
repeat itself’?9 In what ways is Bergson’s notion of non-causal flow of time similar 
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or different to what Goulish sees as a question of perception? I have chosen to focus 
the discussion on two performances, namely How Dear to Me the Hour When 
Daylight Dies (1996) and When will the September roses bloom? Last night was 
only a comedy (2004). I have chosen these pieces as they present interesting 
examples for the investigation of waiting and uncertainty, or not-knowing, 
conditions which present a fruitful starting point for an investigation of inner 
duration.  
I begin my investigation by unpacking some of the terms and notions from 
Bergson’s book Time and Free Will in order to explore their implications for our 
understanding of the non-repetition of similar moments in Goat Island’s work. For 
Bergson, as we will see, ‘in the human soul there are only processes’ and that is why 
‘every sensation is altered by repetition’.10 Perhaps dance is a useful way of 
approaching the shift in consciousness necessary for the possibility of accessing the 
flow of time since motion, according to Bergson, is a mental synthesis. Bergson 
argues that,  
We generally say that a movement takes place in space, and when we assert 
that motion is homogenous and divisible, it is of the space traversed that we 
are thinking, as if it were interchangeable with the motion itself. Now, if we 
reflect further, we shall see that the successive positions of the moving body 
really do occupy space, but that the process by which it passes from one 
position to the other, a process which occupies duration and which has no 
reality except for a conscious spectator, eludes space. We have to do here not 
with an object but with a progress: motion in so far as it is a passage from 
one point to another, is a mental synthesis, a psychic and therefore 
unextended process.
11
 
Thus we see that motion is a similar psychic process as time. Thus I wonder whether 
watching movement augments the experience of the flow of time. Furthermore, 
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speaking of aesthetic feelings, Bergson uses the figure of the dancer to demonstrate 
the feeling of grace (the simplest of the fundamental emotions, according to 
Bergson). ‘If curves are more graceful than broken lines’, argues Bergson, it is 
because ‘while a curved line changes its direction at every moment, every new 
direction is indicated in the preceding one’.12 The perception of ease we see in that 
motion then ‘passes over into the pleasure of mastering the flow of time and of 
holding the future in the present’.13  
Moreover, the accompanying music creates a ‘regularity of the rhythm 
[which] establishes a kind of communication between’ the dancer and spectator.14  It 
thus allows us ‘to foresee to a still greater extent the movements of the dancer, make 
us believe that we now control them’.15 In doing so, we feel physical sympathy. Our 
aesthetic pleasure does not grow in magnitude but is in fact ‘resolved into as many 
different feelings, each one of which, already heralded by its predecessor, becomes 
perceptible in it and then completely eclipses it’.16 In her book Thinking in Time: An 
Introduction to Henri Bergson, Suzanne Guerlac notes how aesthetic experience 
becomes ‘paradigmatic of feeling in general’.17 ‘In this fictive scene’, Guerlac 
claims, ‘the dancer performs for us what goes on inside us when we experience pure 
quality as ‘qualitative progress’, or the dynamic unfolding of differences in kind’.18 
Moreover, this qualitative progress ‘is precisely what characterizes the flow of time 
itself’.19  
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However, what is important here is the assumption that the dancer is dancing 
to music. Bergson argues: 
A third element enters when the graceful movements obey a rhythm, and 
when music accompanies them.  This is because, by permitting us to 
anticipate the artist’s movements even better, the rhythm and the beat lead us 
to believe that we are the masters of these movements.
20
 
 
The task that Bergson takes on in Time and Free Will is to ‘consider a level of 
experience that is immediate in that it is not mediated through language or 
quantitative notation, an experience of the ‘real’…that resists symbolization’.21 This 
means to discern a notion of time that is not related to space – pure duration – 
‘which we can approach only through inner states, that is through immediate, or 
purely qualitative experience’.22 Bergson argues that in order to count and measure 
time we ‘project time into space’23 since ‘counting material objects means thinking 
all these objects together, thereby leaving them in space’.24  However, if space is 
quantity then time, or duration, is quality and cannot be measured. The multiplicity 
of time is distinctly different from the multiplicity of space. Pure duration is 
‘succession without distinction’25, a heterogeneous reality consisting of a 
multiplicity of psychic mental states which permeate one another and flow. 
Sensations, or intensities, cannot be measured or compared since they are not 
external objects. However, we are so used to measuring things in the external world 
that we do not realise the difference in multiplicity between objects and intensities. 
Bergson argues that,  
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Pure duration is the form which the succession of our conscious states 
assumes when our ego lets itself live, when it refrains from separating its 
present state from its former states.
26
 
But, as Guerlac elucidates, ‘the only way to appreciate the power of temporal flow – 
the force of duration – is to be here now...to engage completely with the feelings of 
the present moment in all their contingency’.27 We are in fact unable to know the 
flow of time cognitively. Indeed, ‘We can only know it concretely through the way 
different qualities feel to us at different times’.28  Furthermore, the intervention of 
language adds another complication. Bergson is quick to point out that ‘there is no 
common measure between mind and language’ and we therefore cannot translate 
what the soul experiences.
29
 He argues: 
We instinctively try to solidify our impressions in order to express them in 
language. Hence we confuse the feeling itself, which is in a perpetual state of 
becoming, with its permanent external object, and especially with the word 
which expresses this object.
30
                                                                                                              
In other words, each conscious state is produced in ‘the time as quality’ but 
projected into ‘the time as quantity’, i.e. space. Therefore, as Bergson explains, if 
we walk past the same houses year after year we perceive them to look the same and 
we assume we still have the same impression as the first time we saw them. 
However, if we can arrest our habit of merely recognising instead of perceiving we 
will see that the houses ‘have ended by borrowing from me something of my own 
conscious existence’.31 The houses have grown old too and thus our first impression 
is no longer applicable. Otherwise, ‘what difference would there be between 
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perceiving and recognizing, between learning and remembering?’.32 Similarly, 
sensations, such as taste, seem to us the same only because we give them the same 
name. It is the distinction which Bergson makes between perceiving and 
recognizing and between learning and remembering that becomes significant when 
considering Goat Island’s employment of time and repetition. 
2 Goat Island and waiting, still 
Time has been an important subject of investigation for Goat Island. As company 
director Lin Hixson asserts: ‘I have sought time as material in performances since I 
first began to work with Goat Island in 1987’.33 This interest in time manifests in 
several ways in the company’s work. Resulting from a detailed investigation of 
duration, the performances are, for want of a better phrase, full of time. Made of 
physical, dance-like tasks, borrowed texts and recurring sequences where 
performers often seemingly repeat ‘actions to the point of exhaustion’34, the 
performances evoke the experience of real time instead of the cut-up, shortened and 
accelerated time of performance. Those writing on Goat Island’s performances 
frequently note how ‘time often seems to slow down or extend’35 resulting in ‘a 
quantity of time that simply exceeds our ability to ‘know’ rationally what to do with 
it’.36 Former company member Karen Christopher states that, ‘We have used 
different tactics throughout our working history for approaching the pause, the 
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break, the slowing or distortion of time’.37 Time used as tangible material has a 
function beyond the act of framing the event by giving it a beginning and an end. 
Using real actions in real time means that time becomes ‘regulated by the time it 
[takes] for the body to sweat’.38 Time is not only felt as a passing of time longer 
than expected in a performance but its traces become visible through the exhaustion 
of the body. Furthermore, Christopher explains that ‘the manipulation of time 
through the extension or duration of a similar gesture, or a series of images repeated 
for a longer-than-expected length of time’ is, in part, a tool for facilitating a space 
for the audience to break away from the demands of their day and be in the here and 
now.
39
  
That the company are invested in examining time and duration is obvious 
already in the titles of their work. For example, while How Dear to Me the Hour 
When Daylight Dies focuses on a very specific temporal measure, an hour, and 
gestures towards this specific time as something precious and worth waiting for (this 
hour will come again and again), When will the September roses bloom? Last night 
was only a comedy poses a question and a concern about the future while also 
casting the mind back to the past, last night’s event which was only a comedy. In 
addition to the quantification of time and temporal markers in their titles (somehow 
a careful framing of duration), the work of the company evoked an experience of 
endless time when all the while the work is in fact very carefully calculated. There 
is a fixation on numbers, counting and ordering structure in Goat Island’s work that 
comes across indeed as very anti-Bergsonian.  
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For example, September Roses is structured according to the Fibonacci 
number sequence where every number is the sum of the two numbers preceding it 
(e.g. 1, 1, 2, 3, 5, 8, 13, 21…).  All the sections in the piece have their own precise 
duration and once 337 seconds has been reached the spiral starts going back down 
again. Not only was this spiral mapped on the floor of the performance space but 
also ‘in time (with a stopwatch, eventually replaced by a music soundtrack, and then 
by a clock)’.40 Hence, the duration of the beginning section is 55 seconds and the 
longest time and the highest point on the spiral, 337 seconds, corresponds with the 
duration of Litó Walkey’s one leg stand. As Goulish explains, the reason for 
choosing two James Taylor songs (Sweet Baby James and Fire and Rain) for this 
one leg stand sequence was to cue them into the Fibonacci structure.
41
 Furthermore, 
Goulish notes how Hixson ‘orchestrated the varying durations of the missing parts 
[in September Roses when audience and performers wait] with a precision that, in 
fact, reminded me of 4’33, John Cage’s three-movement silent work for piano’.42 
Similarly, the scenes in How Dear to Me... which I will discuss below are at least 
partially set to music, as if to mark the marching on of time and the persistence of 
movement as it continues in silence. In its precise orchestration, Goat Island’s work 
resembles choreography. It is demanding that one is, and executes these movements, 
on time, to some extent. But in actual fact, it is more specifically the joining of 
dance to music.   
Witnessing some of the repetitive sequences in these works is further 
complicated by their presence on stage. Framed as a theatrical performance, the 
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audience has come to see the work with their learned modes of spectating and 
expectations. As Adrian Heathfield argues, ‘Traditions of watching within live 
arenas may lead us to expect that such experiences’- of self-consciousness, 
confusion, frustration, near boredom, and vague recognition - ‘should and will have 
been cut down or out’.43 However, Heathfield goes on to suggest that ‘Goat Island’s 
work holds you inside the duration of these experiences’.44 For example, in How 
Dear to Me... Goulish walks in a circle around the stage and at regular intervals 
steps over a chair that Bryan Saner places in his way. Goulish walks in a calm 
tempo, seemingly unaware of the other activity going on around him. After a while 
Christopher and Antonio Poppe join Saner and they all move the chair. The walking 
literally goes in circles and yet resists closure. The song that is played during this 
scene gradually grows to a crescendo. However, nothing is explained and what is 
left for the spectator is a varied range of associations and images. Indeed, it is 
uncertain whether the walk that the company perform here is in fact a repetition of a 
circle or a continuation of a line. It is this uncertainty perhaps that allows the 
spectator to enter the work through associations but it is also the key to the kind of 
temporality or experience of duration that the work offers. The not knowing opens 
up time so that time can be experienced as ‘a succession of qualitative changes’.45 
In effect, there always seems to be something missing in Goat Island’s 
performances, and in the movement sequences in particular, due to the way they 
have been constructed in the first place. Hixson would usually give a directive to the 
group members who then devise movement sequences, actions or gestures. These 
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sequences in turn get altered by others or recycled into something else. This long 
‘ongoing winnowing process’46 of accumulating responses produces an absence at 
the core of every movement sequence. This results in what Sara Jane Bailes calls ‘a 
performative state of stillness’.47 This state of stillness is perhaps nowhere as 
forceful as in September Roses when Saner comes forward to announce that they are 
missing the beginning. A silence lasting 55 seconds ensues during which the 
performers simply stand on stage and wait. In a similar vein, there is a moment in 
September Roses when Walkey stands on one leg for the duration of two James 
Taylor songs. Taking their time, these scenes force the audience to wait and to 
adjust their viewing accordingly. Given no context, the seemingly endless or 
directionless movement or simply waiting seem to invite the spectator to take their 
time to perceive how the action unravels in time. Walkey notes: ‘I could easily just 
get into a meditative state and close off, but I don’t, I’m really trying to project 
something’.48 Paradoxically, it is ‘I must practice; do not waste time’.49 Indeed, 
‘there’s a lot of action going on in that stillness’.50 However, the audience is never 
really let in on what Walkey is projecting or why and the uncertainty about whether 
anything really is unravelling or will be revealed grows. The ‘winnowing’ making 
process leaves the audience with an unsettling sense that things are in fact done in 
secret and that the spectator watching the action on stage will only see a small part 
of what actually goes on. Things will not be explained to us. As Walkey contends, 
‘with Goat Island there’s a level of unconsciousness, or intuition – things aren’t 
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over-explained. If anything, it’s unexplained’.51 Watching the slight trembling of 
Walkey’s body while she balances on one leg, we merely venture a guess that 
something is happening. Similarly, we wait for the missing beginning hoping, or 
trusting, it will appear. In doing so, the audience is held, as Heathfield suggests, 
inside the duration of such experiences. We are held because we are uncertain if 
anything is going to happen, if there is in fact anything to wait for.  
According to Bailes, the performances employ ‘repetitive sequencing as a 
way of exhausting movement rather than simply exhausting the body’.52 For 
example, How Dear to Me... starts with a monologue by Saner taken from Kon 
Ichikawa’s 1956 film The Harp of Burma after which Goulish comes forward and 
stands still. He then lifts his right hand and rubs the back of his palm with his left 
hand using circular movements. He lowers both hands and after a beat starts again. 
This action is done first in silence and then over the duration of an Irish folk song 
and continues after that in silence. It is as if the silence that preceded the song was 
carried over and thus the music offers only a short respite. To place such an action at 
the beginning of the performance balances an atmosphere of languor against a 
growing concentration as the audience are drawn into the image. This is followed by 
a jumping sequence, named by the company as the ‘puppet jump’, where all the 
performers jump, spin and fall for several minutes after which they begin the 
‘shivering homage’, a movement executed in a line to the accompaniment of ‘Que 
Sera?’. Watching How Dear to Me... it would be easy to say that one has just seen 
three series of repeating movement sequences. However, as Stephen Bottoms 
argues: 
                                                          
51
 Walkey, cited in Bottoms, 2005, np. 
52
 Bailes, p. 38 
181 
 
while sequences such as the ‘puppet jump’ are blatantly constructed and self-
reflexive, apparently referring to nothing beyond their own physical textures, 
the sheer, repetitive insistence of the performers' movements seems to 
demand an appreciation on the spectator's part which goes beyond the purely 
formal.
53
                                                                                                    
Indeed, employing Bergson here suggests that seeing Goulish rub the back of his 
hand repeatedly or the company perform the puppet jump for ten minutes we most 
probably mistake what we see with our feeling. If a movement that we watch 
someone else do recurs, we say that our sensation of it repeats. We say our sensation 
is the same because we perceive the movement to be the same. However, being in a 
perpetual state of becoming, our intensities and sensations are always changing. In 
yet another example, from time to time during September Roses Goulish ducks his 
head as if to enter through a door into a small room. Bailes observes how during the 
repetition of this moment ‘the door becomes an impeded body whose head stoops, 
tilting the body forward, knees bent as it walks so that the body is lowered with 
stiffness, maintaining straightness through the spine before rising again’.54 It is not 
that the body is miming a door but that ‘the door is becoming a body remembering a 
door’.55 Or as Nicholas Ridout proposes, ‘It is a repetition, scrupulously observed, 
of a memory of a doorway’.56 But one could also say that it is in fact not just a 
memory from the body repeated but a learning, a perceiving anew of a door. 
September Roses in fact takes repetition a step further. The performance is 
actually two performances on two consecutive nights. The show is compiled of parts 
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in a way that results in the middle section of each performance being slightly 
different while the beginning and end of both nights are the same sequences. Hence, 
returning on the second night of September Roses the spectator encounters what she 
calls the same beginning and the same end and she might thus say she is watching 
repetition. As Roms contends, ‘The power of performance is that it can and must be 
repeated’.57 Of course, as theatre-goers we are usually well aware that every 
showing of the same performance is different, that seeing the same performance 
twice is never like seeing the same performance twice. Or in other words, that what 
we might call the same performance paradoxically never is. One might feel a bit 
different tonight, sit in a different place, pay attention to different things while the 
performers might do something slightly differently. But once we see the same 
beginning and the same end we remember we saw them last night. However, what 
September Roses instigates by repeating a performance on two nights with some 
minor alterations is not the act of memory but of learning, not of recognising but of 
perceiving. 
One can find the significance of the distinction between memory and 
learning in Goat Island’s interest in pedagogy and teaching. Steve Bottoms notes 
how ‘[i]mages of schooling and teaching recur persistently through Goat Island’s 
performances’.58 There is always someone who is teaching or someone who is 
learning. But running parallel to the use of imagery of schooling is an emphasis on a 
learning that goes on beyond the experience of the performances. When still active 
as a company, Goat Island’s practice extended beyond performance work and the 
company focused heavily on running workshops and summer schools. The 
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company’s teaching was based on their own working process and many of the 
exercises used in their teaching are the ones the company have used while making 
their own work. One of the methods which often acts as a basis for all their 
processes is the practice of response. Company members would produce work by 
responding to a directive usually given by Hixson. Members would bring material 
into the process which from that point on would become everyone’s material. They 
would then respond to each other’s work by making another sequence which would 
again get a response from one of the company members and so on. Here the 
response given becomes a gift that requires perceiving in place of memory. The 
notion of response, which produces those moments in stillness in the middle of 
movement, was an active tool in the group’s work. One is asked not to recognise the 
work that inspired the response but to perceive the change in the response offered. A 
similar process of relearning happens in many of the exercises which require the 
(non)repetition of a movement sequence which is performed for one minute first 
slowly, then fast, then in fragments and so in different variations. The variation 
compels a change where we learn the new movement rather than think back to the 
initial sequence that started the exercise. It is in these moments where the pedagogy 
is about learning learning. This is sometimes referred to as unlearning in the writing 
on the company’s work59 but I suggest it is more accurate and helpful to focus on 
this specific aspect of perceiving and learning. Pedagogy, then, becomes a way to 
connect the way we experience performance with the way we experience all 
(creative) life.  
In fact, what these two performances discussed here lay bare is not only the 
uniqueness of every performance but every single moment. As Guerlac states:  
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Time itself, as real duration, enters into the identity of inner experiences. 
These involve not only what is felt but also, quite specifically, how it feels. 
And how it feels depends on everything else that is happening at that 
particular moment, a moment that “never presents itself twice”. It even 
depends on one’s whole history.60      
What is at stake, then, is not only radical difference but the loss of causality. For 
Bergson, ‘no effort of logic will succeed in proving that what has been will be or 
will continue to be, that the same antecedents will always give rise to identical 
consequents’.61 Bergson thus ‘redefines inner identity in terms of the radically 
singular quality of each lived moment’.62 What I want to suggest here is that by 
inviting the spectator to be here and now in the present through the act of waiting 
and repetition, these performances draw attention to process and the perpetual 
becoming of time. Thus they expose radical difference since how each moment feels 
to each spectator is dependent, as Guerlac states, on one’s whole history and will 
never be the same, will never present itself twice. In doing so, they initiate a 
possibility of immediate experience, or the dynamic force of time, which Bergson 
calls real duration. Could the time of waiting in September Roses, while the missing 
beginning declares its absence or when Walkey stands on one foot, offer an 
opportunity for accessing the flow of inner experiences? What would that demand 
and is that possible in the space of theatre?  
I would like to briefly discuss here a work of choreography that presents a 
useful comparison. Anne Teresa de Keersmaeker’s Piano Phase is a dance 
originally made for de Keersmaeker and Michele Anne de Mey as part of Fase: 
Four Movements for the Music of Steve Reich. The music is one of Reich’s so-called 
process pieces where a gradual process of phase shifting ‘allows a relatively small 
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amount of musical material to be cycled through all its possible permutations, in a 
slow and orderly way, that is perceptible to the listener’.63 Piano Phase is played by 
two pianists who begin in unison and repeat a pattern of twelve notes. K. Robert 
Schwarz explains: 
One pianist increases his tempo very gradually until he is one note ahead of 
the other; the process now pauses, and the new configuration is repeated. 
Again one pianist gradually quickens his tempo; this time he ends up two 
notes ahead of the other, and the new combination is repeated. This sequence 
of gradual acceleration and repetition is performed twelve times until the two 
pianists have arrived back where they began.
64
 
 
Analogous to the music, the movement is also a gradual process of shifting. De Mey 
and de Keersmaeker stand next to each other and move along one line but the 
lighting causes the dancers’ shadows to appear on the white canvas wall behind 
them as if another three dancers were on stage and thus gives the simple staging 
surprising depth. The dancers spin around on one foot while the other pushes them 
around, their arms constantly swinging up and down like a lever aiding the turning 
movement. Frequently, the simultaneous spinning goes out of phase. Their arms do 
not stretch to the right at the same time anymore but we see one of the dancers 
slowing down ever so slightly (or is the other speeding up?). After a while they 
seem to be in the same rhythm again, only now their arms meet in the middle as one 
stretches right and the other left. Out of sync they go again and after another while 
come back to how they started. Continuing the spinning movement, they travel 
along the line only to turn again, sometimes suspending the movement mid-way. 
Arms bend and wrists are held up to punctuate the occasional stop and gradually, in 
some form or another, everything repeats again.  
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The toing and froing of the movement is a repetition which, as Andre 
Lepecki argues, ‘creates a form of standing still that has nothing of the immobile’.65 
This repetition, which in its constant movement is going nowhere and yet gets 
everywhere,
66
 is that of paronomasia. Paronomasia is a composite word made of 
para meaning alongside or beyond and onomos which means name. Linguistically 
speaking, then, paronomasia is ‘the careful reiteration of an idea through an ongoing 
stringing of different words that share the same ‘stem’’, or ‘repetition with a 
difference’.67 Lepecki employs the term when he writes about choreography 
because,   
the paronomastic movement dissolves the temporal tyranny modernity’s 
being-toward-movement imposes on subjectivity for it to be constantly on 
time. Paronomasia proposes to subjectivity alternative modalities of being in 
time.
68
   
 
Although the choreography appears like a relentless machine which is insistently on 
time even though it is difficult to really understand how it does it, the repetition of 
spinning, travelling, swinging and suspending in Piano Phase is a movement which 
is in time as well. However, I would argue that while resisting the count, the 
‘choreography’ of Goat Island is a similar paronomastic operation. The endless 
circle Goulish travels in How Dear to Me... or the literal standing still of Walkey 
produces a still-act which is ‘the activation of a proposition for an ethics of being 
that is always an active entanglement with time’.69 It is important to note here, then, 
the difference we might observe between Goat Island’s way of joining dance, or 
movement (or in fact at points even stillness), to music and the more straight-
                                                          
65
 Andre Lepecki, Exhausting Dance: Performance and the Politics of Movement (London: 
Routledge, 2006) p. 62. 
66
 Lepecki, p. 63 
67
 Lepecki, p. 62 
68
 Lepecki, p. 62, original emphasis 
69
 Lepecki, p. 62 
187 
 
forward relation to music that de Keersmaeker’s choreography performs. Unlike in 
Piano Phase, in Goat Island’s work it is not so much the movement of the dancer 
obeying the rhythm of the music that allows us to enter pure duration but the 
uncertainty over waiting.  
So what is this ethics, this active entanglement with time and what does it 
look like outside of performance? This question is related, I would argue, to the role 
of pedagogy in the company’s work and their insistence on the ecology of their 
practice which came across in their teaching. Above I discussed some of the aspects 
of teaching and learning in their work and mentioned in particular their use of 
responding. In ‘Letter to a Young Practitioner’, a text the company members wrote 
as encouragement to young performance makers, Mark Jeffery notes: ‘The act of 
receiving, and the acceptance of a gift is an important philosophy we adhere to’.70 
He goes on to write:  
Once the digestion of the gift has been articulated in oneself then we begin 
to understand the nature and the power of sharing. [...] This idea of 
ownership becomes a wider participation, and one of interaction and 
creativity with others.
71
  
In fact, all company members articulate the significance of valuing collaborators 
and shared ownership in the letter. As CJ Mitchell notes, ‘Give up what seems 
important to you; it’s not yours’.72 In this process of gift giving and accepting, the 
work of perceiving and learning is extended beyond its role in performance out into 
the ‘normal time’ of everyday life. The gift becomes, as I pointed out via Derrida in 
the previous chapter, a gift of giving.   
                                                          
70
Karen Christopher (ed.) Goat Island: School Book 2, (Chicago: The School of the Art Institute of 
Chicago, 2000), p. 106. 
71
 Christopher, p. 107 
72
 Christopher, p. 102 
188 
 
The process of sharing material as a ‘gift’ was sometimes time consuming 
and in their practice, Goat Island took two to three years to make a performance. 
This was partly because the individual company members needed to make a living 
outside of Goat Island. But taking their time also became a proposal to relearn 
perception. This, then, is the type of ecology that was so central to the company’s 
working practices. And it is akin to paronomasia. As Lepecki argues, paronomasia 
ensures that ‘movement belongs more to intensities and less to kinetics; and the 
appearing body must be seen less as solid form and rather as sliding along lines of 
intensities’.73 Furthermore, Bailes notes how the relearning, and learning to see in 
particular, becomes in Goat Island’s performance ‘an opportunity to investigate not 
seeing itself but what it means to be able to perceive things differently so that we 
become conscious of the politics of looking as an act of construction, a privilege 
rather than a given’.74 The investigation into the construction of looking, then, is a 
way of slowing down in order to have the time to relearn.  
But if both de Keersmaeker’s choreography and Goat Island’s stillness can 
be considered as paronomasia it is perhaps worth examining how they differ from 
one another and relate to the question of pure duration. In fact, it seems that the 
place for realising the flow of duration that Bergson is thinking of could be that of 
art. Speaking of aesthetic feelings, Bergson contends that, ‘the object of art is to put 
to sleep the active or rather resistant powers of our personality, and thus to bring us 
into a state of perfect responsiveness’.75 In this state of responsiveness, then, ‘we 
realize the idea that is suggested to us and sympathize with the feeling that is 
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expressed’.76 Just as we saw with the example of the dancer and the feeling of grace, 
art ‘engages our feelings through an experience of qualities’.77  Bergson argues that, 
In the processes of art we shall find, in a weakened form, a refined and in 
some measure spiritualized version of the processes commonly used to 
induce the state of hypnosis. Thus, in music, the rhythm and measure 
suspend the normal flow of our sensations and ideas by causing our attention 
to swing to and fro between fixed points, and they take hold of us with such 
force that even the faintest imitation of a groan will suffice to fill us with the 
utmost sadness. If musical sounds affect us more powerfully than the sounds 
of nature, the reason is that nature confines itself to expressing feelings, 
whereas music suggests them to us.
78
                  
Art addresses us by suggesting feelings instead of operating ‘like a physical 
cause’.79 ‘It elicits a sympathetic response on our part, a virtual participation in the 
feeling or idea, which is imprinted in us by the artistic manipulation of qualities’.80  
Thus, it is perhaps easy to see how the toing and froing of the movement in Piano 
Phase ‘suspends the normal flow of our sensations’ and even nearly induces the 
state of hypnosis. We follow the movement and through investing ourselves in its 
relentless repetition experience a multiplicity of qualities. But what about the 
stillness and waiting in Goat Island when we feel things are done in secret and we 
are held in the experience without much context? We wait expecting to be told what 
is happening and why, and yet are left to our own devices. We will not get there, 
instead the performance keeps us there and in that sense, one could say that it is a 
Bergsonian experience in the way it does not allow us to bring our past experiences 
to bear on the present moment. Yet, in order to have a qualitative progress the act of 
waiting has to become something else. Otherwise, anticipating, we are still 
projecting into the future whereas in order to appreciate the flow of time we need to 
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be here and now and engage with our present feelings. However, one could say that 
Goat Island’s refusal of a climax is similar to that in Piano Phase. It does not 
particularly get us anywhere either.  
3 Einstein on the Beach and climatic time 
So we have seen in Goat Island’s work and in Piano Phase a repetition that I have 
argued is not a straightforward repetition but one where sensations and intensities 
are in a perpetual state of becoming and the task of recognising is in fact a task of 
perceiving. It is in fact here that we see a similarity with Gertrude Stein’s work I 
discussed in the introduction. In my next example I turn from the ideas of waiting, 
not getting there and anticipation to looking at a type of slowness that might, at first 
glance, look similar to that slowness we encounter in Goat Island’s work. I examine 
this slowness, of going but not getting, in Robert Wilson’s Einstein on the Beach. 
Steven Connor calls this certain type of slowness, or a limited flow of information, 
‘slow going’.81 I discuss how the experience of slow going manifests itself in 
Einstein on the Beach, work that is at points excruciatingly slow and famous for 
taking its time. Through considering the experience of time in Einstein on the 
Beach, I demonstrate how, unlike the pure duration in Goat Island’s work, it is in 
fact mediated through space. In so doing, I will discuss the tightly controlled 
performance space and its relationship with time from the point of view of someone 
who saw it from the left circle.  
Wilson’s and Glass’ opera was first performed in 1976 and has been since 
revived in 1984, 1992 and 2012. Its roots are lodged firmly in the minimalist art 
practices of the mid-1960s where completing the art work is part of the role of the 
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spectator. In addition to Glass, Wilson collaborated with Lucinda Childs who 
choreographed the dance sequences and contributed some of the text. Child’s 
minimalist movement experimentation which mixes simple movement patterns and 
complex transitions sit perfectly in Glass’ music. Einstein on the Beach eschews 
narrative and plot and is, according to Glass, ‘a poetic vision’.82 The opera’s 
structure is made of acts and scenes but they are more like images and montages of 
actions. The music of Einstein on the Beach grew out of Glass’ realisation that ‘a 
piece of music could be organized around the idea of rhythm rather than harmony 
and melody’,83 a discovery that was facilitated by his collaboration with Ravi 
Shankar in the mid-1960s. To be precise (and precision as we will come to see, is 
important to this work), there are four acts and five connecting interludes, or knee 
plays (called that because they act as the joints of the piece). The knee plays seem to 
function as binding material but their function is more about grounding or repeating. 
As Stefan Brecht notes, ‘they do not link what they separate’.84 Instead, they repeat 
the musical theme of the work and thus bring the work back to its starting point. But 
whatever else starts from that point, as if anew, starts with a sense of what has just 
been. Here the act of repetition is one of return and accumulation. That is to say, we 
keep returning to the beginning or somewhere near the beginning, something we 
already know. And we depart from it in order to go on yet another excursion into a 
new act. Thus every knee play brings us back to the same point, a point we 
recognise, and every scene is pregnant with the preceding sections. In his discussion 
of Jérôme Bel’s work, Lepecki notes how ‘repetition unleashes a series of 
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differences’.85 Similar to what I have been calling the (non)repetition in Goat Island, 
repetition of the knee plays make the familiar strange and points out the subtle 
difference in every repeating moment. 
The opera is and is not about Albert Einstein. Most of the performers are 
dressed in white shirts, baggy trousers and suspenders and there is a similarly clad 
figure with a big mop of white hair playing the violin but this is by no means 
character-based story telling. Rather, the opera uses facts from Einstein’s life as 
common points of reference: Einstein as a keen amateur violinist, the themes of 
light, space and time, the steam locomotive, the spaceship, a gyroscope (a tool used 
to measure the rotation of the Earth), travelling across the stage in the Trial scene. 
Lawrence Shyer argues, as many observers have done, that ‘The train and the 
spaceship both relate obliquely to the life of Einstein, who was born in the age of the 
steam locomotive and died on the brink of the space age which his pioneering work 
helped bring about’.86 There is mechanical clock time manifested as wristwatches 
that performers keep looking at throughout the opera. But there is also duration: 
‘Wilson’s slow motion dramatizes time, not as a discrete unit ticked off by a 
chronometer, but as a flowing succession of states, melting invisibly, indivisibly 
into each other’.87 But as I hope to point out, that duration of a flow of melting states 
is one of slow going, which, although not contrary, is distinct from Bergson’s notion 
of pure duration.  
The opera starts before the audience come in. The curtains are still closed 
but in the orchestra pit a chorus, dressed in Einstein-‘inspired’ baggy trouser and 
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suspender outfits, is chanting numbers. On a platform next to them, two 
stenographers count and mime. The first scene of the first act, once the lights have 
gone down and the curtain has gone up, consists of a train entering the stage. It 
slowly emerges from stage right and makes its way across. It covers most of the 
back wall of the stage. Up in a steel tower a boy is throwing down paper airplanes. 
Centre stage, one of the Einstein figures is walking up and down while gesturing 
with her arms. Her pacing starts from stage left and in the course of the scene travels 
20 metres towards stage right while seemingly only going back and forth. 
Downstage, a man is drawing in the air, on what I assume is a blackboard in front of 
him. Upstage, another figure, traverses the stage next to the train as if driving a train 
herself, her hand gestures indicate that she is operating a machine. Moving 
alongside the gigantic train, she overtakes it and carries on.  
In the second scene of Act 1 a court room is revealed. A jury is trying a 
defendant. Two judges, one of them an old man, the other a small boy, sit behind a 
big white desk. An enormous bed is lying centre stage. A figure, dressed like the 
rest of the cast, sits in the seat of the accused but no one seems to know who is 
accused and of what. Nor does it seem to matter. Another knee play, followed by 
Act 2 and a dance sequence where the dancers jump, whirl, twirl and leap in ever 
changing permutations and combinations, a whirlwind of movement that ends as 
abruptly as it began. Then another scene with a train, now seen as if from behind the 
train. A couple are singing an aria, standing on the back of the train. Then, a knee 
play follows. Sitting there following these scenes (and I use the word following 
rather than watching as I feel like I am not really watching with any intent, after a 
while a state of languor takes over and it becomes apparent that waiting for things to 
happen any faster than they do is not going to help here) I could not say how long 
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they last. It does not matter of course. They last as long as they last and then a new 
thing comes along. Another court room scene and another scene on a train. Another 
scene with a dance sequence follows, performed on a field, underneath a hovering 
spaceship.  
However, there is only seemingly repetition in Einstein on the Beach. As I 
discussed in the first section of this chapter with regards to Reich’s music or Goat 
Island’s performances, what repeats here is in fact perpetually changing score. As 
Maria Shevtsova explains, ‘Act 1 has the first train and the trial themes (Train 1 and 
Trial 1). Act 2 has the first field theme and a new train theme (Field 1 and Train 2). 
Act 3 has a new trial theme and a new field theme (Trial 2 and Field 2). Act 4 pulls 
the three themes together (Train, Trial and Field...)’.88 Paradoxically, what allows 
pure duration here as in Reich is systematic structure, or in Shevtsova’s words, 
‘mathematical permutation and combination’.89 Such combination and permutation 
of themes is even more strongly inherent in Glass’ compositions based on 
techniques of ‘additive process and cyclical structure’.90 As Shevtsova argues, ‘It is 
precisely his procedure of repeating say five notes several times, then six, then 
seven, then eight and so on, that gives the sensation of addition and return in the one 
stretch of sound’.91 It is the perpetual and systematic change in these works which is 
so similar to what we saw in Goat Island and especially in Piano Phase. The 
repetition of language or, at points, the lack of language also plays a part here. What 
is sung in this opera is most often numbers and solfège syllables. When spoken 
word is used it is repeated. In Trial 1, the two judges take turns in declaring: ‘This 
court of common peace is now in session.’ The repeated declaration ceases to be a 
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simple spoken statement and becomes a chant, merging in with the sung material of 
the opera.  
It might be useful to pause here for a while to consider the shared ideas and 
notions in both Glass’ and Reich’s work. The music of both composers is often 
described as minimalist although they have been more or less reluctant to accept 
such categorisation. There are, however, common interests in their work which are 
clear to see. Although Glass and Reich were not aware of each other’s work from 
the start nor have they been influenced by each other (despite studying at Juilliard at 
the same time), their work was made in a similar cultural climate from the mid-
1960s onwards. Thus they both independently developed their interest in reductive 
repetition. One common influence was Michael Snow’s film Wavelength (1967). 
From early on, the focus in Glass’ and Reich’s work was rhythm, not pitch. Glass 
worked in India with the sitar player and composer Ravi Shankar who became an 
important influence for him. From Indian music Glass picked up the use of cyclical 
structures which is the joining of cycles of different beats. It produces an effect 
similar to wheels inside of wheels where at some points the wheels which are going 
around separately come into contact. After returning from India, Glass also began an 
exploration of additive processes. His 1+1 from 1968 for one player and an 
amplified tabletop was his first composition using an additive process. The 
composition has two given rhythms which ‘should be combined in continuous, 
regular arithmetic progressions’.92 Glass gives some examples of how these units 
could be combined, for example: 1+2; 1+2+2; 1+2+2+2; 1+2+2; 1+2. However, 
after the free experimentation of 1+1, Glass’ music starts to use a strict additive 
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process which, like phrasing in Reich’s work, offers ‘a way into a musical structure 
which may otherwise seem merely aimless’.93 
Keith Potter notes that Einstein on the Beach ‘is bounded by a clear cadential 
progression in C major’.94 Glass uses a five chord cadential pattern ‘which occupies 
a central position in the opera’s overall structure, integrating local harmonic motion 
and long-range tonal planning’.95 Over the course of the second and third act the 
formula ends up ‘making the phrase resolve a half-step lower’.96 Glass notes that as 
a formula that invites repetition ‘it is particularly suited to my kind of musical 
thinking’.97 In fact, what this particular section does is avoid ‘the potential 
monotony of having long stretches of music in one key’.98 Potter contends that this 
section ‘derives much of its impact in Einstein, indeed, from its sharp contrast with 
other, more harmonically static, sections’.99 Thus, despite the seeming unity, or even 
monotony of the music in Einstein on the Beach, ‘individual sections use different 
tonalities to articulate a totality which, especially when experienced in the theatre, 
exhibits a surprisingly conventional approach to such matters as proportion and 
climax’.100 Perhaps here we find a difference between Glass and Reich whereby 
Einstein on the Beach, for all its (non)repeating and seemingly lingering and waiting 
music, actually has a climax and a spectacular one at that. In fact, the whole of the 
opera is spectacular and as such is constantly, although almost invisibly, geared 
towards that climax or finale. There is fulfilment whereas with Goat Island and 
                                                          
93
 Potter, p. 272 
94
 Potter, p. 326 
95
 Potter, p. 330 
96
 Potter, p. 330  
97
 Glass cited in Potter, p. 330 
98
 Potter, p. 330 
99
 Potter, p. 330 
100
 Potter, p. 326 
197 
 
Reich’s Piano Phase we are indeed left waiting not knowing whether there is 
anything to wait for.  
Reich’s 1965 composition It’s Gonna Rain established the technique of 
phasing but his Piano Phase ‘first explored phasing in live performance and then 
extended its implications by incorporating a wider range both technically and 
stylistically’.101 Although there was a new emphasis on pitch, for Reich the 
overarching thing was still rhythmic structure. Like Glass, Reich was influenced by 
and interested in non-Western music. Potter notes that his ‘aesthetic approach to 
non-Western music was…governed by his already familiar constructivist 
attitude’.102 Piano Phase made clear to Reich that such music using phasing could 
indeed be played live instead of playing along or against a recording. Although the 
piece is not improvised but very carefully constructed it is not, according to Reich, 
necessary to read the notation while playing. Reich argues that ‘what you have to do 
to play the piece is to listen carefully in order to hear if you’ve moved one beat 
ahead, or if you’ve moved two by mistake, or if you’ve tried to move ahead but 
have instead drifted back to here you started’.103 He goes on to say that, ‘the 
psychology of performance, what really happens when you play, is total 
involvement with the sound; total sensuous-intellectual involvement’.104 
I would argue that there is a difference between the music and approach of 
Reich and Glass. The difference is one of expectation and conventionality and can 
be perhaps described through a joke which Glass recounts in a documentary on his 
work. Glass says the joke is often told to him and it goes like this: 
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Knock knock. 
Who’s there? 
Knock knock. 
Who’s there?  
Knock knock. 
Who’s there? 
Knock knock. 
Who’s there? 
Philip Glass.
105
 
 
I would suggest here that the joke and the work of Glass are similar in the way the 
joke needs the punch line and Glass’ music somehow needs or at least promises a 
satisfying end point. In this vein, one could imagine that a similar joke on Reich 
would go something like: 
Knock knock. 
Who’s there? 
Knock 
Knock who’s 
There knock 
Knock 
Who’s Steve? 
Knock knock... 
And so on.  Despite the similarities in the two composers’ work, it is Glass’ music 
which follows a more predictable (although in no way unadventurous) structure. 
Bonnie Marranca argues that Wilson’s ‘landscapes stage the passage of 
time’.106 Marranca’s point is an important one here because it actually reveals 
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something significant about Wilson’s treatment of time. That is, in Einstein on the 
Beach at least, time is travelling across the stage. We can see the movement of time. 
Or to put it differently, the experience of time here is spatialised. In one way it is 
easy to begin to think of the work as a flow of time that is an invitation to pure 
duration. Wilson’s and Glass’ ‘poetic vision’ is a dreamscape where ideas flow into 
each other. As Wilson states, ‘This is not a rational way of working, it’s intuitive. 
Slowly the pieces fall together and add up. More meanings emerge in my theatre 
because more than one thing is going on at the same time’.107 Its actual demand, 
then, is for endurance coupled with a long attention span. Or, attention span is not 
quite the right word. It is not so much about attention, I would suggest, than it is 
about attunement or attuning. Watching Einstein on the Beach there is a sense that 
things are moving slowly or not moving at all. But look away for a while or close 
your eyes and suddenly things look a bit different. Things are not going as slowly as 
one might think. It is also relative, of course, the slowness of things. As Connor 
notes, ‘We mistake the experience of slowness as a simple negative measure; if only 
things could go more quickly, in the queue, during pain or unhappiness’.108 But do 
we wish for things to go quicker in the theatre? Are we not supposed to give 
ourselves over to the duration? We know how long this performance is, we are 
aware this will last four and a half hours. Slowness here then draws attention to the 
difference between the measurement of time and our perception of it. Einstein on 
the Beach is an invitation to notice things and to be surprised, an unravelling and a 
subtle but constant anticipation. This evident slowness, or a limited flow of 
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information, Connor calls ‘slow going’. Unlike going slowly which ‘is something 
we attempt to do to time’,109 slow going is ‘the experience of a loss of temporal 
relativity; when things are going slowly, the scale of measurement itself begins to 
elongate, to attenuate, to dissolve’.110 In fact, ‘We cannot apply measure to this 
movement of slow going, because it is itself the only scale against which to measure 
the refusals and remissions of elapsing time of which the hectic interval of human 
life is composed’.111  
Imagine this: a boy is standing in a steel tower, or a crane. He stands, he 
walks forward. Or he stands. Underneath, a man in a red jacket is standing and 
drawing. A woman in a white shirt and suspenders is walking back and forth, 
dancing. Red sneakers. Boy stands, walks forward, a steam train is emerging from 
stage left. The music travels up and then down, swirls like the dancer. How many 
times? Five minutes. Twenty minutes. The boy is throwing paper airplanes from his 
steel tower, a crane. The steam train travels across, it is covering the back of the 
stage, leaving the back of the stage in its enormous shadow. The music travels up 
and down, the train travels. 20 minutes. 30 minutes.  
Or it’s like this: a court scene, again, but not the same. A prison too. A jury, 
two judges, a clock, prison bars. ‘I was in this prematurely air-conditioned super 
market and there were all these aisles and there were all these bathing caps that you 
could buy that had these kind of Fourth of July plumes on them. They were red and 
yellow and blue I wasn't tempted to buy one but I was reminded of the fact that I 
had been avoiding the beach’.112 And again. Some movement. Someone moves. The 
music repeats, or otherwise does its thing. Climbs up and up and comes down and 
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down. Not much moves except the gyroscope which is suspended above downstage. 
Or does it? Slowly like the Earth would move and rotate.  
Marranca argues: ‘This contemplative mergence of cosmic time and 
theatrical time (the macrocosm and microcosm theme are elaborated in [Wilson’s] 
special attention to scale) outlines the utopian dimension of late twentieth-century 
performance which Wilson so consummately elucidates’.113 In some ways, slow 
going is evoking cosmic time. For Connor, ‘Slow going is always the failure to be 
there, to have been there, in that condition of slow going that will have been going 
on, as we so serenely say, all the time’.114 What Einstein on the Beach so beautifully 
elucidates is that cosmic time is a slow going where we fail to be present, or to meet 
up. That cosmic time is not about being on time but in time.  
The passage of time that Marranca refers to is here most crucial and we see it 
in the train, slowly gliding forward across the stage. It is in these moments when we 
see the train traverse the space or the gyroscope making its way slowly across that 
the idea of time is articulated. And the idea of time is presented to us as movement 
across space. It is here that we see that Wilson’s treatment of time and therefore 
Einstein on the Beach is indeed anti-Bergsonian. The unravelling of time is an 
actual unravelling that happens in space whereas in Goat Island time only passes 
through time. The horizontal and vertical lines that dominate the stage images in 
Einstein on the Beach are time that we see actualised in space. Bergson argues that, 
‘it is principally by the help of motion that duration assumes the form of a 
homogeneous medium, and that time is projected into space’.115 The movement of 
the train across the space thus quantifies time.  
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Slow going, then, in Einstein on the Beach is the convergence of things 
moving or going slowly like that gyroscope, and things moving fast, like the dancers 
in Act 2, scene 1, whirling and jumping on stage and staying there, whirling and 
jumping. Staying on and carrying on; the permeability of a stage image. It is saying 
look at this, this is enough. This unravels and carries on. Such a slow going and 
unravelling is possible partly because of the absence of narrative. The opera which 
is not about Einstein is also in some ways about Einstein. ‘What’s important’, says 
Wilson, ‘is that we come into the theatre sharing something. In a sense, we don’t 
have to tell a story because the story’s already been told’.116 In this case it is the well 
known figure of Albert Einstein and the reliance that everybody knows something 
about him or his work. Such an assumption is playfully referred to during one of the 
knee plays when the choir mime brushing their teeth while singing. They finish by 
sticking out their tongues while the popular picture of Einstein sticking out his 
tongue is projected behind them. The image of a group of Einsteins sticking their 
tongues out is perhaps the strongest reminder of the influence for the work. For 
Glass, ‘It’s very much in line with the idea that the audience brings something real 
to the experience, that the audience completes the work. That’s a generational belief 
and something I grew up with in the theatre.’117 Brecht argues that Einstein differed 
from Wilson’s earlier work ‘by its vaccuity: tho in fact not without content, it took 
one in as pure surface, aesthetically; by being composed but not developing: its 
content divorced from its form, an actual structuration may be inferred, but its 
apparent structure is a mere formality’.118 For Brecht, ‘One watches appearances 
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and enjoys them aesthetically.’119 Although, as we have seen, the formality of the 
structure is not a case of being ‘mere’ anything. Its formality is crucial to how the 
work is able to function as slow going. What Brecht seems to imply here is that 
there is a certain kind of emptiness perhaps at the heart of Einstein on the Beach or 
else around it, or permeating it. That we, in some way, watch emptiness. Whether or 
not spectators complete the work by bringing something real to the experience, as 
Glass contends, we are presented with an emptiness which is, I suggest, part of the 
experience of slow going. Slow going where, as Connor notes, the scale of 
measurement begins to dissolve.
120
 What is important here, however, is that it only 
begins to dissolve. It does not completely dissolve, there is always something 
ticking over as it were, ticking to measure time. Slow going, we observe here, is not 
the same as pure duration. 
Indeed, the way Einstein on the Beach invites the spectator to experience 
time is inseparable from its use of space and that is what makes his approach to 
theatre so anti-Bergsonian. This is evident in his thinking, as Wilson argues: ‘Time 
exists through space. It is the space around the time that is the construction. And the 
time around the space. Neither exists without the other’.121 The control of space is 
remarkable in this opera. As is apparent from the discussion above, in his approach 
to theatre Wilson eschewed the prevalence in art that was against illusion in the 
1960s. Indeed, Wilson’s preference for the traditional theatre set-up makes him 
different from his theatre and performance contemporaries. Instead, he ‘prefers a 
strictly defined space’.122 He goes on to say: ‘Everywhere, wherever you are, there 
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are a lot of things to see. It is very difficult to see and hear well in an open space. 
When you really want to see and hear something, a theatre with a proscenium is still 
the best’.123 In an interview, Wilson states that he can see himself going to the 
theatre where a piece is playing non-stop and where the audience could simply pop 
in for a quarter of an hour.
124
 And in some ways, Einstein on the Beach is an 
attempt, to an extent, at an installation type durational performance.  The work does 
not have an interval but the audience are allowed to leave the auditorium and come 
back to their sets during the work’s 4.5 hour duration. This ‘relaxed’ or ‘open 
house’ mood is enhanced by the gradual beginning where the first 20 minutes are 
performed with the house lights on as the audience arrives to take its seats. 
However, despite its invitation to come and go, the rest of Einstein on the Beach is 
played with the house lights off, which appears designed to discourage movement 
out of the theatre. What appeared to happen at the performance which I attended at 
the Barbican, however, was that some spectators were leaving their seats fairly early 
on in the performance. It seemed that knowing that one could leave at any point 
made people take breaks early before the traditional time for an interval would have 
been reached. For some the way to take a break was to nod off for a while. 
Although, Einstein on the Beach as an opera is not particularly long when one 
compares it to other operas such as Faust which lasts around three hours and forty 
minutes. Neither is Einstein on the Beach an installation or an endurance test 
comprised of one or two repetitive actions like a durational performance-
installation, nor is it as long as such performances. It is not even one of Wilson’s 
longest works; his Life and Times of Josef Stalin (1973) and The Life and Times of 
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Sigmund Freud (1969) were both twelve hours. As we will come to see, the fact that 
it is framed by a proscenium arch is significant to its concept. 
According to Holmberg, of all of Wilson’s work Einstein on the Beach in 
particular is theatre of images in which ‘[s]pace speaks’.125  As Holmberg states, 
‘Wilson’s drawings were the genesis of Einstein on the Beach; the rest of the 
production – music, text, staging – was built around them’.126 Wilson, who trained 
as an architect, ‘regards the stage not only as a flat picture space, but also as a 
sculptural volume to be composed’.127 He works with drawings and storyboards. 
Robert Stearns makes the comparison between Wilson’s working process and 
editing a film: ‘Frames of thought, personal experiences, previous images, time, 
space, and color suspended in his memory provide the basic elements’.128 The work 
is the outcome of the cutting, splicing and reordering of these elements. It is 
interesting to note that, as Stearns points out, Wilson’s drawings ‘both precede and 
follow the realization of a performance’.129 According to Stearns, ‘After a 
production, even when photographic documentation abounds, he continues to draw 
and redraw the images, reviewing his initial visualizations’. 130  In some ways, the 
stage production is only a link in the chain that is Wilson’s artistic process. The 
performance seems in this way almost like a by-product. As Stearns notes, ‘It is as 
though the drawings are more real than the physicality of the finished work’.131 It is 
this two-dimensional flat plane of Wilson’s drawings that is shaping the way 
Einstein on the Beach is figured on stage and also how it treats time as something to 
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depict through and across space. Such flatness is evident in the train that travels at 
the back of the stage in the first scene of act 1 or the enormous bus that similarly 
emerges from stage left, this time downstage, in the final scene. Reminiscent of 
cardboard cut-outs, they are made of something sturdier but are essentially painted 
canvases, the illusion of depth drawn on them. Or the painted set in act 4, scene 1 
which covers the length of the stage. Painted on it is the facade of a tall brick 
building, like a power station. At the top window an Einstein figure is writing down 
equations in his notepad. A crowd is gathering on stage to see him while a 
saxophone solo is played at the bottom of the building. The strong lines and the 
angular, sculptural forms of the whole set are, in fact, like a drawing lifted up from 
the drawing table to stand upright. The use of strong lines in Einstein on the Beach 
does not erase the depth of the stage space but they are important to the position of 
the spectator. 
According to Miguel Morey and Carmen Pardo, in Wilson’s theatre, space is 
the horizontal line and time is the vertical line crossing the frame. They argue: 
Two lines that trace the pictorial frame of the scene, that cut through it. The 
vertical divides the scene into a space on the right and a space on the left, 
two separate parts. The horizontal, running through that space, traversing the 
two parts from one side to the other, institute an above and a below; and 
above and below that are set in motion by the vertical and at the same time, 
as separate parts, negated by it. These two dynamic lines are capable of 
creating other geometries inside themselves, triangles, trapezoids or even 
circles, showing that time and space are malleable, the products of a 
mathematics, a counting that has become body, geometry. A vertical line and 
a horizontal intersect at the starting point of any possibility of experiencing 
time and space.
132
  
 
Morey and Pardo’s analysis makes clear how time is figured as a line on stage 
along, or intersecting, with space. They go on to argue that what brings depth and 
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breadth to the work is the diagonal line, ‘the line that actualizes the depth of 
field…always the longest trajectory inside a closed space’.133 Furthermore, Morey 
and Pardo add that in Wilson’s work ‘the structures often form a diagonal’.134 In 
Einstein on the Beach, for example, it is the line in the first scene which the 
performer pacing centre stage ‘traces with rapid movements, a diagonal that is 
articulated with the slow movement of the train at the back of the scene, a woman 
passing by and a man writing on an imaginary blackboard’.135 In the same scene, a 
horizontal line keeps repeating. The train that travels across the stage slowly stops 
as a line of light beams at it from the opposite side. The light stops and the train 
carries on, making its own horizontal line from stage left. Again, the line of light 
from stage right stops the train. After a while, the train carries on. And a third time.  
Similarly, the spaceship in the penultimate scene is made of horizontal and 
vertical lines, a grid or a cube made of smaller cubes filling the back wall. Hanging 
mid way in the air, glass boxes cross the space carrying a single passenger and an 
alarm clock. One glass box traces a horizontal line as it moves across the stage 
while the other describes a vertical line travelling up and down. These glass boxes 
with their passengers replicate an earlier image from act 4 scene 2. It is in this scene 
that the importance of lines is realised to full effect. The stage is empty and black 
apart from a bar of light lying horizontally on the floor. It also replicates an earlier 
image, the line of light that was the bed in Trial 2. The bar of light rises slowly from 
its horizontal line to a vertical line. Once vertical, it carries on its upward journey 
and disappears finally into the ceiling. This ‘light show’ is accompanied by an aria 
without words sung by a mezzo soprano. One could see in this bar of light a clock 
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hand counting time as it does in a clockwise movement. This interpretation of the 
bar of light is, in fact, very revealing. It is the exact image Bergson gives in his 
example on the quantity of space. Bergson uses the image of a clock in explaining 
how we project time into space when we count it. When we add numbers or time 
together we project units onto space which are distinct from one another. And 
because they are distinct we can keep them in space without them merging into one 
unity and thus are able to add them to other single units. Bergson argues: 
I say e.g. that a minute has just elapsed, and I mean by this that a pendulum, 
beating the seconds, has completed sixty oscillations. If I picture these sixty 
oscillations to myself all at once by a single mental perception, I exclude by 
hypothesis the idea of a succession. I do not think of sixty strokes which 
succeed one another, but of sixty points on a fixed line, each of which 
symbolizes, so to speak, an oscillation of the pendulum. If, on the other 
hand, I wish to picture these sixty oscillations in succession, but without 
altering the way they are produced in space, I shall condemn myself to 
remain forever in the present; I shall give up the attempt to think a 
succession or a duration. Now if, finally, I retain the recollection of the 
preceding oscillation together with the image of the present oscillation, one 
of two things will happen. Either I shall set the two images side by side, and 
we then fall back on our first hypothesis, or I shall perceive one in the other, 
each permeating the other and organizing themselves like the notes of a tune, 
so as to form what we shall call a continuous or qualitative multiplicity with 
no resemblance to number. I shall thus get the idea of pure duration; but I 
shall have entirely got rid of the idea of a homogeneous medium or a 
measurable quantity.
136
 
 
The rising bar of light is like the minute hand of a clock tracing a succession of 
points in space and thus quantifying time. To think time without quantifying it is a 
challenge that the consciousness finds near impossible. Bergson writes: 
‘Consciousness, goaded by an insatiable desire to separate, substitutes the symbol 
for the reality, or perceives the reality only through the symbol’.137 Holmberg states 
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that in Wilson’s work, ‘the structure of space is the plot’ in the work.138 In Einstein 
on the Beach, then, the plot is of recurring lines that define the space; the horizontal 
and vertical lines emphasising the flat plane of the canvas, the drawn image, and the 
horizontal line realising the depth of the performance space where we see time being 
unravelled across the stage, opened up like a scroll of film. Stearns notes that ‘The 
diagonal recurs throughout the later works as both line and plane. As a sum of 
vertical and horizontal forces, it is versatile: it can suggest expanding space, 
velocity, a bending force in tension, recumbence, a pathway for ascending or 
descending or a dynamic balance or imbalance.’139 
The stage as a canvas also requires that the space of the auditorium 
succumbs to its configuration. As such Einstein on the Beach has to be viewed from 
a fixed position in the theatre space.  Moreover, I would add, Einstein on the Beach 
is to be watched from the seat of the king, the seat perfectly situated and offering the 
best view of the stage. This is often referred to by Robert Wilson as the ‘Bob seat’, 
implying the centrality of the director. I will briefly discuss the historical importance 
of that central seat in the theatre space after which I will highlight how it defines the 
spatial experience of Wilson’s theatre, and the connection it has to his notion of 
time. Simon Jones writes of the ‘perspectival genealogy’ of the proscenium arch 
theatre where monarchs and rulers were placed ‘at the point of optical convergence, 
which mirrored the vanishing point on stage where all the lines of perspective 
illusion met’.140 The theatres of the sixteenth and seventeenth century France and 
Italy, for example, placed the ruler in the seat with the best view in the house, with 
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‘all others placed further away, literally by degrees, from the plane and the attitude 
of the perfect vision, as they were placed further away politically and socially’.141 
The concern in the theatre space was to see the monarch and to be seen by the 
monarch as well as to be seen by others being seen by the monarch. As such, the 
mirror up to Nature that theatre held was one where ‘the illusion of the stage [was] 
repeating the fiction of power’.142 This meant that the monarch was the external 
reference point by which the theatre justified its very existence. Jones goes on to 
argue that, ‘when the bourgeois classes claimed the playhouses for themselves’, 
rather than getting rid of such a privileged seat, ‘they set up king Nature as the 
earthly representative of their god Capital in the place of…the ousted authority’.143  
Thus, in the democratic theatre, Nature takes the role of the monarch and we judge 
theatre by its capacity effectively to replicate nature. 
According to Jones, then, Naturalism democratised the seat of the king 
which became the most expensive seat in the house. But, in theory at least, anyone 
could sit in it. The democratisation of taste that went along with the democratisation 
of the seat of the king was ‘not the radical dispersal it appeared, as long as the 
idealized spectator, soon to become a critic, remained in his seat’.144 What did 
happen, Jones argues, was the crisis of proof, or in other words things happening, or 
things taking place off scene, out of this frame of the proscenium.
145
  
Although the place and the position of the seat of the king remained the 
same when changing over to the seat of Capital, the ‘novel social procedures it 
accounted for’ changed. The mirror became the frame, or in Zola’s terms, the 
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‘transparent screen’ through which the Object is viewed by the Subject. In all this, 
the frame becomes the medium. In Naturalist theatre,  
the fold of the frame is turned ninety degrees about the center point of the 
line of the proscenium arch, to make a center-line that bisects the stage and 
the spectatorium. Upon this new axis the scene is played; and the points are 
plotted along this center-line in terms of before and behind the gaze, what is 
on and what is off scene, interior and exterior. So the more one speculates 
the scene, literally goes into it, the more one ‘discovers’ that nothing is 
‘really’ there; and the more one speculates on the outside, the more one 
‘realizes’ the actions that can only happen on stage before one’s very own 
eyes.
146
 
Representation takes (place) centre stage at the ‘dead centre’ where the proscenium 
arch and the centre line cut: ‘The event is grounded where these two lines cross; and 
the lines of the force are centripetal, setting the frame and dividing the participants, 
in order that they can bring the outside in and be brought to join hands across the 
dead center’.147 For Jones, the character of the Naturalist stage ‘is to be found in the 
cleaving of the spectator and the actor, staged in both senses of the term to cleave: a 
sundering along the fold of the proscenium, and a joining of the line between subject 
and object’.148 I would argue that Wilson’s theatre, however, obliterates the centre 
line and reinstates the seat of the king as the absolute monarch of the theatre space. 
But at the same time it maintains the medium of the frame. The result is that it 
draws a line from either end of the stage up to the back wall of the auditorium, 
defining an area facing straight to the stage. This is where the work should be seen 
from, or, this is its dead centre. Thus, the ones not sitting in the line descending 
from the seat of the king are outside. In this configuration, they are not seen by the 
monarch because his gaze is taken by the all-devouring stage and moreover, they 
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cannot see all of the stage. They are not devoured nor can they devour. They can see 
the ruler/critic/director and his kingdom but not its mirror. In this way, the three 
dimensional screen loses its depth, acquired by the diagonal line, and becomes, for 
those outside, a flat plane. 
 
4 The wrong place 
Bersani notes that Wilson’s theatre ‘could be thought of as engaged in 
decentralizing the audience’s attention’.149 Unlike in what Bersani chooses to call 
‘traditional theatre’ where we know where the main action is and which has an 
investment in the centrality of the major characters, in Wilson’s theatre ‘we 
frequently are unable to see and hear everything going on at any one moment’.150 
The effect of this is that we are ‘continually discovering that we [are] in the ‘wrong 
place’ – or, more accurately, that there was no right place, or that there were always 
other places’.151 Or to put it differently, ‘nothing is ever entirely anywhere’.152 
But this nowhereness of the audience’s attention does not translate into the 
nowhereness of the psychical place of the spectator. Sitting in the left circle in the 
Barbican, my view of the stage was of the stage left corner while completely 
missing the stage right corner.
 153
 I saw dancers arriving in the wings panting after 
dancing and jumping under the spaceship, only to catch their breath quickly to go 
back on again. A preparatory stand, one foot stretched out in front of the other, arms 
held to the side, ready to propel the body into a forward moving pirouette. And since 
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I could see into the wings on stage left I could not see the jury in the Trial as they 
stood on the stage right line. Their singing was without a source or body, simply 
coming from somewhere… So despite the invitation (or to be more precise, 
permission) to come and go which is further evoked by the ‘invisible’ beginning 
where the spectators arrive, the space of the theatre in Einstein on the Beach is a 
closed space where the attention is directed towards the stage and its tightly 
controlled frame. The frame projects outwards or else, sucks inwards, but only along 
the line of its boundary. Those outside the frame, looking in at an angle, get left 
outside of the pull of the performance. There is in fact a right place to see this 
performance. 
As I look down from my seat in the left circle towards the stage in my field 
of view I can see, in the first instance, the stage with its right corner missing. I can 
see the orchestra pit and the orchestra. I can see the stage left wings. But I can also 
see the audience on my right, in the stalls. Changing my position on my seat after a 
couple of hours of sitting I look at the audience members in their seats in the stalls, 
illuminated by the light emanating from the stage, the dead centre of Wilson’s 
spectacle. I am reminded here, as I was at Marina Abramović Presents… that while 
we share space, we do not share time. 
Although there is relatively little movement in and out of the auditorium 
during Einstein on the Beach, some audience members are taking naps. Towards the 
end of the opera I start to feel tired too. Wilson has stated that during his longest 
pieces, such The Life and Times of Sigmund Freud, audience members sometimes 
fall asleep and that they connect to the work on a different level or in a different 
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way.
154
 For Martin Heidegger, ‘sleep is not simply an absence of consciousness’.155 
Heidegger argues: ‘extremely animated consciousnesses pertains precisely to sleep, 
namely that of dreams’.156 I think of this as I begin to drift off in the middle of the 
final spaceship scene. The music that has been incessant in my head for the past four 
hours becomes a cloud of sound, encasing me and my heavy head. I drift between 
the monologues coming from the stage and the black shimmer of my eyelids that are 
weighing down. Sleep is not a dichotomy of conscious and unconscious. Wilson’s 
work is often referred to as a dream; images that are distorted or that do not quite 
make sense, the lack of narrative or coherence. However, in dreams things happen 
fast, things move and change fast. Here we are still, after twenty minutes, watching 
the trial scene or the train scene or the spaceship in a field scene. Wilson’s theatre 
gives time to see the detail. Unlike in a dream, one cannot take it in in one go. 
Furthermore, unlike the Naturalist stage which Jones discusses there is no crisis of 
proof in Einstein on the Beach. Everything we see we believe is all there is, it is so 
much, so big, that there could not be more of it. There is no space off scene for it. It 
is like Wilson is showing us his hands: I am putting it all out here so you can see 
that there are no secrets. 
It is this last point which bears the biggest difference between my two case 
studies here: that despite the quantification of time and the fixation on counting and 
numbers in Goat Island’s work the crucial aspect of the work is that one settles into 
waiting. Since nothing is promised, the waiting becomes a way to get rid of 
boredom. In Einstein On the Beach, however, one is waiting because one knows to 
wait. There is an indication here in the work that something will indeed take place at 
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the end (or even before). There is a promise here that one’s boredom will be 
relieved.  
Marranca, in her 1977 article, argues that, ‘It is indeed questionable whether 
Wilson will lead us to higher consciousness. Theatre must be more than something 
to gape at or lose oneself in’.157 She criticises theatre critics who are content with 
stating that Einstein on the Beach cannot be described but has to be experienced, 
that ‘the analysis of it is either ‘inadequate’ or ‘irrelevant’’.158 For Marranca, such 
writing on the work ignores the ‘cultural contradiction’ at the heart of the opera’s 
appearance at the Metropolitan Opera in 1976. Marranca goes on to discuss the 
position of avant-garde theatre especially in America at the time and contends that 
such theatre is, especially in Wilson’s case, making increasingly close friends with 
the art market and business. But what Marranca finds particularly problematic in 
Wilson’s theatre is his escapism. I have attempted to describe the performance in a 
way that brings out its climatic nature. While in Goat Island’s work the waiting is 
uncertain since we do not know what we are waiting for or indeed if there is 
anything to wait for (but we do know we need, or even want, to wait) in Einstein on 
the Beach we know that there will be something at the end of the waiting. There is 
no good time to leave one’s seat at Einstein on the Beach as one will never know if 
something surprising begins to take place. 
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Chapter 5 
The Art of Leftovers: Memory, Matter and Decay 
 
1 Performance vanishes 
How does performance’s matter remain? And how can performance remain through 
its matter? Does it matter? How does matter matter? These questions form the core 
of this chapter in which I consider temporality, remains and embodied memories 
within performance. I posit that thinking about performance as always disappearing 
fails to account for the different temporalities that are in operation within 
performance. In so doing I challenge the claim that performance disappears the 
moment it appears, an idea that has been prevalent in performance theory since its 
inception in the 1960s.  
For Antonin Artaud, theatre was ‘the only place in the world where a 
gesture, once made, can never be made the same way twice’.1 The notion of 
performance as transient and ephemeral was similarly, if more forcefully, articulated 
by Marcia B. Siegel who argues: ‘Dance exists at a perpetual vanishing point’.2 
Furthermore, Herbert Blau contends that ‘In theatre, as in love, the subject is 
disappearance’.3 Most famously, perhaps, it is Peggy Phelan’s book Unmarked: The 
Politics of Performance from 1993 that has become the strongest voice in the debate 
on performance as vanishing. Phelan argues that ‘performance betrays and lessens 
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the promise of its own ontology’ when it partakes in reproduction.4 For Phelan, 
‘Performance’s only life is in the present’.5 What is at stake here, then, is visibility. 
As Phelan argues, ‘there are no left-overs’ or copies.6 Thus, ‘live performance 
plunges into visibility – in a maniacally charged present – and disappears into 
memory’.7 Phelan advocates that the politics of visibility are also concerned with the 
unique and hard-won position of performance in visual culture. It is not that, as 
Phelan’s argument is sometimes read, performance leaves no traces, no archival 
objects or representations but that its ontology is based on a value of emptiness. As 
Phelan argues, 
performance art is vulnerable to charges of valuelessness and emptiness. 
Performance indicates the possibility of revaluing that emptiness; this 
potential revaluation gives performance art its distinctive oppositional edge.
8
  
 
However, Philip Auslander argues: ‘It is not realistic to propose that live 
performance can remain ontologically pristine or that it operates in a cultural 
economy separate from that of the mass media’.9 According to Auslander, the 
relationship between live and mediatised events is ‘historical and contingent’.10 
Indeed, Auslander contends, ‘historically, the live is actually an effect of 
mediatization, not the other way around. It was the development of recording 
technologies that made it possible to perceive existing representations as ‘live’’.11 I 
will examine the contested relationship between liveness and the record further in 
the second part of this chapter, but for now I would like to point out how both 
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Phelan and Auslander seem to be in agreement over the fact that live performance 
disappears. Auslander argues that,  
Disappearance, existence only in the present moment, is not, then, an 
ontological quality of live performance that distinguishes it from modes of 
technical reproduction. Both live performance and the performance of 
mediatization are predicated on disappearance: the televisual image is 
produced by an ongoing process in which scan lines replace one another, and 
it is always as absent as it is present; the use of recordings causes them to 
degenerate.
12
 
 
Furthermore, as Rebecca Schneider points out, Phelan and Auslander agree on one 
other aspect: ‘the live does not record’.13 In her recent contribution to the debate on 
performance remains, Performing Remains: Art and War in Times of Theatrical 
Reenactment, Schneider challenges Phelan’s insistence on disappearance and asks: 
‘does an equation of performance with impermanence, destruction, and loss follow 
rather than disrupt a cultural habituation to the imperialism inherent in archival 
logic?’.14 Focusing on American Civil War re-enactments, performance re-
enactments and the still in performance, Schneider considers the possibility of 
performance remaining through so far invisible, or bodily, traces; in short, 
performance which ‘resists a cultural habituation to the ocular’.15 For Schneider, 
then, the question is as follows: ‘in privileging an understanding of performance as a 
refusal to remain, do we ignore other ways of knowing, other modes of 
remembering, that might be situated precisely in the ways in which performance 
remains, but remains differently?’.16 
Often at stake in the definitions of performance as ephemeral is the 
assumption of time as linear within performance. But how might we conceptualize 
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performance’s time? Schneider notes, ‘The theatre, after all, is a temporal medium – 
but a temporal medium in the crease or fold of its own condition’.17 Questioning 
Phelan’s description of time within performance as ‘a maniacally charged present’, 
Schneider argues: 
Is the live really only a matter of temporal immediacy, happening only in an 
uncomplicated now, a “transitory” present, an im-mediate moment? Is a 
“maniacally charged present” not punctuated by, syncopated with, indeed 
charged by other moments, other times? That is, is the present really so 
temporally straight-forward or pure – devoid of a basic delay or deferral if 
not multiplicity and flexibility? Does it not take place or become composed 
in double, triple, or multiple time[...]?
18
 
 
Schneider questions assumptions around performance’s linear time and suggests that 
a focus on re-enactments and the links between performance and different media 
might help us to discover the myriad ways in which temporality functions in 
performance. I will quote Schneider’s book at length in this chapter as it is a seminal 
contribution to performance studies’ engagement with ephemerality. To add another 
aspect to this investigation, I turn to the notions of decay and ruin. 
I investigate the matter in decay to explore how that might help to rethink 
performance’s life in terms of cycles and multiplicity of different temporal frames 
rather than linearity. In particular, I focus on the notion of the ruin. As Brian Dillon 
suggests, ‘the cultural gaze that we turn on ruins is a way of loosening ourselves 
from the grip of punctual chronologies, setting ourselves adrift in time’.19 Writing of 
ruins, Dylan Trigg argues:  
Unfinished, the ruin comes to be experienced, not as a [sic] temporally 
emplaced, but haunted. […]The ruin is not the same as its previous (active) 
incarnation. Now, an altered place emerges, which retains the shadow of its 
old self, but simultaneously radically destabilizes that presence.
20
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The notion of decay here, then, is one of fragmentation. The unfinished ruin is 
complete in its decaying state. As such, this notion of decay contests reason as 
something which ‘predominantly depends upon an image evoked in the already-
lived past to construct an indeterminate present’.21 In so doing, this idea of decay is 
indebted to Walter Benjamin’s theorisations of ruins in his The Origins of German 
Drama and The Arcades Project. Benjamin argues: ‘In the ruin history has 
physically merged into the setting. And in this guise history does not assume the 
form of the process of an eternal life so much as that of irresistible decay’.22 For 
Benjamin, ‘by dint of their wasted constitution, ruins shatter the myth of rational 
progress and permanency, in their abundance and in their necessity’.23 However, in 
focusing on the ontological value and the literal meaning rather than on the allegory 
of decay, Trigg’s philosophy, which I examine here, deviates from Benjamin’s 
theorisations. So in relation to performance, how does decay alter things and what 
can it say about performance’s temporality and liveness? It is the essence of 
performance, its liveness, that is questioned in the debates on performance remains 
and I will examine how Trigg’s ideas on ruins might help us conceptualize the 
temporality of performance. What is this ‘altered place’ that emerges, as Trigg 
argues, and how does it destabilize presence?  
In this chapter, I form a picture of performance as a material practice and, 
more specifically, a practice with considerable material remains, while considering 
Schneider’s arguments around ‘remaining differently’. In particular, I focus on the 
notion of decay and the temporality of matter, emphasising decay as a process of 
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lasting and transformation rather than dying and disappearance. In so doing, I wish 
to raise two main questions: firstly, how to think about those things that become 
something else when they fall apart and secondly, how can performance ‘remain 
differently’ through transformation of substance? The first section will examine 
these questions through three examples, the first of which looks at the work of 
Alastair MacLennan. I will examine how MacLennan’s ‘actuations’ (MacLennan’s 
term for his work which combines action art and installation) engage with (often 
rotting) matter and animal flesh and how the temporality of this matter in decay 
contributes to the multiplicity of temporal frames in MacLennan’s work. I focus on 
MacLennan’s work because it allows for the consideration of the cyclical and live 
nature of decay to be emphasised.  
Questions around decay will be developed into considerations of ruins in the 
second part, which will discuss The Dust Archive, a book archiving a collection of 
performances that visited the Leeds Met Studio Theatre before its demolition. 
Through The Dust Archive I will examine how space remembers and what 
significance and efficacy there is in ruins. The Dust Archive allows for an 
examination of space to be focused on here and renders the inevitability of material 
remains explicit. The third and final artwork I will discuss is Doris Salcedo’s 
Shibboleth, which was part of the Unilever Series at Tate Modern in 2007. I 
consider Shibboleth as belonging to a temporal medium in the way it was destroyed 
or erased after its tenure. In so doing, I examine what questions the artwork raises 
about the ‘liveness’ and ‘nowness’ of material remains.  
All these three examples I examine ground the discussion on decay in 
tangible matter and allow a shift away from allegory and melancholy. The second 
section will continue the troubling and questioning of assumed ends and beginnings 
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of performance and suggests that re-thinking performance and its temporality 
through reappearance rather than disappearance draws out central questions on 
agency, authenticity and documentation. In order to do so, I will firstly examine a 
project by Performance Re-enactment Society, whose work opens up, I argue, a 
useful way of thinking about agency, memory and re-enactment in performance 
documentation. The second example is a reading of Bill Morrison’s Decasia, a 70-
minute film made of found, rotting film. I argue that Decasia poses questions on 
ideas on the ontological value of decay and the production of different kinds of 
knowledge. By focusing on decay and memory, I wish to investigate how the 
different mediums of performance, photography and film deal with memory, decay 
and documentation and their possible disappearance from (and reappearance in) the 
archive. 
2 Alistair MacLennan: actuation as archive 
MacLennan’s actuations engage with tangible, often rotting, material such as old, 
found objects like shoes or playing cards, and natural materials such as soil, pig 
heads and fish. Although there is extensive documentation of MacLennan’s work, 
mostly in the form of photographs and film, the artist maintains that ‘there are some 
things that can’t be documented’.24 MacLennan goes on to say: ‘Some will say it’s 
unfortunate that all those traces have not been fixedly ‘documented’, and in some 
sense its [sic] true. In another sense however, for me, how this is, is a document in 
itself’.25 Here MacLennan identifies the multiplicity of temporal frames that 
simultaneously exist in his works. Roddy Hunter notes that ‘MacLennan’s work 
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‘actuates’ unexpected syntheses and initially incongruous juxtapositions of 
materials, forms, and media [...] Pluralities of dialogues emerge, ebb and flow over 
the extended duration of an actuation’.26 Both Hunter and MacLennan refer to the 
pluralities of people’s memories and their engagement with the work. As 
MacLennan notes, in the actuations, ‘nothing’s finished, nothing is’.27   
This idea of performance as ‘becoming’ is a useful and increasingly familiar 
one in recent discussions of performance’s temporality. I am thinking here 
especially of the Deleuzian definition of the term (via Henri Bergon). For Deleuze, 
as Laura Cull articulates, ‘Time is not a discrete ‘now’ that beings occupy or are 
contained by; time is immanent to what lives and as such what lives is ceaselessly 
becoming, self-differentiating, creative’.28 But I would like to consider here the 
different time frames that are in operation in these actuations. I would argue that in 
addition to the interweaving and syncopated trajectories of people and their presence 
in the work, there is also a different temporality, that of matter. What is, for 
example, the time of rotting flesh in MacLennan’s work? MacLennan’s actuation 
Emit Time Item in Toronto (1999) consisted of a long table placed diagonally in a 
room and over the work’s 30-hour duration MacLennan set the table with plates, 
cups, black balloons, dead fish and pigs’ ears. Paul Couillard notes how ‘The pigs' 
ears completely changed colour over the 30 hours. They dried out and became quite 
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red; one could see scars developing’.29 This gradual transformation of the flesh is 
heightened by the long duration of the actuation.  
The process of rotting and decaying and the temporality of such operations 
are not so much outside of the time of performance but interweave it. Here, the 
flesh, the object, teeters between being what Caitlin DeSilvey calls an artefact – ‘a 
relic of human manipulation of the material world’ and an ecofact – ‘a relic of other 
than human engagements with matter, climate, weather and biology’.30 At the end of 
Emit Time Item, MacLennan sets fire to the 30 paper planes resting on the plates. 
They burn out quickly, turning into grey fragile strips, their swift destruction 
accentuating the different temporal frame of the animal flesh. In other works, the 
actuation is followed by an installation, such as in (the reworking of) Unseeing 
Trace in 2003. Performed in Ormeau Baths Gallery in Belfast, the actuation, which 
similarly consisted of a table with plates, cups and pig heads, ran for seven-and-a-
half hours non-stop on 25
th
 February and the following installation stayed in the 
space for the subsequent four days.
31
 Furthermore, for an installation in Krakow in 
1992 entitled A Wake, MacLennan brought in a dead bird he had found on the street 
in Belfast.
32
 Similarly, for the ShowReal Festival in Tel Aviv in December 1993, 
MacLennan used a dead turtle he had come across on the beach. The bodies of the 
animals might be dead, but they are not still. Instead they are in the perpetual 
process of transformation.  
Furthermore, their decay is not started by the performance but was already in 
process. Or to put in another way, the bodies of the animals are not dead, or at least 
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dead in the sense of still. They are here and they are happening, still. The focus here 
on decay is thus on cyclical processes. Seen in this way, the actuations are thus not 
only imbued with the time of people present but the flux of the past and present of 
the decay of matter. The now of the performance is an interrelation of the past of the 
flesh (of the dead turtle or bird), their decaying present, and inevitable further and 
future decay, which is increasingly evident in the matter in the now, the present 
moment. Here, to quote David Gross, ‘objects have to fall into desuetude at one 
level in order to come more fully into their own at another’.33 The result is a tangible 
process of decay; both a haunting ghost and a haunted presence/present. The 
temporality of matter spills and leaks.  
As Gross suggests, the decay of objects facilitates a cycle where each part 
goes through several processes of transformation in order to partake in the cycle. In 
this way, the actuation also becomes an archive or a repository of sorts for the 
rotting flesh. Taking flesh as flesh and bone as bone, it thus resists and undoes the 
logic of the archive as Schneider articulates it: ‘flesh can house no memory of bone. 
In the archive bone speaks memory of flesh’.34 Therefore, seen as punctuated and 
cyclical rather than linear time, performance here does not follow the archive’s logic 
and disappear because it cannot reside in its material traces. Instead, as DeSilvey 
contends, ‘decay reveals itself not (only) as erasure but as a process that can be 
generative of a different kind of knowledge’.35  
In fact, I would disagree with DeSilvey on her point about erasure and argue 
for a stronger emphasis on the production of a ‘different kind of knowledge’. Or as 
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Alan Read argues on the political efficacy of performance’s ends: ‘Something ends, 
it does not die or disappear, this is the inevitability of a beginning that is a far more 
fragile and worthwhile invitation to political analysis and empowerment. […] One 
ending inaugurates another beginning’.36 The slowness and apparent aimlessness of 
MacLennan’s actions and presence in his work deploy time as material and thus 
brings out the vitality of the processes of decay. Performed as part of Marina 
Abramović Presents… in 2009 in Manchester, MacLennan’s actuation Warp Wrap 
ran from 3-19 July for three hours each evening. Performed in one of the smaller 
rooms in the Whitworth Art Gallery, the actuation had his oft used set of a table 
placed diagonally with a mountain of soil, fish and pigs’ heads on top of it. Most of 
the floor was covered with neat rows of old shoes.  
When I enter the room, MacLennan is sitting on a chair in the corner. On his 
lap he has a tree branch, on his head a shoe. The room is filled with a dull but potent 
smell, a combination of the rotting fish and pig flesh lying on the soil, the old shoes 
and the bodies of the spectators in this rather small room. MacLennan sits with his 
eyes closed. From the documentation after the event I see that he moved around the 
space, that he sat with a shoe on his head and stood holding the branch in different 
places in the room. But for now he simply sits and does not move, seemingly 
unaware of all the people watching him. The smell in the room is becoming too 
much and my tired mind and body will not stay in the room for long. Exploring 
processes of meditation, MacLennan’s actions are slow and considered and the 
actuations become processions or ceremonies which go on longer than most 
spectators are able to follow and sit through. MacLennan moves with his eyes half 
closed, paying attention to every detail of his actions to the point where they begin 
                                                          
36
 Read, p. 67, original emphasis 
227 
 
to feel aimless. But this period of stretched out time in his processional work brings 
out the liveness of decay. There is a purpose to the tasks MacLennan has given 
himself and although the work is experienced as slow, almost with a sense of 
endlessness, the decaying organic matter does not tend toward death but towards 
cyclical processes.  
Unlike in some endurance art, where death comes close and there is a 
genuine risk of dying or an emphasis on the mortality and the ephemerality of the 
body, MacLennan’s work is a re-affirmation of liveness. As Gray Watson states, 
‘One of the several pairs of polarities which especially interests [MacLennan]… is 
that of wounding and healing’.37 MacLennan’s ritualistic mode of performance with 
its emphasis on endurance and continuation is a different proposition from, for 
example, Stuart Brisley’s And for today… nothing (1972), which was a two-week 
performance where the artist lay in a bath tub filled with black water for two hours 
each day. Pieces of offal were placed around the bathroom and in the bath and over 
the course of the show’s two weeks the offal decayed attracting flies and feeding 
maggots. The bathroom, which was in Gallery House in the Goethe Institute in 
London, had low lighting and its door was ajar, creating a sense of obscurity as to 
what the room held inside it. I place this performance here in parallel with 
MacLennan’s work to draw out the differences, despite the seemingly apparent 
similarities of materials in both artists’ work.  
As acts of preservation themselves, MacLennan’s actuations question not 
only the form of the archive (the archive in which ‘bone speaks memory of flesh’) 
but also the processes of preservation (or the subject that makes the decision on 
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what is worth preserving). The next example considers this issue from the 
perspective of space and place. In 2008 the director of Leeds Met Studio Theatre 
Annie Lloyd and Alexander Kelly, co-artistic director of Third Angel, wrote a 
history of sorts of Leeds Met Studio Theatre, titled The Dust Archive. The book 
marked the departure of Lloyd as artistic director as well as the demolition of the 
studio. In it, Lloyd and Kelly have written a short piece on every show they could 
remember that had visited the space during Lloyd’s directorship. Lloyd writes that 
they wanted to ‘create an archive of dust’, carrying ‘the physical residue of 
performances collected in corners of the space’.38 The title of the book evokes the 
image of the dusty archive or the notion of the archive as good for only collecting 
dust. But it also suggests that dust itself is worth archiving or collecting, indeed that 
dust might have something to tell us. Each show has its own transparent page where 
a short memory is written on tracing paper, its spot on the floor plan corresponding 
to its spot in the studio. The dust in this archive, then, refers to the spatially located 
memories, the tiny particles of thoughts and images that have been left behind in the 
mind. 
However, there is also actual dust. Page eleven has a list of ‘everything we 
found when we swept up’, ‘beneath the heating units, stage left’.39 The list includes 
things like pencil shavings, sand from two different shows, polystyrene fragments, 
tomato seeds and much more. Here it is evident that no matter how thoroughly a 
show has been cleared up, done with, erased, something material remains and haunts 
the space. Performance has its clever ways of staying and continuing to take place. 
Interrupting the linear forward marching of time, the space becomes a ruin. Trigg 
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argues: ‘What remains in the ruin is the trace of a past, fragmented and unable to be 
situated in an overarching narrative, fusing with the ruin’s decay in the present’.40 
What is important here is how, as Trigg articulates,  
ruins evade a static, and thus nostalgic, image of the past by rendering 
memory ambiguous.[…]If the fragmented quality of the ruin were restored 
to a totality, it would lose its status as a ruin and instead be reduced to a 
monument.
41
 
 
The way performance takes place, I argue, is through return and repetition; 
performance returns and comes up again and again in fragments of dust which resist 
monumentalization. In the case of The Dust Archive, to borrow from Carolyn Kay 
Steedman, dust  
is not about rubbish, nor about the discarded; it is not about a surplus, left 
over from something else: it is not about Waste. Indeed, Dust is the opposite 
thing to Waste, or at least, the opposite principle to Waste. It is about 
circularity, the impossibility of things disappearing, or going away, or being 
done.
42
  
Moreover, there is a further significance, I believe, to the dust in the archive, to all 
those bits of polystyrene and tomato seeds. When it comes to encounters with dust, 
as Phil Dunham points out, questions are raised about ‘what (if anything) is 
consistent or whole about our bodies, and where (and indeed whether) a line can 
meaningfully be drawn between the human and nonhuman worlds’.43 As the final 
sweeping of rubbish at the studio shows, in such spaces the tiniest dust particles 
begin to trouble the boundaries between human bodies and nonhuman worlds. It acts 
as a reminder that we are made of dust. Every day the human body produces and 
sheds dust while other types of dust get carried off the floor, furniture and air on to 
the human body. Joseph A. Amato argues that, ‘A target of laboratory analysis on 
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the one hand, and of cleaners of all sorts on the other, dust has lost its ancient and 
metaphorical powers. It no longer declares the passage of time and the mortality of 
all living things’.44 But I would argue that the dust in The Dust Archive does exactly 
that, it records performance as a dusty archive and an archive of dust, circulating, 
refusing erasure.  
3 Materiality of things 
I am going to pause here to set up some ideas about materials and materiality. My 
approach here is partly in line with what Daniel Miller calls ‘the humility of 
things’.45 Miller argues that objects have an ‘unexpected capacity to fade out of 
focus and remain peripheral to our vision and yet determinant of our behaviour and 
identity’.46 Objects are, of course, evident and do physically constrain or enable, but 
they are important ‘often precisely because we do not see them’.47 This is not so 
much to assert the importance of materiality of performance, its materiality isn’t in 
question here, but to begin to pay attention to specific ways in which we might 
engage with those materials. 
In discussing the materiality and materials in performance, I take my cue 
from Tim Ingold who draws an important distinction between the material world 
and the world of materials. In his article ‘Materials against Materiality’ Ingold 
attempts to emphasise materials and their properties over the materiality of the 
object. He questions a certain type of focus in material studies on materiality that 
has, in the end, nothing to do with materials or matter. Ingold’s article is a call for 
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‘taking materials seriously’.48 His argument centres on the way properties of 
materials emerge in the interaction between its environments. According to Ingold, 
all materials, like humans, ‘are, in the first place, organisms, not blobs of solid 
matter with an added whiff of mentality of agency to liven them up. As such, they 
are born and grow within the current of materials, and participate from within in 
their further transformation’.49 Here he also includes all sorts of matter from falling 
snow and frost to fungal bacteria. The distinction between artefacts and natural 
objects is, Ingold suggests, a difficult and unnecessary (and often impossible) one to 
make.  
I cite Ingold here in order to find a way of thinking about two interrelated 
things. One of them is the materiality of performance and how objects and matter 
come into contact and interact with the immateriality of performance. The second is 
the duration of different materials and the way in which we might think about these 
different temporalities when refiguring performance’s linearity. I demonstrate these 
two points here briefly before moving on to my bigger case studies. My first 
example is from theatre. That materials or matter might have something to tell us as 
themselves is thrown into relief by stage props in Naturalist theatre. In such theatre, 
people, the actors on stage, have mastery over the objects and the objects become to 
mean or signify whatever the narrative of that performance requires. However, in 
her article ‘Human Remains: Acting, Objects, and Belief in Performance’, Aoife 
Monks delivers an account about a certain human skull that found its way on to the 
stage in the Royal Shakespeare Company’s production of Hamlet. The skull was 
that of Andre Tchaikowsky, a classical pianist, and Holocaust survivor. 
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Tchaikowsky had been diagnosed with terminal cancer in 1979 aged only 46 and he 
bequeathed his organs to medical research and his skull to the theatre. 
Tchaikowsky’s skull did not, however, play (or stand in for) Yorick’s skull to 
the end of the 2008-9 production. The media found out the secret of the ‘real state’ of 
the skull and the RSC decided to replace it with a replica. According to the director 
Greg Doran, the attention that the skull was getting was threatening to ‘topple the 
show’.50 The twist to the story came after the production’s successful run in London 
when it was announced that it was in fact Tchaikowsky’s real skull that had been on 
stage all the time. The news that it had been swapped for a replica was a ruse to stop 
audiences thinking about it. As Monks notes, ‘Andre Tchaikowsky continued to play 
Yorick under the cover of semiotic subterfuge’. 51 
The underlying assumption in employing a real skull was that the realness of 
this object would carry its realness into the realm of acting and that the world on 
stage would become more real too. Doran noted that he had wanted ‘to make the 
performance as real as possible’.52 Such an approach is characteristic of the 
Naturalist stage. For example, as Monks argues, in Stanislavskian acting theory, 
objects  
function as vehicles for transformation within the actor, and the reality of 
these objects is crucial to the successful production of truthful acting. […]By 
focusing closely on an object, actors are transformed by it, forgetting 
themselves in the process, while at the same time transforming the object by 
incorporating it into their theatrical world.
53
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The problem here is, though, that rather than being caught in the realm of illusion or 
become only a medium through which the immaterial world of the play is  accessed, 
‘the ‘realness’ of these artifacts [run] the risk of piercing the illusion, uncoupling the 
dramatic sign from its referent’.54 Thus, Tchaikowsky’s skull, which brings to the 
fore issues of the inerasable or undeniable property of materials and matter, 
interrupts the flow of illusion and theatrical time and stops the audience from going 
beyond the material world presented on stage (or happening despite of it). Here, 
then, we see objects and materials acting out their properties in the interactions with 
their environments.
55
 Of course, bodily remains such as skulls, as well as dust to 
some extent, carry a degree of agency that is harder to ignore than a vase or a teapot 
standing on a table in A Doll’s House. Placing a real skull on stage interrupts the 
flow of illusion in theatre in the same way a bodily remnant, or a rotting fish, asserts 
its own duration, into the ‘real time’ of live art.  
In thinking about the properties of materials, Ingold draws attention to the 
duration of different matter. His article asks the reader to find a stone, water it and 
place it on the desk while reading. At the end of the article, Ingold asks the reader to 
observe how the stone has changed. It has changed colour as it has dried. It looks 
different but does it look more or less ‘stony’, or to put it differently, where is its 
‘stoniness’? It is in this short examination of the stoniness of their chosen stone that 
the reader can also mark something about the duration of the stone. We might say 
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that it is difficult to think about or see the time it takes for something like a stone to 
change. And yet stones do change, they have their own duration.  
Next I would like to read this medium of stone through another medium, that 
of performance. There is perhaps something of the inter(in)animation at work here 
in Ingold’s discussion of properties of materials. The term inter(in)animation is one 
which Schneider uses via Fred Moten and John Donne. Fred Moten’s term 
‘interinanimates’ refers to ‘the ways live art and media of mechanical and 
technological reproduction, such as photography, cross-identify, and, more 
radically, cross-constitute and ‘improvise’ each other’.56 For Schneider, the 
inter(in)animate encounter is one ‘that requires syncopation or cross-temporality’.57 
It is to read media through each other in order to move meaning ‘into chiasmatic 
reverberation across media and across time in a network of ongoing response-
ability’.58 In my second example I want to think about the stoniness and the duration 
of stone and how that might come into contact with other times in other ways, into 
the present moment.  
This example is from the British Museum’s exhibition of Ice Age art.59 The 
exhibition gathered together several objects from as far back as 40,000 years ago. 
Objects made of bone, carved in intricate detail, female and animal figures telling, 
according to the exhibition curators, the story of the first modern mind. They were 
perhaps a surprising reminder of the abilities of people living further back than one 
mind can completely comprehend. One of them was a puppet with moving limbs 
and made in a way that when seen in the light of a fire it would cast a shadow on the 
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wall of the cave (we are told in the text relating to the object). This, according to the 
exhibition information, was the first example of performance art.  
Such objects were a strong reminder that the experience of time and duration 
is different in different times. We might not be able to comprehend or at least would 
easily forget that these art works are in themselves a measure of time and that that 
measure would have meant different things to people whose lives were shorter than 
ours. The time that it takes to carve a bone to portray two reindeer swimming, say, 
30,000 years ago differs from the duration that we would now afford to a piece of 
carved bone. The exhibition is made up of glass cases with the exhibited objects 
accompanied with short pieces of text about their origin and purpose.  
After such a simple layout where the objects were allowed to, in some way, 
‘speak for themselves’, the exhibition leads into a room (or to be more exact, a 
thorough-fare space between two exhibition rooms) with a long seat against the 
back wall. On the opposite wall, a projection of a wall of cave paintings is slowly 
moving. It moves as if it was moving along the cave, or as if one looking at it was 
moving along a cave. It fades into darkness and back into light again, as if the cave 
was lit by a fire. The temporary exhibition wall that the cave paintings are projected 
on is protruding and curving, mimicking a cavernous wall. The information panel at 
the entrance to this space informs the viewer that the images are from the caves of 
Chauvet, Lascaux, Pech Merle and Niaux in France and El Castillo in Spain, painted 
between 34,000 and 14,000 years ago. It states that the installation shows ‘how 
painters worked with the form of the rock surfaces to create great friezes or tiny 
images hidden in niches’.60 The idea behind this slowly moving cave painting on the 
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cavernous wall seemed to be to animate an art work that cannot be brought to the 
museum.  
According to Andrew Cochrane, one of the curators of the exhibition, the 
installation seeks to represent the experience that a viewer would have of the images 
when visiting the caves.
61
 Cochrane notes that visiting the caves is often a 
disorientating experience where the environment produces different effects on the 
human body. He goes on to say: 
Being so far underground, and feeling so small, in a massive chamber can be 
difficult to comprehend. They are dangerous places – the surfaces and 
cavernous heights aside, cave bears and cave lions often visited them in the 
Ice Age. When you interact with cave art, it is in such conditions. 
This part of the exhibition, then, aims to create the authentic conditions of the cave 
and to transport the viewers to the cave where this wall painting is from, as if we 
were there. Furthermore, Cochrane points out that the cave paintings are often 
invisible when looked at straight on. Instead, they have been painted to appear only 
from certain angles and use the uneven surface of the walls. Cochrane calls them ‘a 
powerful and interactive performance’.  The projection of the images on the gallery 
wall simulates the conditions of the cave but also alludes to the altered states of 
consciousness that people might have been in when interacting with the paintings. 
Cochrane notes: ‘There are ideas that the images are affective; that they stimulate; 
that they are representations of ‘entoptics’’. The Ice Age exhibition aims to produce 
(some of) that affect with the help of technology. The exhibition does not go as far 
as creating the atmosphere of a cave with a more specific space (this is just an 
exhibition space with blue grey walls) as some museums in their bid for interaction 
and haptic experience might do.  
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I mention this exhibition here because it was a striking attempt at 
inter(in)animation. Watching the paintings glide over the cavernous wall, I found it 
puzzling as to what I was asked to look at here. (A small boy of perhaps eight years 
old is sitting on the bench, turning to his parents he asks, ‘what is this?’. He might 
have, of course, meant what are the cave paintings (the information on the paintings 
was on a small panel outside the room) but it also sounded like a question about the 
room’s purpose). It seemed to me that a photograph of the cave paintings would 
have given a clearer picture of them (since of course the cave itself can’t be brought 
to the museum). But it also seems that that is not the purpose of this projection. Its 
purpose was to inter(in)animate a still work that is far away - to bring it to the 
museum viewers, or more accurately, to take the viewers to the cave. However, in 
its inter(in)animation it managed to make the artwork seem distant and distorted. 
And that was because film’s way of ‘improvising’ the cave paintings ignored their 
duration and temporality. It lost the caveness of the cave and the lived experience of 
the paintings. 
My third case study continues along this line of stoniness in some way. In 
October 2007, a crack opened up on the floor of the Turbine Hall at Tate Modern. A 
fine hair fissure left the west entrance and travelled down the inclined concrete 
floor, widening as it went. It followed a snaky path underneath the mezzanine 
leaving forked out lines randomly dispersed. It reached the other end of the hall 
disappearing underneath a glass wall. In its attention to Doris Salcedo’s Shibboleth 
(2007-8) the press seemed to focus on two main issues: how the crack was made and 
how dangerous it was. The Guardian brought in an award winning architect and two 
builders to look at the work to solve the mystery of its installation. The three 
professionals could not agree. In the end, Mr E, a builder working in the Tate at the 
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time of the installation and wishing to remain anonymous, tells how it was 
produced. According to Mr E,  
They dug a dirty great trench about a yard wide and a yard deep… Then they 
brought in lorry-load after lorry-load of cement and poured it in, using 10-
foot sections of what looked like carved polystyrene moulding to form its 
sides.
62
  
 
Other accounts say that the walls were made elsewhere and installed in the Tate. 
Another large area of interest for the press was the amount of injuries that occurred 
to viewers. Both of these concerns evidence an emphasis on the realness of this 
space: this is a real crack; there is real danger.  As Tate Director Nicholas Serota 
said, ‘It has taken five weeks of work here with very considerable disruption to the 
hall. It's not an illusion - it's there, it's real’.63 And yet, as every question about the 
specifics of the work’s installation was met with a friendly but stern silence, a sense 
of mystery about Shibboleth prevailed. As Richard Dorment wrote in his review for 
The Telegraph:  
With part of your mind, you completely accept the reality of the cracked 
floor, but, with the other, rational part, you wonder whether what your eyes 
see can possibly be true. The effect is disconcerting because you find 
yourself trapped between knowing and not knowing.
64
  
The opening, which for Salcedo ‘refer[s] to the evil of racism, the divide between 
the black and white halves of humanity’, is such an assault on the building that it 
‘will, at the end, bring the whole building down’. 65 As Eyal Weizman states, ‘A 
crack is not a static state but a stage in a process of gradual shear that might expand 
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and tear through a building’s structure and skin along the line of least resistance’.66 
So the line that disappears underneath the glass wall and continues, we believe, on 
and on unseen can and will destroy the whole building. As real as the crack is when 
you put your hand down it and touch its wire mesh walls it is thus also an illusion, 
faux, theatrical.
67
  
At the end of the tenure of the installation the crack was filled up again to 
allow for new artworks in the series. It became clear that there will be no gradual 
shear or decay. The filling-in has halted and distilled the process that the cement and 
its layers would have otherwise gone through. Now, a discernible trace on the floor 
remains. In fact, one can see the whole length of the crack. The cement used for the 
filling is slightly darker than the rest of the floor. It is also less smooth. One feels 
they could have done (had they wanted to) a slightly better job with filling and 
hiding it. But the remains of Shibboleth seemed to have been important to its whole 
concept. Serota said at the time, ‘There is a crack, there is a line, and eventually 
there will be a scar. It will remain as a memory of the work and also as a memorial 
to the issues Doris touches on’.68 But what I would like to suggest here is that the 
scar is more than something left over, that, in fact, there is no original and remains; 
it is all Shibboleth, it is still Shibboleth. The somewhat paradoxical choice of words 
in an article in the Guardian at the beginning of the installation illustrates this: ‘The 
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installation will be removed in April next year when the crack will be filled in’.69 
The installation is removed, in other words it goes somewhere else, when the fissure 
is filled. I suggest that it remains but, that its darker, less smooth line is freed from 
illusion.  
Whereas in 2007 the fracture appeared to continue on and on as it 
disappeared underneath a glass wall, now that the glass panel is gone the darker 
cement line grazing the floor stops suddenly at the penultimate floor slab. It lies 
underneath and amongst new artworks that take over the Turbine Hall and between 
installations when the hall is empty one can see the crack as if it was still open. 
Except that now I delight in walking on top of it from one end to the other without 
the hazard of falling in and do not wonder how it was made. To borrow Dorment’s 
words, I am not in between knowing and not knowing but re-enacting those 
encounters that took place with its earlier manifestation. It is no more real or faux, 
or live for that matter, than before but, to borrow from Schneider, ‘contains the 
palimpsestuous reality effect of faux upon faux that gives us, so promisingly, the 
transitivity of the real, which is to say its mutability, its availability for and as 
change’.70 No more live, then, but perhaps ‘durational live’.71 The distilled 
Shibboleth in its durational liveness remains and in its remains resist forgetting and 
decay. 
Through the examples I have discussed here I have explored Schneider’s 
question of how performance can ‘remain differently’ by considering the possibility 
of conceptualizing it as a material practice. In so doing, I have contested the claim 
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that equates performance’s life with disappearance and have instead argued that 
temporality in performance is a crossing of different times. For Phelan, the politics 
of visibility raises one crucial question: ‘what would it take to value the immaterial 
within a culture structured around the equation ‘material equals value’?’.72 By 
focusing on material remains I do not mean to state that performance can only 
remain through tangible matter. But I do wish to suggest that in ignoring the 
different temporalities existing and acting in performance we ignore both the 
entangled relationship between human bodies and non-human matter and the 
different kinds of knowledge that matter in its decay can produce. This is evident in 
MacLennan’s actuations which engage with rotting matter and animal flesh. In the 
multiplicity of temporal frames, the actuations become repositories for the flesh. 
Here, it is not only performance’s temporality but also the notion of the archive that 
has been reconceptualized as something which does not resist decay but partakes in 
its processes. The fragmentary nature of decay and ruins is significant here.  
The fragments of left-overs and dust particles in The Dust Archive 
emphasize the impossibility of eradicating the materiality of performance. 
Furthermore, if, as Steedman argues, dust is not about waste or the discarded, then 
the final sweeping of the studio floor (which produces the material remains of 
performances from over the years that have been haunting the space) reveals the 
processes of transformation of substance. And it is these processes that draw 
attention to performance as perpetual becoming. I discussed how the idea of remains 
is central to the concept of Shibboleth. In fact, such a severe assault on the building 
could hardly go unnoticed even after the crack had supposedly gone. The fissure on 
the floor of the Turbine Hall implied the gradual destruction of the whole building 
                                                          
72
 Phelan, p. 5. 
242 
 
but instead of tearing the building apart the fissure remained and will not let us 
forget. Here, then, it is not so much about the material remains or their decay but 
more about the mimetic remains of people’s memories. I walk to the other end of 
the hall along the fissure and instead of falling in I remain on top of it.  
4 Memory and re-enactment 
Above I discussed the material remains of performance in tandem with other forms 
and media such as books and exhibitions to point out that materials act in the same 
way whether in the performance event or on their own. I have also attempted to 
highlight the impossibility of eradicating the materiality of performance. I suggested 
that its materiality not only becomes most prominent when it comes to the remains 
of left-overs (as we saw in The Dust Archive) but that those remains are also 
processes which produce different substances and knowledge. But what about 
embodied knowledge and memory? How do they remain in documentation? In her 
study or rethinking of performance in the Americas, The Archive and the 
Repertoire: Performing Cultural Memory in the Americas, Diana Taylor focuses on 
repertoire instead of archive. For Taylor, the repertoire ‘enacts embodied memory: 
performances, gestures, orality, movement, dance, singing – in short, all those acts 
usually thought of as ephemeral, nonreproducible knowledge’. 73 Taylor places these 
embodied and nonreproducible acts in opposition to writing, which she sees as 
historically privileged over those practices included in the repertoire.  
Taylor argues: ‘Even though the archive and the repertoire exist in a constant 
state of interaction, the tendency has been to banish the repertoire to the past’.74 
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That is because, as Taylor contends, the liveness of embodied memory ‘exceeds the 
archive’s ability to capture it’.75 In other words, performance disappears when it 
enters the archive, because it stops being performance and becomes something else 
(for example, video). However, seen as repertoire, these embodied and performed 
acts continue to ‘generate, record, and transmit knowledge’.76 Therefore, as 
productive as Taylor’s emphasis on repertoire as a set of reiterative performances is, 
it nevertheless maintains the binary between archive as that which is material and 
performance as that which cannot be held in the archive. In other words, it does not 
trouble the notion of the archive. Schneider asks: 
Does the logic of the archive, as that logic came to be central to modernity, 
in fact demand that performance disappear in favour of discrete remains – 
material presented as preserved, as non-theatrical, as “authentic”, as “itself”, 
as somehow non-mimetic?
77
 
 
Furthermore, speaking of oral histories (which become archival objects only through 
their recording and saving), Schneider asks:  
Do not such practices buttress the phallocentric insistence of the 
ocularcentric assumption that if it is not visible, or given to documentation or 
sonic recording, or otherwise “houseable” within an archive, it is lost, 
disappeared?
78
 
 
I approach Schneider’s question here with the media of photography and film with a 
short detour to re-enactment in order to investigate and trouble the boundaries of 
those media and to examine mimetic remains.  
I would like to begin with Martha King re-enacting Pina Bausch’s Café 
Muller and The Rite of Spring which were presented as a double bill at Sadler’s 
Wells in 2008. The image of Martha’s re-enactment was taken as part of The 
Performance Re-enactment Society’s project at The Pigs of Today Are the Hams of 
                                                          
75
 Taylor, p. 20 
76
 Taylor, p. 21 
77
 Schneider, p. 100, original emphasis 
78
 Taylor, p. 101 
244 
 
Tomorrow conference in Plymouth in January 2010. The Performance Re-enactment 
Society is a collaboration between three Bristol artists who are interested in playful 
as well as critical re-enactments of performances and this project was made with 
photographer Hugo Glendinning. Participants selected their most memorable 
moments from a performance they had attended to the Society’s archive and that 
moment was then recreated and photographed. Most of the re-enactors came with 
their props and costume at the ready and some had meticulously rehearsed a scene 
to re-enact as faithfully as possible. Others came with an idea for an image which 
was then worked on by Glendinning and the participant. Martha arrived with a bag 
of sand, some miniature chairs, a slip and a vague idea that she wanted to fall, these 
elements being the strongest impressions she had from witnessing the double bill.  
I stand at the back of the room as Martha re-enacts a fall, amidst a pile of 
sand and tiny scattered chairs. Glendinning moves around Martha trying to get a 
good angle and Martha falls. There is a painful thud every time she hits the floor. 
Her body remembering the painful thuds from Café Muller where a woman and a 
man repeat a gradually accelerating sequence in which the man lets the woman go 
off his hold and she drops to the floor. There is something in Martha’s fall of the 
painful yet pleasurable repetition. Repetition which starts as pleasurable, both 
physically and mentally satisfying, but which turns into pain (again, both mental and 
physical) and yet is impossible to stop. Thud after thud, bruise after bruise, the 
performance happens again and again, it reappears and remains. As discussed in the 
previous section, performance does not happen in and follow the rules of linear time 
but does, in fact, reappear and travel back, forth and sideways and is syncopated 
with other times and other moments, and in so doing troubles the distinction 
between now and not-now. After all, performance always happens now and it is now 
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every time performance happens. In other words, performance happens every time a 
viewer sees the work. Writing of re-enactments, Schneider argues, ‘There is, 
instead, a certain superabundance to re-enactment, like a run-on sentence, as if an 
event in time, refusing to be fully or finally ‘over’ or ‘gone’ or ‘complete’ pulses 
with a kind of living afterlife in an ecstasy of variables, a million insistent if 
recalcitrant possibilities for return (doubling as possibilities for error)’.79 Martha’s 
re-enactment does not (only) move backwards to Café Muller’s fall but forward, on 
and on. But what is Martha’s fall as re-enactment, and as a photograph or 
documentation?  
Schneider argues, ‘An action repeated again and again and again, however 
fractured or partial or incomplete, has a kind of staying power – persists through 
time – and even, in a sense, serves as a fleshy kind of ‘document’ of its own 
recurrence’.80 The question, then, for Schneider is: ‘Might a live act even 
‘document’ a precedent live act, rendering it, in some way, ongoing, even 
preserved?’.81 In this act of distilling a whole performance into one single instant, a 
flash of the camera, comes together Café Muller’s fall, Martha’s repeated and 
repeating fall, throwing into high relief assumptions not only about the liveness of a 
performance but also about its authorship and authenticity. In this case, where is the 
original, where is the liveness, or more accurately, non-liveness? The generally 
assumed dichotomy of performance as live and photography, as well as re-
enactment, as the record of the live is in question here. The minimalist sculptor Carl 
Andre gets to the heart of this dichotomy when he states: ‘Art is a direct experience 
with something in the world, and photography is just a rumour, a kind of 
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pornography of art’.82 For Andre, although not talking exclusively about live 
performance, photography is only a trace or a shadow of what art can do.  
I contest this claim with some examples below. However, before I do I 
would like to briefly consider that the notion of rumour might actually be useful in 
the context of live performance. Vanessa Agnew argues that, ‘Reenactment’s central 
epistemological claim that experience furthers historical understanding is clearly 
problematic: body-based testimony tells us more about the present self than 
collective past’.83 Agnew’s argument rests on the assumption that body-based 
testimony, as she calls it, or embodied memory is not a reliable tool for knowing 
history. In so doing, it ignores the efficacy of affective engagement and what we 
might now call, after Andre and Agnew, bodily rumours. For if those painful and 
pleasurable thuds are Martha’s rumour then it is a powerful one. It says: this is how 
it happened and keeps happening. 
The second image I turn to is Bob Whalley and Lee Miller’s re-enactment of 
Forced Entertainment’s Club of No Regrets as part of the same Performance Re-
enactment Society event in Plymouth. What is important to note here is that 
Glendinning who took the photograph of Whalley’s and Miller’s re-enactment also 
took the images of the Forced Entertainment performance in 1993. Two, 
interrelated, things are interesting here I think. One of them is the illustration of how 
images of performance circulate. Many of us are perhaps familiar with the original 
images of the Forced Entertainment show and even more of us are, I suspect, 
familiar with images from Café Muller or The Rite of Spring. If you are familiar 
with Bausch’s work, you will recognise the chairs and the soil, and the fall in 
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Martha’s photograph. We know the fall. Therefore, those images of performances 
that circulate and become stills do not or have not in fact distilled a performance but 
in incorporating into itself other people’s memories of those falls (Café Muller) and 
that struggle in a talcum powder blizzard (Club of No Regrets) they travel sideways 
and in loops. They keep on circulating.  
Secondly, what is also highlighted here is the new approach to 
performance’s photographic documentations. It is an approach whereby 
photographers such as Glendinning and Manuel Vason who take on ‘artistic 
collaborations’, stage individual scenes to camera rather than photographing a 
performance as it is being performed (to an audience). This approach, as Alice 
Maude-Roxby argues, ‘opens up a consideration of the significance of photographic 
documentation as it has changed from the nature of a relic (where the action took 
place once) to part of a practice, which incorporates representation of performance 
within it’.84 Vason’s collaborations with performance artists have resulted in two 
publications, Exposures (2001) and Encounters (2007), in which ‘performance work 
is either restaged anew or uniquely developed, but, in any case, specifically for 
[Vason’s] camera’.85 They are what Schneider terms as ‘inter(in)animate’: 
…casting collaboration beyond singular sight invites a way of reading what 
takes place (and where and when) that pushes any event or any seemingly 
singular thing off of itself and into a mobile space, a transient space, a 
creative space (a future space as it is always more than one – it is always 
between).
86
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 Dominic Johnson argues that in their denial of ‘the posture of an authentic record of 
the real’87 these collaborations do not become iconic, like so many pieces of 
performance documentation.  
5 Repetition and iconic images 
I discuss this issue through my last example from 
 
the Performance Re-enactment 
Society’s project in Plymouth. Martin O’Brien’s re-enactment, after Bob Flanagan’s 
Nailed, is an even more explicit remake of an image than those of King and Whalley 
and Miller. At the end of his 1989 performance Flanagan nailed his penis to a plank 
of wood. The most recognisable image that survives of that one-off performance is 
that which O’Brien’s image re-enacts. He stands naked with his penis resting on a 
plank of wood, holding a hammer in one hand and a nail in the other, ready to hit. 
O’Brien’s image reflects the fact that the trend of re-enactment that has recently 
become more prevalent in live art and performance often focuses on (mainly 1960s 
and 70s) performances that have only been performed once and of which only 
written descriptions and photographs remain. In the absence of other material the 
scarce images have become iconic as they circulate within the discourses on 
performance histories. As Tracey Warr argues, ‘the very incompleteness and paucity 
of photographic documentation enhances its iconic capacity – encouraging the 
development of legend by giving us enough but nothing too definite’.88  
Marina Abramović’s Seven Easy Pieces in 2005 is an interesting example of 
this as her re-enactment of VALIE EXPORT’s Genital Panic/Action Pants (1969) 
was of a performance that probably never took place. The description that has been 
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circulated about the original performance is that VALIE EXPORT walked into an 
erotic cinema in her leather trousers with an exposed crotch and while holding a gun 
challenged the men watching porn to look at ‘the real thing’. As Amelia Jones 
discusses in her article on Seven Easy Pieces, this description is in fact a myth and 
the only action performed in these ‘action pants’ was posing for photographs. Not 
being able to receive answers from EXPORT on the full nature of the performance, 
Abramović decided to re-create the original performance as an image. Jones argues,  
Speaking her work through mythification, EXPORT…has shown a sharp 
attention to how history works – making the images mean something 
discursively but in contradiction (or at least contrast) to what occurred with 
the physical body and in material spaces at the time… EXPORT’s self-
mythifying act prompts later reenactors such as Abramović to fantasize the 
work in ways that may or may or not be connected to an ‘original’ durational 
event.
89
 
 
In all her six re-enactments Abramović ignored the length or form of the original 
performance and instead performed every piece for six hours. In so doing, Nancy 
Spector contends, Abramović ‘freely conflated each performance and its 
documentation to create a hybrid format, one that disregards the conventional 
hierarchy between the lived and the recorded’.90 Abramović’s re-enactment and its 
motivation as a preservation of live art history is decidedly different from O’Brien’s 
who used his recreation of Flanagan’s image to playfully acknowledge and examine 
his own position as a post-Flanagan performance artist with cystic fibrosis.
91
 
However, both use iconic images to re-enact iconic images, a process that at least 
seemingly short-circuits or cuts out performance. I would also like to raise here the 
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question of whether O’Brien’s image after Flanagan has more efficacy or agency 
because it is re-enacting a one-off performance compared to the other two examples 
of Bausch and Forced Entertainment where repetition is an essential part of the 
genre. What is the significance of keeping ‘alive’ performances that are designed to 
be seen only once, such as Flanagan’s Nailed? And what is the significance of 
keeping it ‘alive’ through another body, or a similarly ailing body like that of 
O’Brien’s? Is the repetition of Bausch’s work antithetical to disappearance?  
In her article on performance and precarity in late capitalism, Shannon 
Jackson notes how types of virtuosity circulate in art practices. One of the 
discourses on virtuosity declares the perhaps familiar expression to performance 
practitioners: ‘if you rehearse, you can’t be a performance artist’.92 The assumption 
here is of course that forms of theatre that require practice (developing vocal skills 
or bodily coordination for example) regards virtuosity as excellence and must be 
critiqued or resisted. This same critique views the “unpractised’ as progressive’.93 A 
part of the significance of live art’s real time is that it does not repeat, that real time 
happens only once. To flip this assumption on its head, however, would be to say 
that repetition is always theatrical, or that whatever repeats is always the same. And 
that repetition creates not a flow of time but a non-progressive state where the 
repetition is only pedalling air, not moving anywhere. (That is to say, not only is it 
not moving forward, in a linear fashion, but it is not moving back or sideways 
either.) The question here then is, is the re-enactment (or re-imagining in the case of 
Seven Easy Pieces) a repetition of the real time of the one-off event in the past? Or 
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is it a repetition that does not rely on virtuosity but takes into account, what I might 
call here, the progressive pedalling of repetition? 
Hayley Newman’s project Connotations – Performance Images (1994-1998) 
explores this question of performance documentation through images that were 
taken over one week in 1998 but were exhibited as an archive of an artist’s career 
over four years. The images are performed ‘fakes’ of performances that never took 
place. Connotations, then, is an attempt to form a ‘subjective performance canon’.94 
Some of the photographs are ‘mimicking, misinterpreting, and re-expressing what 
already existed in the canon, while at the same time creating, or at least imagining, 
new performance works’.95 Crying Glasses, for example, is a response to Adrian 
Piper’s Catalysis IV from 1970. In the documentation that resulted from Piper’s 
performance, we see Piper ‘sitting on a bus with a white towel stuffed in her 
mouth’.96 In her Crying Glasses Newman is sitting on the tube wearing glasses 
which produced tears running down her face through a small pumping system. For 
Newman, ‘Through these particular processes of authentication and attention to 
detail, Connotations extends beyond theatre, mimicry and parody to acknowledge 
contradictions between the artifice and realities of performance art.’97 While the 
relationship between live art practices and photography has been visible from the 
start, theatre’s connection to photography has been decidedly more implicit.  
Schneider considers the still (pose) and tableaux vivants in theatre in order to 
trouble the distinction between performance as live and photography as a record. 
For Schneider, the unrecognised significance of the theatre still has led to ‘an 
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(historically faulty) absolutist distinction between performance remains’.98 She goes 
on to contend: ‘The live aspect [of performance] – its in-timeness – appears to elude 
arrest. In line with this logic, we consider (perhaps shortsightedly) that a moment is 
past (i.e. no longer live) the moment an image appears to remain – appears that is, to 
still’.99 We might also think here of early photograph and daguerreotype portraits 
made in the nineteenth century which show people looking at pictures of their loved 
ones. Many such daguerreotype pictures, Geoffrey Batchen states, ‘feature images 
of people holding daguerreotype cases, allowing them to display someone else’s 
portrait within their own. Sometimes the case is open, sometimes not.’100  Schneider 
points out that photography’s addiction to death ‘may indeed be on the part of 
modernist habit of thought about photography, rather than a condition of 
photography itself.’ 101  
It is therefore important to emphasise the focus on liveness and the presence 
of others in my daguerreotype example. Similar to these daguerreotype portraits, 
Whalley’s and Miller’s struggle amidst talcum powder is a portrait within a portrait, 
a syncopated portrait. Perhaps this is what Schneider means by her call to think 
‘through ‘mutually disruptive energy’’ which ‘implies that the bygone is not entirely 
gone by and the dead not completely disappeared or lost, but also, and perhaps more 
complexly, the living are not entirely (or not only) live’.102 She goes on to say, ‘It is 
one time passing on to and as another time, but also not quite passing. One time 
almost but not fully passing in and as another time’.103 It is useful here also to think 
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how, as Batchen points out, in the early days of photography, ‘Individuals and 
families would sit for their photographic portraits, their heads usually supported by a 
standing metal device to keep them steady during the relatively long exposure.’ 104 
Therefore, ‘if one wanted to look lifelike in the eventual image, one had to pose as if 
dead’.105 Stillness, then, does not equate the end or disappearance of performance, 
nor is live completely live but also pretending to be dead. Or in Read’s words, an 
end is a beginning.  
6 Decasia and decay 
Thinking archive, then, through these mutually disruptive energies might prove 
useful in examining the notion of archive. As Taylor argues, ‘Insofar as it 
constitutes materials that seem to endure, the archive exceeds the live’.106 But what 
if the live is not only or entirely live? Taylor goes on to assert that one of the myths 
attending the archive is that ‘the archive resists change, corruptibility, and political 
manipulation. Individual things – books, DNA evidence, photo IDs – might 
mysteriously appear in or disappear from the archive.’107 Old film is a case in point 
and this brings me to the final example. As Andre Habib points out, ‘specialists 
estimate that about 80% of cinema’s first 30 years has disappeared’.108 (This is not 
to say that digital media isn’t in danger of disappearing.) And as Taylor points out, 
while some material disappears from an archive so does other material appear and 
seemingly belong to no one, and such is the case of Bill Morrison’s film Decasia 
from 2002. It was made out of various black and white decayed fragments of orphan 
                                                          
104
 Batchen, p. 17 
105
 Batchen, p. 17 
106
 Taylor, p. 19 
107
 Taylor, p. 19 
108
 Andre Habib, ’Thinking in the Ruins: Around the Films of Bill Morrison’, Off Screen, 
<http://www.horschamp.qc.ca/new_offscreen/cinematic_ruins.html> (Accessed on 25 august 2011). 
254 
 
nitrate film which were found in old archives (called orphan film because they have 
been abandoned by their owners or copyright holders, thus not really belonging to 
anyone).  
Decasia was made to accompany Michael Gordon’s symphony of the same 
name. The film is made up of material from mainly the early days of cinema to the 
1920s when the standard 35mm film was composed of a strip of nitrate cellulose, a 
layer of gelatine, and an emulsion of silver salts. The film is not narrative based but 
made up instead of recurring scenes like those of whirling dervishes. The main 
effect of the film however is its decay.  Nitrate film is highly flammable and 
deteriorates fast if not stored in correct temperatures and what we see in the 70-
minute Decasia is its perishing, decomposing, vanishing. The result is a spectre that 
seems on all accounts to eat itself. The whirling dervish and the merry-go-round that 
we see in the film are apt examples of a film that goes round and round, echoing 
Mary Ann Doane’s proposition that ‘film makes visible not a knowledge of the 
original but a certain passing temporal configuration’.109 Doane says of the medium 
of film, ‘Once the present as contingency has been seized and stored, it ineluctably 
becomes the past. Yet this archival artefact becomes strangely immaterial; existing 
nowhere but in its screening for a spectator in the present, it becomes the experience 
of presence’.110 
The binary condition that film can be archived but that a film is also an 
archive (as discussed above with regard to the work of Alastair MacLennan) is an 
idea evident in Decasia. Halted in its decaying process, the film (material) comes to 
exceed the boundaries of its medium as already non-live, past, dead. It spills, leaks 
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and weaves its way through. Or following Schneider, it not only goes back and forth 
but sideways. Decasia’s decay is also a ruin of sorts. Josh Pollard argues: 
‘Breakage, decay and attrition have the potential to create entirely new kinds of 
substance, and often novel and unimagined points of connection between different 
materials and ontological states’.111 Thinking memory and documentation through 
ruins, then, allows us to shift emphasis on processes of transformation and what 
Pollard calls ‘unimagined points of connection between different materials’. It is 
also important here how, as Trigg argues, ‘ruins evade a static, and thus nostalgic, 
image of the past by rendering memory ambiguous’.112 Therefore, to trouble the 
assumed boundaries between live performance and re-enactment, and live 
performance and the mediums of film and photography is to question the role of the 
still or the dead, or disappearance.  
In these examples I have discussed here re-enactment is not any more re- 
than it is pre-enactment or post-enactment, it is perhaps just enactment. And if 
photography is about being still in order to be live instead of being live in order to 
be still then does the still really make performance or us disappear? And if 
photography is also about the dead, the people in daguerreotype cases whether they 
are open or shut, then, again, what is re-enactment? And if decay is a process of 
transformation then archive becomes something else all together and in that archive 
the dervishes keep whirling, Martha keeps falling after Bausch and Bob and Lee 
struggle to be freed from their chairs while talcum powder falls and falls and falls.  
To round up this discussion of archives, documentation and labour both 
living and refusing to die (or go away), I would like to briefly consider the 
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economical implications of archiving and of taking care of the non-disappearing. In 
particular, I am thinking here about the possibility of archiving the living. This 
might sound very much like something Schneider and Taylor refer to in their writing 
on repertoire and the bodily transmissions of remains. However, the thought I am 
pursuing here is somewhat different. At a recent Performing Documents conference 
in Bristol,
113
 Lisa Newman proposed that we begin to think about the body of work 
of artists as needing documenting at the moment it is made and about the artist as an 
archive. Newman’s provocation arose out of a conversation about the economic 
implications and costs of archiving. What does it cost to document performance and 
what if we began to invest in the upkeep of the artist as archive? Considering the 
living and the not-yet-happened labour of the artist as an archive in process also 
places the focus on the categorisation of different archives. How do we invest in 
archivable work and in fact, what qualifies as archivable?  
It is clear that Schneider is invested in the re- of re-enactment (or reappear). 
In an aside (a step aside, a syncopated aside), I would like to note that the reversal of 
that re- becomes an er–, the sound of a hesitation, something uttered when nothing 
else is forthcoming. A pause to think, to gather thought. There is something of that 
hesitation, I would suggest, in performance’s temporal drag but also in the archive 
where things can stop for a while, to gather thought, to be inbetween. 
 
  
                                                          
113
 Performing Documents, organised by University of Bristol, held at Arnolfini, Bristol, 12
th
 – 14th 
April 2013. 
257 
 
Conclusion 
 
In this thesis I have examined two central research questions. Firstly, what is the 
relationship between capitalist production and its methods from the 1960s onwards 
and the material conditions of performance’s temporality during that time? 
Secondly, I have asked whether a focus on the materiality of performance can 
change the way we view the relationship between performance and time.  In the 
course of answering these questions I have charted the importance of flexible 
accumulation and just-in-time production to capitalism and the labour markets and 
have argued that the rise of such systems in the 1960s were reflected in concerns for 
and a certain type of anxiety over what was happening to time. This chronophobia 
morphs into a different kind of interest in time with the approach of the millennium 
in the late 1990s. Just-in-time production speeds up life in the 24 Hour Society and I 
have examined how the character of this society affects and is reflected in the 
material conditions of making and viewing performance. I have argued that reading 
performance and its relationship to time and duration in conjunction with the 
changes in capitalist production during this time reveals some important aspects 
about performance’s duration and its material conditions. In so doing, I have traced 
performance studies’ history and attempted to address the claims that have been 
made about the central place of temporality in the discipline.  
On and on 
I would like to briefly discuss two sound works here which will help to bring 
together the ideas examined in this study and draw some conclusions. These works 
are two attempts at (seemingly) achieving endlessness and I focus on them to 
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emphasise the tendency in much of the performance work discussed in this thesis to, 
on the one hand, calculate time and, on the other, to document time through lived 
experience. These two works are Jem Finer’s Longplayer and John Cage’s 
Organ2/ASLSP, 1000 years and 638 years long respectively. Both of these works 
began at or near the millennium, although for different reasons. 
 Longplayer was conceived to mark time’s passage at the cusp of our most 
recent celebration of time, the millennium. It started to play simultaneously in 
London and in Sydney, Australia on 31 December 1999. Longplayer is a 
composition for six musicians playing Tibetan singing bowls by hand and designed 
to play for a thousand years without repetition. To achieve this, the composition is 
made up of six short pieces of music. One section from each piece is playing 
simultaneously at all times chosen by Longplayer in such a way that ‘no 
combination is repeated until exactly one thousand years has passed’.1 Longplayer is 
constructed like a Steve Reich composition where sections of different lengths are 
combined so a cycle of a piece of music is constantly shifting. The Longplayer 
website states: 
Every two minutes a starting point in each of the six pieces is calculated, 
from which they then play for the next two minutes. Each starting point is 
calculated by adding a specific length of time to its previous starting point. 
For each of the six pieces of music this length of time is unique and 
unvarying. The relationships between these six precisely calculated 
increments are what gives Longplayer its exact one thousand year long 
duration.
2
 
 
Theoretically speaking then, Longplayer is possibly endless, carrying on for an 
eternity, coming back to its starting point every 1000 years. The main concern when 
making Longplayer seems to have been its survival and the enormity of the task of 
                                                          
1
 Longplayer website, <http://longplayer.org/what/how/> (Accessed 15 January 2013). 
2
 Longplayer website 
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maintaining Longplayer is already clear. Currently played by computers but 
adaptable to (foreseeable) technological changes, how best to ensure the continual 
survival of Longplayer beyond any one human being’s life?  
 A major part of the project has been the development of strategies for 
keeping the music going. Although at the moment Longplayer can be streamed live 
on the internet, the problem remains that the internet is a medium which, as the 
makers admit, ‘depends on a vast, complex, and somewhat unstable technological 
network for its broadcast and a high technological ‘overhead’ for its reception’.3 The 
website lists radio, mechanical devices and technology used in deep space missions 
as possibilities for future media for the project. Longplayer, then, does not so much 
display a suspicion towards technology or about what technology is doing to time as 
the work discussed in Chapter 1 as it does examine the effects time has on 
technology. If technology was becoming all pervasive for Marcuse in 1964 at the 
turn of the millennium time is taking a hold of technology.  
Wertheim and Wertheim suggest that ‘Longplayer aims to beat the clock at 
its own game, using micro-time to build macro-time in a brave attempt to 
reconstitute a meaningful dimension in our temporal experience’.4 It seems that the 
work shares some of the concerns I have been examining in this thesis not only 
around what is happening to time in the latter part of the 20
th
 and the beginning of 
the 21
st
 century, but how to halt or affect time’s effects. Wertheim and Wertheim’s 
proposition that Longplayer is engaged in a game to beat the clock at the clock’s 
own game suggests firstly that the clock (or more precisely perhaps, time) is playing 
a game at all and secondly that it cannot only be beaten but needs to be beaten. But 
                                                          
3
 Longplayer website 
4
 Wertheim and Wertheim, p. 6 
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what exactly is that game? It seems to me that this game is to march on incessantly 
and the way to beat the clock is to take hold of time, to control it, to build a 
relationship with time that somehow makes sense of the world. In the case of 
Longplayer, that is to attune to a rhythm that beats differently from the 24 Hour 
Society. It is to imagine a time a thousand years away and to negotiate the gap 
between then and now. In that way, Longplayer reflects an interest in time rather 
than an anxiety about it, especially on the cusp of the millennium, as we attempt to 
grasp the duration of a millennium and yet are reminded of the precarity of the 
future (the millennium was after all received amidst fears of the millennium bug and 
the computer chaos it could possibly cause). But rather than give into chronophobia, 
Longplayer settles into the long wait with a distinct understanding of technology’s 
unpredictability. 
Longplayer makes no claims for endurance. In fact, listening to it is a very 
pleasant experience. The Tibetan singing bowls produce a vibrating bell sound, like 
an invitation to prayer or meditation. The constant variation of notes keeps 
Longplayer going forward while at the same time lingering at every point. 
Organ2/ASLSP’s invitation to think time and its passing is somewhat different as it 
is actually more difficult to grasp this composition in its entirety. In a small town of 
Halberstadt in Germany John Cage’s composition ASLSP, which was written in 
1985, is being played by a purpose-built organ. Organ2/ASLSP, which is to be 
played as slow as possible, will play until 2639. The performance started in 2001 
and its duration was determined by the years lapsed since the invention of the first 
organ in 1361 in Halberstadt. The organ changes notes once or twice a year. The 
changing of the notes of the organ in Halberstadt requires a person to do it and an 
audience gathers to witness this momentous occasion. Although both compositions 
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take their time they do not seem to invite or make claims for wasting time. They do, 
however, remind us that endlessness and infinity can be produced by something 
simply being longer than a human life. As one of the organisers in Halberstadt, 
Michael Betzle, has said: ‘I have to accept the distinct possibility that I shall die 
before the concert is over’.5  
Since ASLSP begins with a silence the first year and a half were silent. The 
first note was played in 2003. For Cage, silence is as important as sound and a 
central element of music. Cage argues: 
If you consider that sound is characterized by its pitch, its loudness, its 
timbre, and its duration, and that silence, which is the opposite and, 
therefore, the necessary partner of sound, is characterized only by its 
duration, you will be drawn to the conclusion that of the four characteristics 
of the material of music, duration, that is, time length, is the most 
fundamental. Silence cannot be heard in terms of pitch or harmony: It is 
heard in terms of time length.
6
 
 
As discussed in Chapter 4, we see this same way of marking time through silence in 
Goat Island’s work, for example, when September Roses begins with a 55 second 
silence. Organ2/ASLSP’s silence, however, is a slightly different proposition from 
the indeterminate sense of waiting in September Roses. Both Longplayer and 
Organ2/ASLSP are aiming for durations that are ungraspable in terms of a human 
life. Their demand for time is not an interruption in our busy daily life but a 
commitment spanning generations. Organ2/ASLSP is intended to play as slow as 
possible and the performance in Halberstadt is by no means the longest the 
composition could be. But even its 639 years (and particularly its first, silent, year 
and a half) marks time in a way that is difficult to see.  
                                                          
5
 Michael Betzle, cited in Karen Christopher, ‘Silence is a Memorial’, in Small Acts of Repair: 
Performance, Ecology and Goat Island, ed. by Stephen Bottoms and Matthew Goulish (London: 
Routledge, 2007), pp. 106-108 (p. 108). 
6
 John Cage, in John Cage, ed. by Richard Kostelanetz (London: Allen Lane, 1971), p. 81. 
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Furthermore, despite being played by machines, both Longplayer and 
Organ2/ASLSP require human labour power in order to continue to play.  
Longplayer can be listened to via a live stream on the Internet as well as at several 
listening posts over the world. In London, for example, its listening post is in the 
Lighthouse at Trinity Buoy Wharf. However, although the composition plays 
constantly the listening post is only open during the weekends. Here too, then, we 
must consider the material implications of the human labour and the space required 
to keep these works going.  
For example, in Chapter 4 I referred to the employment of time in Goat 
Island’s practice and in their working process. The company took two or even three 
years to make a performance during which time they did several work-in-progress 
showings. This long period of time taken to make work and the attention to duration 
manifested in the performances are part of the same project: the belief in the 
importance of taking time. However, what is more important about the company’s 
working process is that they take a long period of time to make a performance 
because of financial implications. The company funded their work through art 
funding and residencies and all company members needed to make a living amidst 
the rehearsal process. This issue of making a living while working as an artist (or, 
making a living as a working artist) was taken up in Chapter 3 where I discussed 
short performance work and the implications short duration bears on the economy of 
theatre. Wilson’s work is equally relevant in that discussion. Marranca’s concern 
over the tight relation between Wilson’s work as art and the art market that supports 
it is a revealing one when considering the, somewhat astronomical, costs of staging 
a work like Einstein on the Beach. In this study I have attempted to unpick the 
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perceived (and sometimes misconstrued) relationship between performance and the 
economic market it functions in.  
I started that investigation in Chapter 1 where I discussed how performance, 
as it emerged within visual art circles towards the late 1960s, was seen as 
impermanent, immaterial or disposable. And it was its impermanence which was, in 
a way, performance’s response to the demands of the throw-away society. Kinetic 
art and happenings were seen as non-commercial and ephemeral. One could not own 
them or purchase them, only support them. Such logic has prevailed in the thinking 
around performance and this is clear from Marranca’s argument on Wilson’s 
approach to funding his work. In Chapter 3 that examination led me to ask, what 
does performance sell? Lobel’s Carpe Minuta Prima investigates this question and 
probes at the assumptions about the divides between a performer’s and spectator’s 
labour. The financial transaction of recorded minutes of spectators’ time that Carpe 
Minuta Prima deals in also problematises, in some very productive ways, 
performance’s ontology of emptiness that Peggy Phelan advocates. Making visible 
both the time and the labour of performance, Lobel’s project questions assumptions 
around performance’s temporality. 
In the same chapter I also asked what one gets from being there, at a 
performance, when work like Creed’s Work no. 850 and its sprinters in the Tate 
only seem to present a fragment of what is really going on. I compared it to circuit-
based sport where the spectator only experiences a moment out of a longer event. 
Here I would like to point out a further importance of Creed’s Work no. 850 and 
suggest that sprinting is in fact the perfect paradigm to capitalism. Both sprinting 
and capitalism depend on the ability to produce something very fast. The work of 
sprinting is measured in the act (the current world record for men’s 100 metre sprint 
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is 9.58 seconds) but as in capitalist production what we do not think about and what 
that measurement of 9.58 seconds does not account for is the labour time it takes to 
train or produce the athlete’s sprinting body that is able to run that fast. 
In the introduction I noted how much early research on time and 
performance has made a connection with media and technology, emphasising real-
time systems in technology and their relationship with the accelerated time in the 
20
th
 century or time-based media and the possibilities of merging body time and 
computer time. This connection between time and technology was examined in 
Chapter 1 where I discussed Toffler and MacLuhan’s ideas around the throw-away 
society and the domination of technology. What Toffler and MacLuhan do not see 
or admit to seeing is that the technology they discuss was not invented separately 
from the society and its perceived needs. It was invented to facilitate capitalist 
production, it is a tool that the capitalist society needs in order to function like late 
capitalism needs to function.  
I have also considered in what terms time is being discussed and considered. 
I pointed out Lehmann’s misunderstanding of the character of time in his statement 
that time can be shared like a cake. I suggest that it is in fact Barnet Newman who 
articulates an accurate notion of time when he writes: ‘Only time can be felt in 
private. Space is a common property. Only time is personal, a private experience. ... 
Each person must feel it for himself’.7 As I discussed, since time is only a measure 
of movement, time itself cannot be divided as if it was an object. Thus, when we 
speak about sharing time, whether it is in a four-hour durational performance or a 
one to one encounter, we are, to be accurate, sharing space. 
                                                          
7
 Newman, p. 175 
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Finally, I have traced how just-in-time production develops and grows from 
the 1960s onwards and how subsequently around 2005 the issues that rise from 
flexible accumulation’s demands begin to be theorised and discussed in terms of 
precarity and the precarious life in late capitalism. Around this time, then, leftist  
cultural studies grow weary of the far left’s ideas around  innovation, among other 
things, and an emphasis on taking time and paying attention to the stoniness of a 
stone, for example (as Ingold’s article instructs us), starts to be articulated. While a 
lot of the contemporary work that I have looked at has some direct debt to the work 
I discussed in Chapter 1, especially to Nauman, it is worth pointing out that it is 
MacLennan who has been making the same work since the 1960s and yet he has 
none of the anxiety of chronophobia. MacLennan is perhaps the most attuned to 
how performance studies and new materialism is now thinking about temporality.  
In focusing on the wider material conditions of performance with an 
emphasis on the diverse ways in which time comes to constitute our experience of it, 
I have in effect argued for taking time seriously, or at least, to not take it for granted. 
It is hoped that this study has begun to develop a new approach to understanding 
performance as situated at the centre of a network of time, temporality and materials 
and that it has suggested paths for further research into the central position of 
performance in a commodity culture.  
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